杰西卡·李特曼 著 倪朱亮 譯

內(nèi)容提要：版權(quán)學(xué)者們認(rèn)為我們過(guò)去為之抗?fàn)幍乃^版權(quán)之戰(zhàn)名義上是作者、創(chuàng)作者利益與讀者、社會(huì)公眾之間的利益沖突導(dǎo)致的，但是，現(xiàn)在我們愈發(fā)清楚這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)根本不是這么一回事。相反，真正的沖突出現(xiàn)在二十世紀(jì)具有市場(chǎng)支配地位的出版商、唱片公司、電影公司以及其他中間商與作為二十一世紀(jì)版權(quán)市場(chǎng)強(qiáng)有力的參與者的數(shù)字服務(wù)商、平臺(tái)之間。本文認(rèn)為，至少有部分人主張二十世紀(jì)出版者與二十一世紀(jì)數(shù)字平臺(tái)之間的沖突應(yīng)當(dāng)留待雙方律師解決，而我們應(yīng)當(dāng)關(guān)注那些并未引起我們注意的問(wèn)題。當(dāng)版權(quán)學(xué)者致力于討論究竟是作者利益還是讀者利益至上時(shí)，很顯然我們已經(jīng)錯(cuò)過(guò)了研究這場(chǎng)版權(quán)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中那些讓人難以理解的問(wèn)題的最佳時(shí)機(jī)。比如，所有論述都認(rèn)為作者在版權(quán)體系中具有核心地位，但是，事實(shí)上版權(quán)法幾乎沒(méi)有賦予作者權(quán)力，也沒(méi)有給予他們足夠的金錢(qián)回報(bào)。相反，中間商擁有版權(quán)，并構(gòu)建許可體系，以實(shí)現(xiàn)自身收益最大化，同時(shí)縮減支付給作者的報(bào)酬。對(duì)于這一點(diǎn)，版權(quán)學(xué)者的認(rèn)識(shí)一貫十分膚淺。該原因在于法律人士理所當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為版權(quán)就是財(cái)產(chǎn)，財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)通過(guò)自由轉(zhuǎn)讓可以使受讓人取得原權(quán)利人的地位。通過(guò)比較創(chuàng)設(shè)法定版權(quán)并將權(quán)利集中到出版商、印刷商手里的1710年英國(guó)安娜法令與對(duì)美國(guó)剝奪印第安人土地起著關(guān)鍵作用的1887年道斯法案，本文從中抽離出相一個(gè)相同的寓意，即若將某些事物歸為可以自由轉(zhuǎn)讓的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的話(huà)，其結(jié)果往往會(huì)反映或者惡化財(cái)富與議價(jià)能力之間的懸殊差異，而有關(guān)財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的法律信條極易讓我們忽略這個(gè)結(jié)果。

