蒂姆·馬迪根

Tim Madigan on logic， language and mysticism in the life of one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century.蒂姆·馬迪根談20世紀(jì)最有影響的一大哲學(xué)家人生中的邏輯、語言和神秘主義。

One of the foremost philosophers of the Twentieth Century and the scion of one of the wealthiest families in Austria， Ludwig Wittgenstein （1889–1951） went to Cambridge in 1911 specifically to study with Bertrand Russell， the best-known logician of the time. At first a protégé of Russell’s， he later broke with him over the claim that mathematics can be firmly grounded in logic. The two for a time shared an interest in mysticism， but Russell seemed to ignore the underlying mystical nature of Wittgenstein’s first book， and the only one published in Wittgenstein’s lifetime， the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus （1921）， for which Russell wrote an introduction. Russell was not the only one so blinkered. The Vienna Circle movement likewise interpreted Wittgenstein’s work to be saying that all of nature could be reduced to propositions. “A proposition，” Wittgenstein wrote， “is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we think it to be.” The Vienna Circle interpreted this to mean that all metaphysical statements were strictly nonsense， since to them they were non-propositional—and if any claim could not be expressed in terms that were verifiable， then such a claim is meaningless and should be ignored. Followers of this view became known as Logical Positivists， and credited their origin to Wittgenstein’s writings. A. J. Ayer， one of the Circle’s most prominent members， used this verification argument to show that all claims about God were meaningless， and could also thus be ignored. After all， Wittgenstein himself had written： “The limits of my language means the limits of my world.”

Wittgenstein disappeared shortly after publishing the Tractatus. He felt he had solved all the problems of philosophy in this short work， and could move on to other pursuits， such as teaching elementary school， designing buildings， and working as a gardener for a monastery. But he was horrified to learn that his book was being used to justify a materialistic， even atheistic， philosophical movement. His thinking was that just because you could not express a concept did not mean the concept itself was nonsensical： it could simply be ineffable. He therefore left his worldly pursuits to return to philosophy， teaching for a time at Cambridge （becoming a professor in 1939）， and subsequently repudiating much of what he had earlier written.

Russell was to say of Wittgenstein that he resembled Blaise Pascal， who had likewise abandoned mathematics for piety. There was a distinctive mystical air around Wittgenstein， and many of his students treated him like a guru. After his return to Cambrige he spent the remainder of his life pursuing the question of the role which language plays in human affairs and the limitations it places on expressing ideas. These observations were published posthumously as the Philosophical Investigations （1953）. Later， several of his students’ notebooks and other dispersed and miscellaneous writings were published as well. This would have infuriated a man so careful with his views that he agonized over every word.

The question of Wittgenstein’s own religious beliefs， like so much else about him， remains a mystery. His paternal grandfather， the founder of the vast Wittgenstein fortune， was a convert from Judaism to Protestantism. This did not protect the Wittgenstein family in Vienna when the Nazis came to power. Wittgenstein’s brother Paul paid a huge sum of money to the Hitler regime to arrange for the safe escape of his sisters from Austria. Wittgenstein’s mother was Roman Catholic， and he himself was baptized in that faith. He manifested a strong ascetic streak throughout his life， as well as a proneness for depression. Three of his brothers committed suicide， and when Ludwig several times expressed the desire to end his life， his family took this desire seriously. Once， upon seeing Wittgenstein pacing the room in apparent agony， Russell jocularly asked him， “Are you thinking about logic or your sins？” to which Wittgenstein replied “Both.” While Wittgenstein seemed to have no conventional religious views， and was considered to be an atheist by some， he often expressed great sympathy for religious figures， particularly those of a contemplative nature. Although he was always loath to admit any influence upon him from previous philosophers， he did admit a fondness for certain aspects of Saint Augustine’s writings. It is also clear that he was familiar with Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation， and seemed to agree with that atheist’s claim that human beings are metaphysical by nature.

Perhaps what most marked Wittgenstein’s character was his often-professed desire to be perfect. This high—indeed impossible—standard had a major impact upon all who came to know him. His tormented nature， his unceasing search for truth， his inability to suffer fools gladly， and his apparent lack of humor all attest to a modern-day mystic. He died of cancer in 1951. Surprisingly enough， given how unsatisfied he seemed with the mundane world around him， according to his friend Norman Malcolm his last words were： “Tell them I’ve had a wonderful life！”

