■ 王忍 徐卓

“藏獨(dú)”是民族之害、國家之患 (二)

■ 王忍 徐卓

2、蠢蠢欲動的分裂圖謀——從“七·八事件”到西藏和平解放

1949年7月8日，在中國革命取得全國勝利的前夜，西藏部分上層加快了與祖國分離的步伐，西藏地方與中央的關(guān)系出現(xiàn)了前所未有的嚴(yán)重危機(jī)。噶廈官員突然通知國民政府駐藏辦事處代理處長陳錫璋說，西藏民眾大會決定西藏政府與國民政府暫時斷絕政治關(guān)系，保留宗教關(guān)系，限令辦事處全體人員及其他機(jī)關(guān)于兩周之內(nèi)啟程赴印。同時，噶廈還派人搗毀了國民政府交通部設(shè)在拉薩的電臺，斷絕與內(nèi)地一切通訊和郵件往來。噶廈當(dāng)局公然草擬了所謂《西藏獨(dú)立宣言》，準(zhǔn)備派員去聯(lián)合國呼吁，請求支持。同時，國際上一些反華勢力也開始鼓噪西藏獨(dú)立。

鑒于此種情況，毛澤東主席作出“進(jìn)軍西藏宜早不宜遲”的重要指示。就在解放軍將士準(zhǔn)備進(jìn)軍西藏的同時，西藏地方政府以攝政達(dá)扎·阿旺松繞等人為代表的少數(shù)分裂勢力，卻置藏民族的前途命運(yùn)于不顧，拒絕響應(yīng)中央政府的呼吁，企圖搞西藏獨(dú)立。他們一方面以和平談判的名義，荒謬地以西藏“外交代表”的名義要求與中央政府在香港談判“兩國”之間的關(guān)系，企圖拖延時間，遲滯解放軍進(jìn)軍西藏的步伐。另一方面，試圖派代表到國外,希望得到外國對“藏獨(dú)”勢力的援助。如伙同原印度政府駐拉薩的商務(wù)代表黎吉生和美國人勞爾·湯姆斯密商，策劃組織“親善使團(tuán)”分赴美、英、印度、尼泊爾等國請求援助。

針對西藏地方政府的分裂行為，中央政府從加強(qiáng)漢藏民族團(tuán)結(jié)、維護(hù)西藏社會穩(wěn)定出發(fā)，在進(jìn)軍西藏的同時，也從未放棄和平解放的努力。在政策準(zhǔn)備上，中央根據(jù)民族團(tuán)結(jié)、民族平等的原則，由鄧小平起草了中央政府與西藏地方政府談判的條件即“十大政策”。在宣傳動員上，中央人民廣播電臺開辦了少數(shù)民族節(jié)目，直接用藏語廣播《共同綱領(lǐng)》、中央對西藏的“十大政策”以及新華社有關(guān)社論，揭露了帝國主義的陰謀，表達(dá)了中央對西藏的關(guān)懷。喜饒嘉措大師等愛國人士，也通過發(fā)表廣播講話、托人帶信等方式，呼吁達(dá)賴?yán)镂鹇犘诺蹏髁x的謠言，速派代表赴京協(xié)商解決西藏問題。此外，中央還通過宗教界愛國人士自發(fā)組織勸和團(tuán)，由格達(dá)活佛親自從四川甘孜啟程前往拉薩做達(dá)賴?yán)锏墓ぷ?。在軍事斗爭上，中央政府?jiān)持“以和為上，以打促談”，于10月6日，發(fā)動了昌都戰(zhàn)役，經(jīng)過18天的戰(zhàn)斗，一舉解放了藏東政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)的中心昌都及其周圍廣大地區(qū)，打開了進(jìn)軍西藏的門戶，粉碎了帝國主義和西藏親帝分裂勢力企圖以武力頑抗的迷夢，加速了西藏上層集團(tuán)的分化，為和平解放西藏鋪平了道路。

