●SYMPOSIUM：Housing Policy

Can the Target Responsibility System Improve Government Responsiveness？

——An Analysis Based on Affordable Housing Policy

………………………………………………Xiaomeng Wang，Zhilin Liu ＆ Luyao Ma

Motivation：Many studies have revealed the positive impacts of the target responsibility system by which a local government's political incentives are ensured when implementing national policies.Yet，few studies have empirically investigated whether and the extent to which a top-down political mandate，adopted through social welfare policy and reinforced through the political accountability system，also increases the responsiveness of local governments to local citizens' needs.

Methodology：Using data derived from a national online platform，“People's Network Local Leadership Message Board”，and from a city government's annual work reports，this study explores the impact of the top-down political pressure on affordable housing construction under the target responsibility system on the local government's responsiveness to the housing difficulties of local citizens.

Findings：Multi-level statistical analysis shows that local government responsiveness to citizens' housing needs is not significantly higher in cities with higher construction targets and thus under greater political pressure.Instead，local government responsiveness is lower in cities with higher housing prices and greater housing demands.

Contribution：These findings shed light on the limited role of the target responsibility system in improving local government responsiveness to local citizens' demands while increasing the top-down political pressure.This has policy implications for future improvements in both affordable housing policy and the target responsibility system.

Key WordsPolicy Implementation；Government Responsiveness；Target Responsibility System；Affordable Housing

Who Benefits from the Adjustment of Housing Provident Fund Contribution Rates：An Analysis based on the Social Construction Theory

…………………………………………………………………Lei Guo ＆ Xiaomeng Hu

Motivation：The policy of the Standardization and Phased Reduction of the Housing Provident Fund Contribution Rates caps enterprise contribution rates at 12%.Local governments were required to reduce contribution rates.This paper explores the responses across enterprises and the allocation of benefits among stakeholders.

Methodology：Using Social Construction Theory，this paper hypothesizes that the policydoes not work for enterprises with a contribution rate above 12%.However，it does work for enterprises with a contribution rate approaching the bottom limit.By analyzing sample data from A-share listed companies for the period 2015 to 2017，this paper evaluates the policy impact using the PSM-DID method.

Findings：The responses vary among the stakeholders.（1）The hidden beneficiaries：Enterprises with a contribution rate greater than 12% before the policy continued to make illegal overpayments.Those enterprises with a contribution rate below the bottom limit either become legal or violated the new regulations to reduce their contributions.Both types received hidden benefits as Contenders through the predictable implementation of deviation.（2）The real beneficiaries：Enterprises with a contribution rate between the bottom limit and 12% before the policy remained unchanged or decreased their contributions.They benefited as the Advantaged and avoided negative construction because of policy ambiguity.（3）The losers：Only by giving up enterprise matching contributions could employees increase their cash income.They received less benefits as the Dependents because of hidden costs.

Contribution：This policy not only directly evaluates the policy impacts，but also identifies three policy design strategies to ensure the benefits allocation model：policy ambiguity to avoid the negative construction of the Advantaged，predictable policy implementation deviation （insufficient or excessive implementation）to benefit the Contenders，and hidden costs to reduce the net benefits of the Dependents.

Key WordsTarget Population；Policy Design；Social Construction；Benefits Allocation

Policy Diffusion Block：Why It Appears and How to Eliminate It

——Observations of China's Housing Rental Policy from 2016 to 2019

…………………………………………………………………………Bin Wu ＆ Xin Qi

Motivation：Is the diffusion process of top-down policy always smooth？What is the performance of the housing rental policy diffusion block in China？How did it happen？How to eliminate it？Can the pilot policy eliminate the policy diffusion block？

Methodology：Based on a content analysis of the provincial and municipal policy texts related to China's housing rental policy from 2016 to 2020，and selected urban housing rental policy implementation cases，this paper explores the policy diffusion process and logic between the provincial（autonomous region／municipality directly under the central government）and municipal governments.In doing so，it identifies the performance and causes of，as well as the resolution strategies for，a policy diffusion block.

Findings：（1）The social attributes of policies naturally lead to the perception of negative incentives by local governments.This in turn leads to a low willingness to adoptpolicies and hindered policy proliferation.（2）Policy pilots convey revenue signals through empowerment， learning， and demonstration.The triple mechanism of competition has played a powerful role in exogenous incentives，reconstructing the positive incentive perception of local governments.This makes up for or even offsets the negative incentive perceptions due to policy attributes，forming a crisscross pattern of policy diffusion and elimination of the policy block.

Contribution：Based on the logic of government behavior and the perspective of the relationship between central and local governments，the paper identifies the policy block in the process of top-down policy diffusion.The paper explores the causal relationship between policy attributes and policy diffusion.It also explores the triple mechanism of a policy pilot to resolve the policy block.We are committed to integrating policy diffusion and policy pilot theory.