如果你們有研讀版權(quán)法的話(huà)，自然了解在過(guò)去25年里美國(guó)版權(quán)法學(xué)界儼然分為對(duì)立的兩派。一部分人認(rèn)為讀者和其他使用者的利益被低估了；另一部分人認(rèn)為我們更應(yīng)加大對(duì)作者的保護(hù)力度。但是，在這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)議過(guò)程中，當(dāng)我們以不雅名字稱(chēng)呼反對(duì)方的時(shí)候，①See,e.g.,Hugh Hansen,David O.Carson,Eben Moglen,Wendy Seltzer &Charles Sims,“Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred v.Ashcroft”(2003)13 Fordham Intellectual Property Media &Entertainment Law Journal 771,787 (“the anti-copyright professors”);Henry Horbaczewski,“No Silver Lining for the Emperor,s New Clothes:Golan and the Traditional Contours of Copyright”(2012)59 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 865,865 (2012)(“scholars that viewed the copyright law as a constitutional abomination”);I.Fred Koenigsberg,“TheFifth Annual Christopher Meyer Memorial Lecture:Humpty Dumpty in Copyright Land”(2004)51 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 677,680 (“enemies of copyright”);Mark A.Lemley,Faith-Based Intellectual Property (2015)62 UCLA Law Review 1328,1343 (“the IP faithful”);Reilly,“Copyright and a Synergistic Society”p.625 (“anti-author proponents”);ibid.at p.626 (“if one reads professorial accounts such as these closely,one can also detect the perfidious underlying presence of ‘copyright envy’”);Pam Samuelson,The Copyright Grab,WIRED,1 Jan.1996,at https://www.wired.com/1996/01/white-paper/ (“copyright maximalists”);Paul Schwartz &William Michael Treanor,“Essay,Eldred and Lochner:Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property”(2003)112 Yale Law Journal 2331,2331 (“the IP Restrictors”).Cf.Kembrew McLeod,Freedom of Expression (New York 2005),65 (referring to copyright bullies as“overzealous copyright bozos”).這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)議變得十分令人難堪。②See,e.g.,Tracy Reilly,“Copyright and a Synergistic Society”(2017)18 Minnesota Journal of Law,Science &Technology 575,591-609 (關(guān)于版權(quán)限制并將作者觀(guān)點(diǎn)視為“版權(quán)嫉妒”的學(xué)術(shù)爭(zhēng)論分析)。版權(quán)人的維護(hù)者將那些為讀者、使用者發(fā)聲的學(xué)者視為谷歌公司雇來(lái)撰文以促進(jìn)其商業(yè)利益的槍手。③See Brody Mullins &Jack Nickas,“Inside Google,s Academic Inf ul ence Campaign”Wall Street Journal,14 July 2017,at https://www.wsj.com/articles/paying-professors-inside-googles-academic-inf ul ence-campaign-1499 785286;Adam Rogers,“Google,s Academic Inf ul ence Campaign:It's Complicated”WIRED,14 July 2017 at https://www.wired.com/story/googles-academic-inf ul ence-campaign-its-complicated/.也有部分人一旦覺(jué)得學(xué)者的文章站在對(duì)立面就不再讀下去。④See Jessica Litman,“War &Peace:The 34th Annual Donald C Brace Lecture”(2006)53 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 1;Jessica Litman,“The Politics of Intellectual Property”(2009)27 Cardozo Arts &Entertainment Law Journal 313.

我相信，或者說(shuō)至少我希望的是，只要我們能夠原諒那些令人討厭的骯臟話(huà)，那么這些難堪就會(huì)快要結(jié)束或者應(yīng)當(dāng)能盡快結(jié)束。當(dāng)那些具體的改革提案從這些“對(duì)戰(zhàn)”中得以呈現(xiàn)時(shí)，很顯然在作者與讀者之間的沖突根本不是這么一回事了。相反，真正持續(xù)出現(xiàn)乃是中間商之間的殊死搏斗。唱片公司針對(duì)“點(diǎn)對(duì)點(diǎn)”文件分享應(yīng)用軟件的個(gè)人用戶(hù)⑤See,e.g.,Capitol Records v Thomas-Rasset,692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir.2012);Sony BMG Music Entertainment v.Tenenbaum,660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir.2011).提起的訴訟，獲得了廣泛報(bào)道。但是最后結(jié)果證明，這些訴訟只是唱片公司力爭(zhēng)使互聯(lián)網(wǎng)服務(wù)商為其用戶(hù)行為承擔(dān)責(zé)任之戰(zhàn)中的虛晃一槍。⑥E.g.,BMG Rights Management v.Cox Communications,881 F.3d 293 (4th Cir.2018);EMI Christian Music v.MP3Tunes,844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir.2016).See Cory Doctorow,Information Doesn 't Want to Be Free:Laws for the Internet Age (San Francisco 2014)80-89.針對(duì)網(wǎng)上用戶(hù)隱私⑦See,e.g.,Privacy and Piracy:The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry,Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,108th Congress (30 September 2003)19-20 (testimony of L.L.Cool,recording artist);Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online:Legitimate Sites vs.Para-sites,Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee,112th Congress (14 March 2011)61-62 (testimony of Frederick Huntsberry,Paramount Pictures).的抗辯很大程度上是大多數(shù)版權(quán)人努力縮小網(wǎng)絡(luò)服務(wù)適用避風(fēng)港規(guī)則的序幕。⑧See,e.g.,United States Copyright Office:Section 512 Public Roundtable,2 May 2016,at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/public-roundtable/transcript_05-02-2016.pdf.舊式的中間商（如出版商、唱片公司與電影公司）正與新潮的中間商（如網(wǎng)絡(luò)在線(xiàn)服務(wù)提供商、平臺(tái)和電子傳遞商）對(duì)抗，目的就是爭(zhēng)奪最大的市場(chǎng)份額。⑨See,e.g.,Robert Levine,Free Ride:How the Internet is Destroying the Culture Business and How the Culture Business Can Fight Back(London 2011);Jonathan Taplin,Move Fast and Break Things:How Facebook,Google,and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undermined Democracy(New York 2017);Guy Pessach,“Deconstructing Disintermediation:A Skeptical Copyright Perspective”(2013)31 Cardozo Arts &Entertainment Law Journal 833;Mary Rasenberger &Christine Pepe,“Copyright Enforcement and Online File Hosting Services:Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance”(2012)59 Journal of the Copyright Soc' y U.S.A.627.Compare Stephen E Siwek,Copyright Industries in the U.S.Economy:2016 Report(2016),at http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2016CpyrtRptFull.PDF,with Computer and Communications Industry Association,Fair Use Industries in the U.S.Economy:Economic Contributions of Industries Relying on Fair Use (2017),at http://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fair-Use-in-the-U.S.-Economy-2017.pdf;US Copyright Office,Section 512 Study,https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/ (2017)(public comments and transcripts of public roundtables).