昌都戰(zhàn)役給西藏上層人士帶來了極大的震撼。噶廈官員和拉薩三大寺堪布緊急開會研究對策，親帝派分裂分子堅(jiān)持敦請印度政府出面干涉，并策劃挾持達(dá)賴?yán)锾油鲇《取６羵惾话秃鸵匀笏聻榇淼娜耸繄?jiān)決反對這種分裂行徑，主張與中央政府進(jìn)行和平談判。雙方激烈論爭，相持不下，于是請護(hù)法降神給予“神斷”。神的指示是讓達(dá)賴?yán)锏ぴ黾未胗H政。1950年11月17日，十四世達(dá)賴?yán)锏ぴ黾未肱e行了親政典禮，年僅17歲的達(dá)賴?yán)锝邮芰巳氐恼淌聞?wù)大權(quán)。但剛剛親政的達(dá)賴，在部分噶廈官員和活佛的裹挾下，就離開拉薩，前往與印度毗鄰的邊境口岸亞東。在英、印、美等國對西藏問題保持中立，噶廈政府宣稱西藏“是個獨(dú)立國家”，要求聯(lián)合國阻止中國“侵略”的呼吁書得不到國際支持的情況下，達(dá)賴與噶廈政府官員反復(fù)權(quán)衡利弊，決定派出阿沛·阿旺晉美等代表赴北京談判，邁出了和平解放西藏的第一步。

1951年4月2 9日，關(guān)于西藏和平解放的談判正式開始。經(jīng)過開誠布公的協(xié)商和談判，中央政府與西藏政府在北京達(dá)成了《中央政府和西藏地方政府關(guān)于和平解放西藏辦法的協(xié)議》，也就是著名的十七條協(xié)議。協(xié)議的條文主要有三個方面的內(nèi)容：一是西藏人民回到祖國大家庭，積極協(xié)助人民解放軍開進(jìn)西藏，守衛(wèi)邊疆，西藏一切涉外事宜，由中央統(tǒng)一處理，中央人民政府在西藏設(shè)立軍政委員會和軍區(qū)司令部，除中央人民政府派去的人員外，盡量吸收西藏地方人員參加工作；二是對西藏現(xiàn)行的政治制度及達(dá)賴?yán)锏墓逃械匚患奥殭?quán)，中央不予變更，班禪固有地位及職權(quán)，應(yīng)予維持，尊重西藏人民宗教信仰自由，寺廟收入中央不予變更；三是西藏實(shí)行民族區(qū)域自治，逐步發(fā)展西藏民族的語言、文字和學(xué)校教育，逐步發(fā)展西藏的農(nóng)牧工商業(yè)，改變?nèi)嗣裆?；有關(guān)各項(xiàng)改革事宜，中央不加強(qiáng)迫。西藏地方政府應(yīng)自動進(jìn)行改革，人民提出改革要求時，得采取與西藏領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人員協(xié)商的方法解決。

協(xié)議簽署后，毛澤東主席在懷仁堂親切接見西藏和談代表，并舉行盛大宴會，慶祝簽訂和平解放西藏辦法的協(xié)議。中央人民政府派駐西藏的代表張經(jīng)武也取道香港、印度到亞東，會晤了達(dá)賴?yán)?，向他面交了協(xié)議的副本和毛澤東的親筆信，并詳盡闡述了中國共產(chǎn)黨的民族和宗教政策。隨著人民解放軍的順利進(jìn)藏宣告西藏的和平解放，結(jié)束了西藏近代以來遭受帝國主義、殖民主義侵略的歷史，為新中國的國家統(tǒng)一、民族團(tuán)結(jié)大業(yè)奠定了堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)，使西藏各民族人民走上了團(tuán)結(jié)、進(jìn)步、發(fā)展的光明大道。

