華東 史安娜

中圖分類號(hào) R288;R95 文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)志碼 A 文章編號(hào) 1001-0408（2021）20-2438-07

DOI 10.6039/j.issn.1001-0408.2021.20.02

摘 要 目的：為促進(jìn)我國中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟（以下簡稱“中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)聯(lián)盟”）的穩(wěn)定運(yùn)行和中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)的轉(zhuǎn)型升級(jí)提供參考。方法：運(yùn)用博弈理論，構(gòu)建道德自律下中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)聯(lián)盟成員合作信任的初次博弈、重復(fù)博弈模型以及外部約束力量下的混合策略博弈模型，分析中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)聯(lián)盟信任機(jī)制構(gòu)建的主要影響因素，并為我國中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)聯(lián)盟信任機(jī)制的構(gòu)建提出對策與建議。結(jié)果與結(jié)論：初次博弈模型和有限次重復(fù)博弈模型均顯示，（不信任，不信任）的策略組合為唯一納什均衡，此時(shí)聯(lián)盟整體得益最小，聯(lián)盟創(chuàng)新效率和穩(wěn)定性十分低下。無限次重復(fù)博弈模型顯示，（信任，信任）的策略組合為該重復(fù)博弈的均衡路徑，博弈雙方因守信而收獲的長期得益大于失信所帶來的得益，此時(shí)聯(lián)盟總得益最大，但需要博弈雙方有充分的耐心和足夠多的博弈次數(shù)。混合策略博弈模型顯示，在背信損失足夠大且上不封頂?shù)那闆r下，聯(lián)盟成員均選擇彼此信任，（信任，信任）的策略為唯一納什均衡;在背信損失比較小且越接近上限時(shí)，聯(lián)盟成員越不愿意選擇守信，此時(shí)外部約束力量較弱。博弈次數(shù)的多少、博弈信息的完全性和外部約束力量的強(qiáng)弱是影響中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)聯(lián)盟信任機(jī)制構(gòu)建的關(guān)鍵因素。建議中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)聯(lián)盟內(nèi)部應(yīng)建立高效的溝通體系、透明的信息公開制度和完善的獎(jiǎng)懲制度，并充分發(fā)揮政府及非政府第三方的作用，以促進(jìn)我國中藥產(chǎn)業(yè)聯(lián)盟的穩(wěn)定運(yùn)行。

關(guān)鍵詞 博弈理論;中藥產(chǎn)業(yè);產(chǎn)業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟;信任機(jī)制

Construction of Trust Mechanism about TCM Industrial Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance from the Perspective of Game Theory

HUA Dong1，2，SHI Anna1（1. Business School， Hohai University， Nanjing 210098， China;2. School of Health Economic and Management， Nanjing University of TCM， Nanjing 210023， China）

ABSTRACT? ?OBJECTIVE： To provide reference for the stable operation of TCM industrial technology innovation strategic alliance （called “TCM industrial alliance” for short） as well as the transformation and upgrading of TCM industry. METHODS： The game theory was adopted to construct the initial game model and repeated game model of cooperative trust among the members of TCM industrial alliance under moral self-discipline， and mixed strategy game model under external constraints. The main influential factors of trust mechanism construction for TCM industrial alliance were analyzed， and countermeasures and suggestions were put forward for the trust mechanism construction of TCM industrial alliance in China. RESULTS & CONCLUTIONS： Both the initial game model and the finite repeated game model showed that the strategy combination of （distrust， distrust） was the only Nash equilibrium. At this time， the overall benefit of the alliance was the smallest， and the innovation efficiency and stability of the alliance were very low. The infinite repeated game model showed that the strategy combination of （trust， trust） was the equilibrium path of the repeated game. The long-term benefits of both sides of the game due to trustworthiness were greater than those obtained by dishonesty. At this time， the total benefits of the alliance were the largest， but both sides of the game needed to have sufficient patience and enough game times. The mixed strategy game model showed that when the loss of breach of trust was large enough and there was no upper limit， the alliance members chose to trust each other， and the strategy of （trust， trust） was the only Nash equilibrium; when the loss of breach of trust was relatively small and closer to the upper limit， the more reluctant the alliance members were to choose to keep faith， and the external constraint force was weak. The number of games， the completeness of game information and the strength of external constraints were the key factors to establish alliance trust mechanism. It is suggested that an efficient communication system， transparent information disclosure system and perfect reward and punishment system should be established within TCM industrial alliance， and the role of government and non-governmental third parties should be fully played to promote the stable operation of TCM industrial alliance in China.