版權(quán)學(xué)者在沒(méi)有我們幫助的情況下，由他們自己解決該爭(zhēng)議。如果上述爭(zhēng)議的核心問(wèn)題是關(guān)于版權(quán)法更應(yīng)該偏向出版商還是平臺(tái)，或者反之亦然；而且該問(wèn)題的答案也不太可能會(huì)對(duì)版權(quán)系統(tǒng)產(chǎn)生重大影響。在這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)議中，雙方都沒(méi)有太多道德方面的主張。⑩See Jane C.Ginsburg,“The Place of the Author in Copyright”in Ruth L.Okediji (ed.),Copyright Law in an Age of Exceptions and Limitations (New York 2017),60,66-68.雙方都是實(shí)力雄厚且可以雇傭許多律師來(lái)保護(hù)自己，以至于他們根本無(wú)需版權(quán)法學(xué)者們的支持。在這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)議中，版權(quán)法體系需要解決的反而是其他問(wèn)題，而不是來(lái)自理論或政策層面的壓力。如果在傳統(tǒng)中間商與新潮中間商之間利益分配不會(huì)過(guò)多影響版權(quán)法所調(diào)整的作者與讀者之間的利益平衡而做的決定，那么許多學(xué)者對(duì)此將會(huì)失去研究興趣。因此，在我們各自收回此前的詆毀后，我希望版權(quán)學(xué)者們能夠離開(kāi)這個(gè)問(wèn)題去思考更加有意思的問(wèn)題上。

本文試圖做兩件事。第一，將聚焦于一個(gè)在之前爭(zhēng)議中本來(lái)應(yīng)具有中心地位卻不知何故未具有中心地位的重要問(wèn)題上，即所有論述都認(rèn)為作者在版權(quán)法體系中處于中心地位，但是，事實(shí)上版權(quán)法幾乎沒(méi)有賦予作者權(quán)力，也沒(méi)有給予他們足夠的金錢(qián)回報(bào)。如果一個(gè)有意為作者利益設(shè)計(jì)的法律體系反而系統(tǒng)性地不公正地對(duì)待作者，那么我們就得思考為什么會(huì)出現(xiàn)這樣的問(wèn)題，我們又應(yīng)當(dāng)如何回應(yīng)？盡管版權(quán)學(xué)者時(shí)常提及該問(wèn)題?See,e.g.,William Patry,Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars(Oxford 2009),117-19;Daniel Gervais,“User-Generated Content and Music File-Sharing:A Look at Some of the More Interesting Aspects of Bill C-32”in Michael Geist (ed.),From“Radical Extremism”to“Balanced Copyright”:Canadian Copyright And The Digital Agenda (Toronto 2010),447,450;Rebecca Giblin,“Reimagining Copyright’s Duration”in Rebecca Giblin &Kimberly Weatherall (eds.),What If We Could Reimagine Copyright? (2017),177,193-96;Ginsburg,supra note ;P.Bernt Hugenholtz,The Great Copyright Robbery:Rights Allocation in a Digital Environment (2000),at https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/thegreatcopyrightrobbery.pdf;Molly Van Houweling,“Authors vs Owners”(2016)54 Houston Law Review 371;Molly Van Houweling,“Distributive Values in Copyright”(2004)83 Tex.Law Review 1535.，但也僅給予一點(diǎn)關(guān)注。其次，本文試圖回答為何我們不關(guān)心現(xiàn)實(shí)世界里作者享有極其微小的版權(quán)利益這個(gè)問(wèn)題。畢竟該問(wèn)題不管是理論上還是實(shí)踐中都非常重要，那么為何我們不為此多寫(xiě)點(diǎn)呢？本文認(rèn)為該答案至少部分源自我們像法律人?譯者注：按照元照法律詞典中l(wèi)awyer的釋義，是指對(duì)從事法律職業(yè)者或者擁有法學(xué)知識(shí)者的總稱(chēng)。因此，本文將其翻譯成“法律人”，視為一個(gè)泛稱(chēng)。具體含義是，法律人從學(xué)習(xí)法律伊始就被灌輸財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)可以自由轉(zhuǎn)讓的法律理念，并且在他們的教育中認(rèn)為版權(quán)屬于財(cái)產(chǎn)，自然需要遵循財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的流轉(zhuǎn)規(guī)則。因此，版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓意味著財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)人地位的承接。這是法律人“約定俗成”的概念。那樣思考財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的規(guī)則。