3、倉皇出逃的鬧劇——從偽人民會議事件到武裝叛亂

《十七條協(xié)議》簽訂后，“藏獨(dú)”分裂分子的分裂活動并沒有偃旗息鼓，反而愈加猖獗。以魯康娃、洛桑扎西等為代表的西藏少數(shù)分裂主義分子大做反對十七條協(xié)議的文章，在人民解放軍剛剛到達(dá)、立足未穩(wěn)、糧食供應(yīng)極端困難等情況下設(shè)置種種障礙，趁機(jī)封鎖糧食，揚(yáng)言“要把解放軍餓跑”。而一些反對祖國統(tǒng)一的商人、寺廟管事和僧人等，也在西藏反動上層支持下組織起來成立了“人民會議”的反動組織，公開要求人民解放軍撤出西藏，進(jìn)行反對十七條協(xié)議、破壞漢藏民族團(tuán)結(jié)、分裂祖國的活動，甚至私自召集藏軍，包圍中央代表駐地和工委機(jī)關(guān)，并在拉薩市內(nèi)尋釁滋事，制造摩擦，挑起事端，以便組織武裝騷亂。

雖然在中央政府有力的政治斗爭和有效的軍事防范下，偽人民會議的這些騷亂陰謀未能得逞，但這次流產(chǎn)的偽“人民會議”事件實(shí)際上是西藏上層反動派陰謀策劃叛亂的一次預(yù)演，從此，偽“人民會議”的一些骨干分子從公開轉(zhuǎn)為隱蔽，繼續(xù)從事非法活動。不久，魯康娃借朝佛為名去印度噶倫堡，噶倫堡成了反對祖國、陰謀進(jìn)行西藏“獨(dú)立”活動的大本營。以夏格巴為首的叛國分子在噶倫堡與英國、美國、臺灣地區(qū)，及其他一些歐洲國家的各種人物，其中包括不少間諜分子聯(lián)系，接受資金及武器的幫助，并秘密地運(yùn)進(jìn)西藏，準(zhǔn)備進(jìn)行“獨(dú)立”活動。

在“藏獨(dú)”分裂勢力與西藏愛國力量的斗爭中，達(dá)賴的態(tài)度也值得關(guān)注。事實(shí)上，達(dá)賴對于中央政府的態(tài)度也存在著變化的過程。西藏和平解放后，達(dá)賴對在西藏進(jìn)行的改革其實(shí)是抱有一定程度的支持和贊同的態(tài)度。1954年達(dá)賴到北京參加第一屆全國人民代表大會第一次會議，當(dāng)選為全國人大常務(wù)會副委員長。1955年,達(dá)賴?yán)锘氐嚼_，還寫了一首《毛主席頌》,在這篇贊文中他把毛澤東主席比作太陽、慈母和大鵬,稱頌毛主席解放了枷鎖,指示了和平的道路。1956年，陳毅元帥率領(lǐng)中央代表團(tuán)抵達(dá)拉薩,參加即將召開的西藏自治區(qū)籌備委員會成立大會。達(dá)賴?yán)锉煌七x擔(dān)任籌備委員會的主任委員,班禪喇嘛擔(dān)任第一副主任委員。年輕的達(dá)賴?yán)镆卜e極熱情地投入到了籌委會的工作中去。

但在掌控噶廈政府內(nèi)部的“藏獨(dú)”勢力的裹挾和左右下，十四世達(dá)賴并沒有堅(jiān)守這種立場，反而走上了“藏獨(dú)”的道路。在達(dá)賴參加全國人大會議返回西藏期間，偽人民會議的重要領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人阿樂群則一行5人，打著迎接達(dá)賴?yán)锓挡氐幕献?，也趕到當(dāng)時西康省的雅安、康定等地進(jìn)行陰謀活動，并上書達(dá)賴?yán)?，公開反對成立西藏自治區(qū)籌備委員會，公然要求實(shí)現(xiàn)“西藏獨(dú)立”。在1956年四川甘孜藏區(qū)發(fā)生叛亂期間，達(dá)賴的副官帕拉·土登次登派人與叛亂武裝保持聯(lián)系，并以商隊(duì)的名義給叛亂武裝運(yùn)送武器彈藥。就在西藏自治區(qū)籌委會成立大會期間，達(dá)賴的三哥洛桑三旦召見江達(dá)宗頭人齊美公布說：“昌都地區(qū)按江東地方行動（指金沙江以東四川藏區(qū)的武裝叛亂），這是達(dá)賴的指令。”1956年11月22日，達(dá)賴、班禪應(yīng)邀到印度參加釋迦牟尼涅槃2500周年活動。達(dá)賴一進(jìn)入印度，就同夏格巴、嘉樂頓珠和西方反華勢力打得火熱，思想動搖，甚至想留在國外。由于班禪大師在1957年1月29日按期乘飛機(jī)回到拉薩，打亂達(dá)賴分裂集團(tuán)的部署，他們怕達(dá)賴不回西藏，大權(quán)旁落，不得不安排達(dá)賴回西藏，進(jìn)一步完成分裂的部署。