Key WordsPolicy Diffusion Block；Policy Attribute；Incentive Perception；Policy Pilot；Housing Lease Policy

●ARTICLES

Aligning the Design of Public-Sector Compensation Systems with Lessons from Public Service Motivation Research

……………………………………………………………………………James L.Perry

Resource Competition versus Yardstick Competition？

——Strategic Interaction in Chinese Urban Infrastructure Investment

………………………………………………………………………Lei Liu ＆ Can Chen

Motivation：The subject of strategic interaction among governments has been the focus of substantial research interest by public finance scholars.Do Chinese city governments behave strategically in making infrastructure spending decisions？

Methodology：Based on spatial panel data consisting of 277 prefecture-level cities from the years 2001 to 2012，this research represents one of the first attempts to empirically examine strategic interactions in urban infrastructure expenditures on capital construction and maintenance in China using spatial panel econometrics.

Findings：This study confirms that city infrastructure expenditures are significantly and positively affected by the action of neighboring cities.In addition，strategic interactions in urban infrastructure finance is stronger both in China's eastern region and in the spending category of infrastructure capital investment.Finally，resource competition and political competition are the main mechanisms underlying strategic interactions in Chinese urban infrastructure finance.

Contribution：This research brings the theories of strategic interaction into the empiricalstudy of urban infrastructure investment in China，and further disentangles the underlying theoretical mechanisms of strategic interaction in Chinese urban infrastructure finance.It makes key theoretical contributions by expanding the literature of strategic interaction.Furthermore，the analysis of the variation of strategic interaction in the different categories of infrastructure investment and across regions enriches and strengthens the practical understanding of the determinants of Chinese urban infrastructure investment.

Key WordsStrategic Interaction；Urban Infrastructure；Capital Construction；Maintenance

Can Mayor Turnover Affect the Audit Force of a City-level Budget？

——An Empirical Study Based on City-level Data

…………………………………………………Baoqing Pang，Ying Zhu ＆ Fang Wang

Motivation：Perfecting audit work is the key step to constructing a modern budget system.As specific executors，the mayor will have an important impact on the audit's force.Will a change in mayor have an effect on the audit's force？If so，what are the differences between different mayors？What is the mechanism？These questions have never been answered through empirical research based on theoretical logic and objective evidence.

Methodology：City-level panel data is from 2006 to 2012，while the mayoral data comes from a self-built database of Chinese officials.Audit data comes from China Audit Yearbook.The two-way fixed effects regression model is applied for analysis.

Findings：（1）Mayoral turnover does have an impact on audit force.Compared with a year without turnover，the audit force in a turnover year will be significantly improved.The influence will change based on differences in the predecessor mayor's destination.（2）The new mayor reinforces the audit in order to better implement new policies.（3）In regions with better institution systems，the influence of mayoral turnover of mayor is smaller；however，in regions with worse institution systems，the influence of mayoral turnover is greater.

Contribution：（1）This paper expands the analytical scope of official behavior theory.（2）It also further reveals that the budget audit is not merely a technical problem，it will be affected by political factors.

Key WordsOfficial Turnover；Audit Force；Audit System；Off-office Auditing

Policy Promotion or Policy Friction？

——Research on Policy Interaction between Medical Insurance Immediate Settlement，and Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment

……………………………………………Yuying Zhong，Kairan Wang ＆ Ting Liang

Motivation：Many public health policies interact with each other.Studying theseinteractions helps theorizing about public policy interactions and promotes the design of follow-up health reform policy.In recent years，the Immediate Settlement Policy and Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment policies have gone hand in hand.Is there a promotion or a friction effect between them？

Methodology：This paper presents an analysis of the medical insurance settlement data of Urban and Rural Residents in B district of A city in Guangdong.The effective sample is 230，000 settlement.Tests include chi-square test and variance analysis on the inpatient visits and expenses of insured patients to distant tertiary hospitals.The PSMDID model analyzes the impact of Immediate Settlement Policy on the implementation effect of Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment.

Findings：“Policy friction” exists between the Immediate Settlement Policy and Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment.The implementation of the policy of settlement of long-distance network to some extent pushes up the number of visits to target tertiary hospitals outside a patient's home city and increases the total hospitalization expenditures and the payments of patients.However，the Immediate Settlement Policy has no significant impact on the payment burden of Urban and Rural Residents' Medical Insurance Funds，and has a policy-promoting effect on improving the health equity of offsite medical patients in general.

Contribution：From the perspective of public policy interaction theory，this paper analyzes the interaction between two policies in the field of health care using PSM-DID and other methods.This makes up for the lack of interaction analysis between policies based on the quantitative analysis of medical insurance settlement data.This paper also provides empirical evidence and suggestions from the field of health policy for the improvement of public policy interaction theory.It offers an empirical basis for the respective renovation of Immediate Settlement Policies，Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment，and reciprocal policy promotion.