20世紀(jì)最重要的哲學(xué)家之一、奧地利最富有家族之一的子弟路德維希·維特根斯坦（1889—1951）于1911年來到劍橋?qū)ｉT跟隨當(dāng)時最著名的邏輯學(xué)家羅素學(xué)習(xí)。一開始他是羅素的得意門生，后來因為反駁羅素關(guān)于數(shù)學(xué)可以牢固建立在邏輯基礎(chǔ)之上的主張而與羅素分道揚鑣。這兩人一度對神秘主義很感興趣，但羅素似乎忽視了維特根斯坦第一本書《邏輯哲學(xué)論》（1921）潛在的神秘性質(zhì)，這是維特根斯坦在有生之年出版的唯一一本書，羅素為這本書寫了導(dǎo)言。羅素并不是唯一一個如此被蒙蔽的人。維也納學(xué)派運動同樣把維特根斯坦的著作理解為所有的自然都可以歸結(jié)為命題?！耙粋€命題，”維特根斯坦說，“是實在的一幅圖像。一個命題是我們所認為的一個實在的模型?！本S也納學(xué)派把這一點理解為所有形而上學(xué)的陳述嚴(yán)格來說都是無意義，因為對他們來說，它們都是非命題——以及，如果任何主張不能用可以證實的術(shù)語來表述，那么這樣的主張是沒有意義的，應(yīng)該忽略。這一觀點的追隨者被稱為邏輯實證主義者，并把他們的根源歸功于維特根斯坦的著作。這個學(xué)派最杰出的成員之一，A. J.艾耶爾用這個證實論點來表明所有關(guān)于上帝的主張都是沒有意義的，因此也可以忽視。畢竟，維特根斯坦自己說過：“我的語言界限就是我的世界的界限?！?/p>

維特根斯坦出版《邏輯哲學(xué)論》后不久就消失了。他認為他已經(jīng)在這本簡短的書中解決了所有的哲學(xué)問題，可以繼續(xù)其他的追求，比如在小學(xué)教書、設(shè)計房子，以及在一所修道院做園藝工。但他驚恐地發(fā)現(xiàn)他的書被用來為一場唯物論、甚至無神論的哲學(xué)運動作辯護。他的看法是，僅僅因為你不能表達一個概念，并不就意味著概念本身是無意義的：它可能僅僅是難以表達出來。因此他放棄了世俗追求而回歸哲學(xué)，在劍橋教過一段時間書（1939年被聘為教授），后來否認他之前寫過的許多東西。

羅素在談到維特根斯坦時說，他很像布萊士·帕斯卡爾（1623—1662，法國數(shù)學(xué)家、物理學(xué)家和哲學(xué)家，譯者注），帕斯卡爾也為了虔誠的信仰而放棄了數(shù)學(xué)。維特根斯坦渾身散發(fā)著一絲神秘，被眾多門徒視若權(quán)威。他回到劍橋后終其余生都在研究語言在人類事務(wù)中的作用，及其在表達思想中的限制。這些觀察結(jié)果在他辭世后作為《哲學(xué)研究》（1953）出版。后來他學(xué)生的一些筆記和其他散碎的文章也出版了。這原本會讓一個對自己的觀點如此謹(jǐn)慎以致為每一個字傷腦筋的人感到憤怒。

維特根斯坦本身的宗教信仰問題，就像其他很多關(guān)于他的事情一樣，仍然是個謎。他的祖父，維特根斯坦家族巨大財富的創(chuàng)始人從猶太教皈依到新教。但納粹占領(lǐng)維也納時，這并沒有使維特根斯坦家族得到保護。維特根斯坦的哥哥保羅付給希特勒政權(quán)一大筆錢安排他姐姐從奧地利安全出逃。維特根斯坦的母親是天主教徒，他也曾受洗為天主教徒。在他的一生中，他表現(xiàn)出強烈的禁欲主義傾向，同時也有抑郁傾向。他的三個哥哥都自殺了，當(dāng)路德維希幾次表達想要結(jié)束生命的愿望時，他的家人都覺得這個愿望是認真的。有一次，看到維特根斯坦在房間里痛苦地踱來踱去，羅素打趣地問他：“你是在思考邏輯呢，還是你的罪行？”對此維特根斯坦回答說：“兩者都有?！彪m然維特根斯坦似乎沒有傳統(tǒng)的宗教觀點，被一些人認為是無神論者，但他經(jīng)常對宗教人物表示極大的同情，尤其是那些沉思的人。盡管他一直不愿意承認以前哲學(xué)家對他的任何影響，但他確實承認對圣奧古斯丁作品某些方面的喜愛。同樣明顯的是，他也熟悉叔本華的《作為意志和表象的世界》，似乎同意這個無神論者關(guān)于人本質(zhì)上是形而上學(xué)的說法。

也許維特根斯坦最顯著的性格是他經(jīng)常聲稱自己的愿望是成為完人。這一高度的——實際上是不可能的——標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對所有認識他的人都有很大影響。他備受折磨的天性、對真理的不懈追求、無法甘心忍受愚蠢之人、顯然缺乏幽默感，所有這些都證明了他是一個現(xiàn)代的神秘主義者。他于1951年死于癌癥。不過奇怪的是，考慮到他對周圍的世俗世界是多么地不滿，據(jù)他的朋友諾曼·馬爾科姆說，他的遺言是：“告訴他們我度過了美好的一生！”