1959年初，在西藏反動上層的支持和策劃下，武裝叛亂不斷加劇，愈演愈烈，殃及了西藏的廣大農(nóng)牧區(qū)。叛亂分子利用西藏駐軍、機(jī)關(guān)分散的特點(diǎn)，不僅襲劫道班，襲擊兵站，伏擊車輛，炸毀橋梁，截斷公路，而且不斷圍攻各地的解放軍和黨政機(jī)關(guān)駐地。西藏上層反動集團(tuán)要發(fā)動全面武裝叛亂，需要尋找一個能夠欺騙群眾、蒙蔽群眾、煽動叛亂的借口，于是，他們選定在3月10日達(dá)賴?yán)镆杰妳^(qū)看戲的時機(jī)，公開撕毀協(xié)議，背叛祖國，發(fā)動全面武裝叛亂。3月10日，西藏地方政府上層反動分子魯康娃、洛桑扎西等人一方面借此造謠惑眾，散布“漢人要劫走達(dá)賴?yán)铩钡闹{言，要求每家都要派人去羅布林卡向達(dá)賴請?jiān)福硪环矫嬗址催^來鼓動達(dá)賴，說解放軍請看節(jié)目是假，乘機(jī)扣留他是真。并以保護(hù)達(dá)賴?yán)锏陌踩珵橛?，派藏軍封鎖了達(dá)賴的駐地。之后，立即召開所謂“人民代表大會”，會上決定同中央分裂，把爭取“西藏獨(dú)立”的活動搞到底，并決定由索康、雪古巴、噶章、大惹·多阿塔青、凱墨札薩和藏軍副司令洛珠格桑等人領(lǐng)導(dǎo)“西藏獨(dú)立運(yùn)動”。 3月11日至13日，叛亂頭目連續(xù)召開所謂“人民代表會議”，加緊組織和擴(kuò)大叛亂武裝；威脅藏族干部、教職員、學(xué)員和在自治區(qū)籌委會機(jī)關(guān)工作的人員，要他們限期向所謂“西藏獨(dú)立國”自首悔過；強(qiáng)迫西藏僧俗人民加入叛亂組織。他們還召開所謂“西藏獨(dú)立國人民會議”，公開撕毀《十七條協(xié)議》，宣布“西藏獨(dú)立”，全面發(fā)動了背叛祖國的武裝叛亂。

