01 China’s New Security Concept and the SCO’s Security Practice in the Past 20 Years,by Xu Tao,Guest Professor at School of International Relations,Shanxi University; and Standing Director of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Research Center of China.At the end of the 20th century,in the face of drastic geopolitical changes taking place at both regional and global levels,China initially formed a new security concept or security model different from that during the Cold War in its diplomatic practice to ensure a stable surrounding environment,when the great powers were competing for hegemony.In the early 21st century,the “Shanghai Five” meeting mechanism intended to address military security problems in the border areas between China and its former Soviet neighbors was formally upgraded to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.Ever since then,this multilateral regional cooperation mechanism has become an important platform for China to practice its new security concept.In the 20-year development of the SCO,the new security concept has not only been constantly improved and refined in the course of regional security activities,but also incorporated into the “Shanghai Spirit”,which is highly recognized by all SCO member states.Faced with the great changes unseen in a century,the SCO will shoulder a new historic mission and the new security concept will continue to play an important and constructive role in the new practice of forging a regional security community.

14 The Biden Administration and the Trend of US Strategic Competition with China,by Zhao Minghao,Senior Fellow at the Center for American Studies,Fudan University; and Guest Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies,Tsinghua University.The Biden administration has identified China as the “toughest competitor” facing the United States,stressed that competition is the essence of China-US relations,and advocated the use of competition,confrontation and cooperation as policy tools to handle relations with China from the socalled “position of strength”.In contrast to the Trump administration,the Biden administration focuses on “positive competition” with China to make its layout centering on “l(fā)ong-term and strategic competition” as well as “extreme competition” with China to gain an upper hand by enhancing its own competitiveness as the basis,building a complex international camp as the support,increasing deterrence on China in the Indo-Pacific as the focus,and provoking ideological confrontation as the leverage.In areas such as combating climate change,the Biden administration has also shown a sense of competition with China.The consensus between the two parties in the United States on strengthening strategic competition with China has become more prominent,as seen in their efforts to cooperate with the Biden administration by promoting the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 and the Endless Frontier Act among others.As the Biden administration has comprehensively deepened strategic competition with China,maintaining a stable China-US relationship and achieving sound interactions between the two countries are facing new and complex tests.

37 Returning to the Paris Agreement: New Changes in Climate Politics of the Biden Administration,by Zhao Bin,Professor and Executive Director at the Center for International Studies,School of Marxism Studies,Xi’an Jiaotong University; and Xie Shumin,Doctoral Student at the Center for International Studies,School of Marxism Studies,Xi’an Jiaotong University.Since Biden took office,a major adjustment has been made to the climate policy of the United States,the most prominent manifestation of which is that the US has returned to the Paris Agreement,made climate change a priority of national strategy,and planned to reinstate a series of environmental laws and regulations enacted by the Obama administration.Such a change is conducive to the realization of the United States’Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) and also to the development of its low carbon economy.To track the process of the major international event of the United States’ return to the Paris Agreement,it is necessary to review the decline of climate politics caused by the Trump administration,analyze the motivation of the Biden administration’s return to the Paris Agreement and the new changes of climate politics,and look into the prospect of the competition and cooperation in climate politics between China and the US in the new era.

59 Progress and Limitations of Climate Cooperation between the EU and Russia,by Fang Lexian,Professor at the Center for European Studies,Renmin University of China and Guest Researcher of the CPDS; and Wang Yujing,Doctoral Student at the Center for European Studies and the School of International Relations,Renmin University of China.In global climate governance,the EU has been trying to play a key leading role,while Russia has not been active enough,and its position and status have even been ignored.In fact,climate action is a key part of the EU’s“selective engagement” with Russia,and climate cooperation between the EU and Russia has a history of many years and a multi-level mechanism,which has made certain headways.Climate cooperation between the EU and Russia is of special significance due to their interrelated ecosystems and close economic ties,which is also closely related to the energy relationship between the two sides.The actual needs of the EU and Russia have promoted the process of their bilateral climate cooperation,and there is a potential to deepen such cooperation.However,the development of EU-Russia climate cooperation has been restrained by apparent differences in their willingness to cooperate,varied positions within the EU,the fluctuation of EU-Russia political relations,and the influence of the thirdparty factor.

79 The Causes for the Deep Impasse in the DPRK-ROK Relationship and Its Prospect,by Li Jun,Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies and Director of the Institute of Worldwide Ideology,Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C (National School of Governance).Relations between North and South Koreas improved dramatically in 2018 as a result of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics,when the supreme leaders of the two countries reached a consensus to comprehensively improve and develop bilateral relations.However,since 2019,relationship between the two countries has taken a significant step backwards and is still mired in stalemate with no sign of improvement.From the whole evolution of the bilateral relationship,we may find that its development has been severely constrained by the US factor,the nuclear issue,the inter-Korean interactions,and the COVID-19 pandemics.Nonetheless,due to the rationality and efforts of both sides,the inter-Korean relationship has not gone out of control and broken down.With the Biden administration coming to power and the Moon Jae-in administration entering its final phase,the prospects for the development of inter-Korean relations have become more uncertain in the face of multiple difficulties and challenges.Despite all these,as long as the two sides respect and understand each other,seize the strategic opportunity,and overcome the difficulties,it is entirely possible for them to jointly open up a new situation of cooperation and reconciliation in the future.

93 Geopolitical Competition,Evolution of Strategic Preferences and Myanmar’s Policy toward China,by Peng Nian,Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director at the Institute of Maritime Silk Road Studies,National Institute for South China Sea Studies.During the Than Shwe administration,as the geopolitical competition between China and the US was rather weak in Southeast Asia,Myanmar gave top priority to preventing security threats,and stressed opposition to external interference,thus adopting a strategy of cooperation with China in order to counterbalance American threats.During the Thein Sein administration,as China and the US stepped up their geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia,both the risk for Myanmar to get involved in major power competition and the opportunity for it to gain benefit from major power competition grew.As a result,Myanmar gave priority to economic interests,hence forming a conciliatory strategic preference.Based on such a strategic preference,Myanmar not only obtained benefits through cooperation with China,but also reduced its dependence on China through improving its relations with the United States.During the NLD administration,due to the increasing pressure from the United States and the growing opportunities for cooperation with China,the Myanmar leaders began to strengthen cooperation with China to offset American threats,while conducting diversified diplomacy to balance China’s influence.After the military took power again,the US pressure on Myanmar is rising sharply.As a result,the Myanmar leaders with reconciliatory strategic preference will move closer to China to resist US pressure.

115 Challenges Facing China-ASEAN Joint Building of the “Maritime Silk Road” and China’s Response in the Context of America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,by Luo Shengrong,Senior Research Fellow at Institute of International Relations,Yunnan University; and Zhao Qi,Doctoral Student at Institute of International Relations,Yunnan University.From the Trump administration to the Biden administration,the US strategic game against China has entered a new era,and the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy with the four-nation security dialog mechanism as its core has become solidified and normal to some extent: on the security level,the US is racing to build an “Asian version of NATO”; on the economic level,the US is accelerating the piecing together of a global economic and trade system that excludes China; and on the diplomatic level,the US attempts to build an “alliance of democracies” to jointly counterbalance China.This strategy of the United States has exerted certain impact on the efforts of China and ASEAN to jointly build the “Maritime Silk Road”.In such a context,China should step up its diplomacy with its neighbors,accelerate the implementation of the RCEP,look for new economic growth points,and make the building of the “Maritime Silk Road” more multilateral.