Key WordsOut-of-town Medical Treatment Behavior；Immediate Settlement Policy；Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment；Policy Promotion；Policy Friction

From Policy Making to Implementation：An analysis of the Time Gap

……………………………………………………………………………………Jia Cao

Motivation：Time in public policy can be a background，a research tool，or even a variable influencing policy results.There's a time gap between policy making and implementation，whose length reflects the rational thoughts and judgements of policy makers.What factors drive the policy makers to set different time gaps？

Methodology：This article develops an analytical framework and uses Guangzhou'sAutomobile Sales Quota Policy and the National Birth Control Deregulation Policy（2013）as comparative cases to analyze the main factors and their influence directions.

Findings：Time is both an input and output of the public policy process and is characterized by its endogeneity to the latter.Time strategy has universal relevance and importance to public policy.Decisionmakers may strategically set time gaps based on constraining factors like policy types，policy entities，policy target groups，and policy environments in order to maximize policy effects.

Contribution：This study deepens and expands the discussions about time in public policy.It is the first exploration of the time gap between policy making and implementation，treats it as a result，and reveals its rationale and influencing factors.It also enriches and develops policy process theories.

Key WordsTime；Time Gap；Time Strategy；Policy Making；Policy Implementation

How Does Horizontal Onsite Learning Affect Policy Diffusion？

——A Case Study of County-Level Converged Media Center Policy

……………………………………………………………………Zhi Yang ＆ Shu Wei

Motivation：Horizontal onsite learning helps realize knowledge transfer and policy diffusion among different jurisdictions.However，the existing literature has paid limited attention to the process characteristics and mechanisms of horizontal intergovernmental learning.Therefore，what influence does horizontal onsite learning have on the evolution of policy diffusion？And，what mechanism is used to achieve its impact？

Methodology：The paper uses the County-level Converged Media Center（CCMC）policy as a case.Based on the government's official website information and news reports，we extracted data on horizontal onsite learning activities and the construction progress so as to track and analyze its policy diffusion process and affiliated onsite learning activities.

Findings：（1）Onsite learning，as an information exchange channel，realizes knowledge transfer between innovation sources and potential adopters；it also affects the policy perception efficiency and policy execution performance of learners.（2）With respect to its mechanisms，knowledge conversion enables the effective acquisition of external policy knowledge（especially tacit knowledge）；and，distance adjustment accelerates the process of policy knowledge transfer in an auxiliary role.（3）The external knowledge sources of CCMC policy are distributed as a one-core and multi-point structure；this meets the heterogeneous knowledge needs of learners and increases the channel and node density of its policy diffusion network.Eventually，the two major mechanisms jointly will form the non-incremental outbreak of CMCC policy.

Contribution：By bridging these two corresponding processes，this paper constructs the theoretical framework for how horizontal onsite learning affects policy diffusion.More importantly，it reveals how the knowledge conversion mechanism and the distance adjustment mechanism through which onsite learning facilitates the policy diffusion process.

Key WordsPolicy Diffusion；Onsite Learning；Horizontal Intergovernmental Relationship；Knowledge Transfer；Policy Outbreaks

Can the Policy Responsiveness of Local Governments Increase the Settlement Intention of Rural Migrants in Cities？

……………………………………………………………………Jidong Chen ＆ Hui Xu

Motivation：The settlement of rural migrant workers plays an important role in shaping the quality of urban development in China.Improving their intentions to settle is a necessary step of actual settlement.In this paper，we analyze and explain whether the policy responsiveness of local governments shapes migrant workers' settlement intentions.

Methodology：Based on nation-wide data generated from an online field experiment，we constructed measurements of local governments' responsiveness to disadvantages.We merged this with“National Dynamic Monitoring Data of Migration Population 2014”.With this working sample，we used Probit regressions to study the impact of local governments' policy responsiveness on migrants' settlement intentions.We also investigated how the impact varies depending on income as well as differences in stay duration and educational background.We used“National Dynamic Monitoring Data of Migration Population 2016”to conduct robustness checks.

Findings：We find that the policy responsiveness of a local government not only directly increases the settlement intention of the migrant workers，but also indirectly improves the marginal impact of income on settlement intention.The impact of policy responsiveness is stronger among individuals who have stayed in the cities for longer periods and those who are better educated.We suggest that this is because those individuals are more likely to clearly perceive the local governments' policy responsiveness.Based on the analysis of the data from 2014 and 2016，we show that the positive effect of policy responsiveness remains persistent.

Contributions：We offer empirical evidence for the effect of local government policy responsiveness on migrants' settlement intentions.The research demonstrates the positive socioeconomic impacts of local governments' policy responsiveness from a unique perspective.In addition，the results help shape a better understanding of the political mechanisms of the migration process.

Key WordsPolicy Responsiveness；Local Governments；Rural Migrants；Settlement Intention