西藏全面武裝叛亂發(fā)生后，中共中央和毛澤東主席對西藏形勢作了正確分析，對中共西藏工委、西藏軍區(qū)在政治上、軍事上所應(yīng)采取的措施作了具體指示。在軍事上，西藏工委、西藏軍區(qū)本著“不打第一槍”、“自衛(wèi)作戰(zhàn)”的原則，擬定了機(jī)動作戰(zhàn)預(yù)案，做好了戰(zhàn)斗準(zhǔn)備；在政治上，則通過各種形式向群眾進(jìn)行廣泛宣傳，充分揭露西藏上層反動集團(tuán)發(fā)動叛亂的真相；對上層人士進(jìn)行團(tuán)結(jié)爭取工作，爭取更多的上層人士站在反對叛亂、維護(hù)祖國統(tǒng)一的立場上。當(dāng)達(dá)賴?yán)镌诹_布林卡受到叛亂分子控制，同他聯(lián)系已十分困難時，西藏工委仍設(shè)法通過愛國人士，先后送去了中央駐西藏代理代表譚冠三的三封信。譚冠三在信中體諒達(dá)賴?yán)锏奶幘常P(guān)心他的安全，并指出反動分子公開地狂妄地進(jìn)行軍事挑釁，要求西藏地方政府立即予以制止。而西藏上層反動集團(tuán)無視中央提出的要求和警告，按照他們的預(yù)謀，繼續(xù)進(jìn)行叛亂活動，加緊進(jìn)行出逃的準(zhǔn)備。3月17日夜間，達(dá)賴?yán)锖透羵愃骺怠⒘?、夏蘇、副官長帕拉、副經(jīng)師赤江等從羅布林卡渡過拉薩河向山南逃走。3月21日，達(dá)賴逃到隆子宗，立即宣布隆子宗是第二首都，并任命恩珠倉·公布扎西為山南衛(wèi)教軍總司令，然后逃往印度，隨后散發(fā)了鼓吹“西藏獨(dú)立”的《達(dá)賴?yán)锏穆暶鳌贰?月20日，達(dá)賴第一次公開出面舉行記者招待會，聲稱“要恢復(fù)在1950年中國入侵以前西藏所享有的自主和獨(dú)立地位”。此后，盡管中央對達(dá)賴采取了耐心等待的態(tài)度，直到1964年12月以前仍保留了他全國人大常委會副委員長的職務(wù)，但是達(dá)賴長期居住印度，公開組織“流亡政府”，炮制所謂“西藏憲法”，鼓吹“中間道路”和“大藏區(qū)”概念，從事分裂祖國、破壞民族團(tuán)結(jié)的活動，在錯誤的道路上越走越遠(yuǎn)，成為了“圖謀西藏獨(dú)立的分裂主義政治集團(tuán)的總頭子，國際反華勢力的忠實(shí)工具，在西藏制造社會動亂的總根源，阻撓藏傳佛教建立正常秩序的最大障礙”。(待續(xù))

2. Attempts at Separation: From the July 8th Incident to Tibet’s Peaceful Liberation

On July 8, 1949, on the eve of the PLA’s victory in the Chinese revolution, elements of the Tibetan leadership accelerated their split from the motherland,which precipitated an unprecedented crisis in relations between the Tibetan local government and the Chinese central government. Officials from the governing council of Tibet – the Kashag – suddenly informed the Nationalist government acting representative in Tibet, Chen Xizhang,that the Tibetan People’s General Assembly had decided to temporarily sever relations between the Tibetan and Nationalist governments but retain religious ties, and to order staff of representative offices and other organs to depart Tibet for India within two weeks. The Kashag also sent troops to destroy the Nationalist government’s broadcasting station in Lhasa, which effectively cut off all communication with the mainland and put an end to postal exchanges. The Kashag then drafted the Declaration of Independence of Tibet and readied a delegation to be dispatched to the United Nations to request assistance, while international anti-China forces began rallying support for their cause.

In view of the situation, Chairman Mao issued instructions that the PLA should enter Tibet sooner rather than later. As the PLA prepared to march into Tibet, the Taktra Rinpoche, who led a small group of separatists in the Tibetan local government, ignored the CPC central government’s advances without thought for future and destiny of the Tibetan people, and set about achieving Tibetan independence. In an effort to delay the PLA’s entry into Tibet, the Taktra Rinpoche absurdly requested “peaceful negotiations” in Hong Kong between Tibetan “diplomatic representatives” and the central government to discuss the relationship between the “two countries.” He also dispatched representatives to foreign countries in the hope of garnering international assistance for Tibetan independence forces.With the help of the British government in India’s trade representative in Lhasa, Hugh Edward Richardson, and the American Lowell Thomas, a “goodwill mission” from Tibet traveled to the United States, Britain, India, Nepal and other countries to request assistance.

Despite the disruptive behavior of the Tibetan local government, the Chinese central government was determined not to give up on its efforts to peacefully liberate Tibet in order to strengthen unity between the Han and Tibetan peoples and safeguard social stability in the region.In preparation, Deng Xiaoping drafted a policy concerning the ten conditions on which the central government would hold negotiations with the local government in Tibet based on the principles of national unity and ethnic equality. In order to communicate the policy, the Central People’s Broadcasting Station put on a special broadcast in Tibetan of China’s interim constitution called the Common Program, the central government’s ten conditions for holding negotiations with the Tibetan side, and a related editorial by the Xinhua News Agency, all of which served to expose the imperialist conspiracy and illustrated the central government’s concern for Tibet. Geshe Sherab Gyatso and other patriots appealed to the Dalai Lama not to be taken in by imperialist lies and to send representatives to Beijing for negotiations on how to solve the Tibetan question.Moreover, the central government put together a group of religious patriots who arranged for the Gedar Tulku to travel to Tibet from Ganzi in Sichuan to do the Dalai Lama’s work. Despite the central government continuing to seek a peaceful resolution and urging the Tibetan side to negotiate,on October 6, the Battle of Qamdo began. After 18 days of fighting, the political and economic center of eastern Tibet and vast areas around the city were liberated, which opened the door for PLA forces to enter Tibet and crush the armed resistance of imperialist and pro-imperialist separatist forces. The victory also caused cracks to appear in the unity of the Tibetan side and paved the way for Tibet’s peaceful liberation.

The PLA’s victory at the Battle of Qamdo came as a great shock to Tibet’s ruling class. Kashag officials and the abbots of Lhasa’s three great monasteries urgently called a meeting to discuss their next move. Pro-imperialist separatists urged the Indian government to intervene, and put together a plan to seize the Dalai Lama and take him to India. However, the Galoin and representatives of Lhasa’s three great monasteries opposed the separatists’ actions and advocated suing for peace with the central government. At loggerheads, the two sides asked the Dharma Protectors to intervene, who instructed that the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, should be aloud to assume the reins of government.On November 17, 1950, the Chikamasa ceremony was held for the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, which meant at the age of only 17 the Dalai Lama assumed supreme power of Tibet’s political and religious affairs. But coerced by certain Kashag officials and tulkus, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa for neighboring India. With Britain, the United States and India remaining neutral on the issue of Tibet, and having failed to garner international support following an appeal to the United Nations for assistance in preventing a Chinese“invasion” after the Kashag declared Tibetan independence,the Kashag and the Dalai Lama were left weighing up their options, and eventually decided to send a delegation of officials, including Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, to negotiate with Beijing in the fi rst step towards the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

On April 29, 1951, negotiations concerning the peaceful liberation of Tibet began. Following frank discussions and negotiations, both sides produced the famous 17-point “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” .There were three main aspects to the provisions of the agreement: First, the Tibetan people would return to motherland; the Tibetan government would actively assist the PLA enter Tibet and guard Tibet’s borders; the Tibetan government would submit itself to the unified authority of the central government; the central government would set up a Military and Political Committee and a military command post in Tibet; and other than personnel sent by the central government, as many Tibetans as possible would be used to carry out the government’s work in Tibet. Second, the central government would not change the existing political system in Tibet or the status, function and powers of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama; the central government would also safeguard and respect the religious freedoms of the Tibetan people and not interfere with the incomes of monasteries.Third, Tibet would become an autonomous region; Tibetan language and script as well as school education would gradually be developed as well as agriculture, livestock breeding, industries and commerce in order to improve the people’s lives. The central government also promised not to force any of the above reforms on the local population.The agreement stated that the local government in Tibet would implement the reforms, and when people sought reform they would consult with Tibetan leaders to work out solutions.

After signing the agreement, Chairman Mao cordially received representatives from Tibet in Huairen Hall, where a grand banquet was held to celebrate the signing of the agreement. The central people’s government also dispatched their representative to Tibet, Zhang Jingwu, via Hong Kong and India to meet with the Dalai Lama and personally hand him a copy of the agreement and a personal letter from Mao Zedong, as well as explain in detail the CPC’s policies on ethnic minorities and religion. When the PLA peacefully liberated Tibet, it brought an end to Tibet’s modern history of imperialist and colonial aggression and laid a solid foundation for the great causes of China’s unification and national unity, allowing the Tibetan people to set out on the bright path of unity, progress and development.

3. The Farcical Escape: From the Pseudo-People’s Assembly to the Armed Rebellion

After the 17-point agreement had been signed, the separatist activities of some Tibetans intensified, with a small number of separatists, led by Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi, who opposed the agreement, attempting to block food supplies to the newly-arrived PLA in an effort to starve them out of Tibet. With the support of reactionary Tibetan leaders, some merchants as well as abbots and monks who opposed the reunification of the motherland,established a reactionary “Peoples Assembly”, which demanded that the PLA leave Tibet and organized activities in violation of the 17-point agreement in order to destroy Han-Tibetan unity and split the motherland. They even secretly formed a Tibetan army and surrounded the of fi ces of the central government’s representative in Lhasa and the local working committee and organized armed riots in the streets of Lhasa.

Although the pseudo-People’s Assembly’s conspiracy did not succeed due to the political struggle waged by the central government and the PLA’s strong military presence,the incident was a preview of the rebellion being plotted by reactionary Tibetan leaders. Afterwards some of those involved went into hiding to conduct their illegal activities in secret. Lukhangwa used the excuse of going on a pilgrimage to India to travel to Kalimpong, which had by then become the headquarters of opposition to the motherland and Tibetan independence activities. Led by Tsepon Shakabpa,the traitors met with people from the UK, the US, Taiwan and other European countries, including a number of foreign spies, and accepted money and weapons from them, which they smuggled into Tibet for independence activities.

It is worth noting the Dalai Lama’s attitude towards the Tibetan separatist and patriotic forces, and his changing attitude toward the central government. After Tibet was peacefully liberated , the Dalai Lama supported some of the reforms being implemented in Tibet. In 1945, the Dalai Lama traveled to Beijing to attend the fi rst meeting of the first session of the National People’s Congress (NPC),and was elected Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. In 1955, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa where he wrote a song praising Chairman Mao, in which he compared him to the sun and a loving mother, and praised him for liberating Tibet and illuminating the path to peace.In 1956, a Central Committee delegation led by Marshal Chen Yi arrived in Lhasa to attend the forthcoming General Assembly of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region, at which the Dalai Lama was elected Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and the Panchen Lama was elected First Vice Chairman. Following his nomination, the young Dalai Lama enthusiastically participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee.

But under the coercion of Tibetan separatist forces who controlled the Kashag government, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama did not continue in that vain, instead veering onto the path of Tibetan independence. Following the Dalai Lama’s attendance at the NPC session, under the guise of going to greet the Dalai Lama on his return, fi ve members of the pseudo-People’s Assembly traveled to Ya’an and Kangding in the former province of Xikang to engage in conspiratorial activities and wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama in which they openly opposed the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region and requested that Tibet declare independence. In 1956, a rebellion broke out in Ganzi in Sichuan Province,and the Dalai Lama’s adjutant, Phala Thupten, gave orders to make contact with the armed rebels and to transport weapons and ammunition to them disguised as a trade caravan. As the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region was being established, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Losang Samten, summoned the head of Jomda County and announced, “Qamdo Prefecture must act in accordance with the area east of the river (referring to the armed rebellion east of the Jinsha River). This is the order of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.”O(jiān)n November 22, 1956, the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama were invited to India for the 2500-year anniversary of Sakyamuni’s nirvana. As soon as he arrived in India,the Dalai Lama strengthened his relations with Tsepon Shakabpa, Gyalo Dhondup and Western anti-China forces,and even thought about not returning to Tibet. However, the Panchen Lama returned to Tibet as scheduled on January 29, 1957, which disrupted the Dalai Lama separatist clique’s plans due to concerns that if the Dalai Lama did not return to Tibet power would fall into the hands of others. He therefore had no choice but to return to Lhasa and work on his plans further.

In early 1959, with the support and planning of Tibet’s reactionary leaders, the armed rebellion intensified and spread to rural areas of Tibet. The insurgents took advantage of the scattered locations of Chinese forces and organs to not only rob road maintenance crews, attack military depots, ambush vehicles, blow up bridges and render roads impassible, but also constantly besiege PLA troops and government organizations. Tibet’s reactionary leaders were keen to launch an all-out armed rebellion but needed an excuse that would fool the masses and fan the flames of rebellion. They therefore decided to use the Dalai Lama’s visit to the military command area to watch an opera performance on March 10 to openly break the 17-point agreement, betray the motherland and launch a full-scale armed rebellion. On March 10, local government reactionaries Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi began spreading unfounded rumors that the Han Chinese wanted to kidnap the Dalai Lama and encouraged people to travel to Norbulingka to petition the Dalai Lama not to travel. They also told the Dalai Lama that the event he had been invited to by the PLA was a ruse and that they actually intended to capture him. Using the excuse that they wished to protect the Dalai Lama from harm, they then kept the Dalai Lama locked in his residence surrounded by Tibetan soldiers. The reactionaries then convened a socalled “People’s Congress”, at which they decided to split with the Chinese central government and fight to the end for Tibetan independence. Between March 11 and 13, the leaders of the rebellion convened the “People’s Congress” to organize the expansion of the armed rebellion. The leaders also threatened Tibetan cadres, teachers, students and people working for organs related to the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region, demanding that they join the cause of Tibetan independence, and forced monks and lay people alike to join the rebellion. The leaders of the rebellion also held a so-called “Tibetan Independence People’s Assembly” ,during which they publicly tore up the 17-point agreement, declared Tibetan independence, and betrayed the motherland by launching an armed rebellion.

After the full-scale armed rebellion was launched,the CPC Central Committee and Chairman analyzed the situation in Tibet and issued specific instructions on the political and military measures that should be taken by the CPC Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military District Command. Militarily, based on the principles of not firing first and fighting only in self-defense, the Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military District Command prepared a plan for mobile operations. Politically, the truth about the reactionary clique who had incited the rebellion was widely publicized through various forms of communication. Work was also carried out to unite people in positions of power in Tibet against the rebellion and in support of national uni fi cation. While the Dalai Lama was being controlled by rebels in Norbulingka, making contact with him proved extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the Tibet Work Committee managed to get three letters through to him from Beijing’s acting representative in Tibet, Tan Guansan, with the help of those still loyal to the motherland.In the letters, Tan Guansan sympathized with the Dalai Lama’s plight and expressed concern for his safety. He also pointed out that reactionaries were fl agrantly and arrogantly provoking a military confrontation, and demanded that the local government put an end to such actions immediately.However, the reactionary leaders in Tibet ignored the central government’s warning and continued to carry out rebellious acts and fi nalize their plans for fl eeing Tibet. On the night of March 17, the Dalai Lama and others crossed the Lhasa River and escaped into Lhoka Prefecture. On March 21, the Dalai Lama arrived in Lhunzhe County,which he proclaimed to be second capital of Tibet and appointed Andrug Gompo Tashi the commander in charge of Lhoka Prefecture’s army. The Dalai Lama then fled to India, from where he issued a statement calling for Tibetan independence. On June 20, the Dalai Lama held his first public press conference and claimed that he wanted Tibet to enjoy the autonomy and independent status it had enjoyed prior to the Chinese invasion in 1950. Afterwards, despite the fact the Chinese adopted a patient attitude and held open his post of Vice Chairman of the NPC until December 1964,he decided to take up long-term residence in India and went on to set up a “government in exile”, concoct a so-called“Tibetan Constitution” ,advocate the concepts of a “middle way” and “Greater Tibet” ,and engage in activities aimed at splitting the motherland and undermining national unity. He walked further and further down the wrong path to become the leader of the separatist political group behind the Tibetan independence conspiracy, a loyal tool of international anti-China forces, the source of social unrest in Tibet and the greatest obstacle to achieving normal order in the region. (To be continued)

TIBETAN INDEPENDENCE IS HARMFUL TO THE NATION AND A MENACE TO THE STATE

■ Wang Ren and Xu Zhuo

(孫顯輝 譯)