一、被削弱權(quán)力的作者

我要感謝我的先驅(qū)者們。盡管二十一世紀(jì)的版權(quán)法是一個(gè)具有一系列且有時(shí)目的不統(tǒng)一的復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)，但是我相信在這些目的中最為重要的包括：首先，版權(quán)法應(yīng)當(dāng)鼓勵(lì)作者創(chuàng)作并廣泛傳播作品；其次，版權(quán)法應(yīng)當(dāng)提供作者從作品中獲得收益的機(jī)會(huì)；再次，版權(quán)法應(yīng)當(dāng)鼓勵(lì)讀者、聽(tīng)眾、觀(guān)眾以及其他使用者從作品中獲得接觸、享受與認(rèn)知。?Jessica Litman,“Real Copyright Reform”(2010)96 Iowa Law Rev.1.See also,e.g.,Doctorow,Information Doesn't Want to be Free,pp.153-54.盡管還有其他目的，但那些都是附屬性的。援用亞馬遜公司副總裁魯斯·格蘭迪內(nèi)蒂（Russ Grandinetti）的話(huà)，整個(gè)版權(quán)法體系中只需要作者與讀者即可。?See David Streatfield,“Amazon Signs Up Authors,Writing Publishers Out of Deal”New York Times,17 Oct.2011 at p.A1(quoting Grandinetti as having said,“The only really necessary people in the publishing process now are the writer and reader”).

當(dāng)然，版權(quán)系統(tǒng)需要中間商將作品傳播給讀者，并且也需要將因作品消費(fèi)所取得的收入分配給作者。但是對(duì)于法律是否應(yīng)當(dāng)傾向于相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中的某一家中間商，我們也可以在所不問(wèn)。而其中最重要的考量因素就是他們?nèi)绾瓮瓿上蜃x者傳播作品并將收益返給作者的任務(wù)。?許多中介機(jī)構(gòu)，無(wú)論是圖書(shū)出版商、在線(xiàn)市場(chǎng)還是社交媒體平臺(tái)，都合理地看待他們?cè)谑袌?chǎng)分析、戰(zhàn)略和設(shè)計(jì)方面的努力，以獲得巨大的創(chuàng)造力。當(dāng)然，可比較的創(chuàng)造力通常需要的銷(xiāo)售產(chǎn)品不是作者的作品，如手推車(chē)或辣醬。中間人對(duì)版權(quán)生態(tài)系統(tǒng)作出創(chuàng)造性和有價(jià)值的貢獻(xiàn)這一事實(shí)，并沒(méi)有使其成為不可或缺的受益者。

那么，我們不妨先了解一下他們是如何完成這項(xiàng)任務(wù)的。當(dāng)今全球版權(quán)體系是如何為作者和讀者服務(wù)的呢？在學(xué)術(shù)生涯中，我花了大量精力去討論讀者以及其他消費(fèi)者的利益極少得到關(guān)注這一問(wèn)題。?See,e.g.,Jessica Litman,“Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why we Can't‘Just Say Yes'to Licensing)”(1997)29 N.Y.U.Journal of International Law &Policy 237;Jessica Litman,“The Exclusive Right to Read”(1994)13 Cardozo Arts &Entertainment Law Journal 29;Jessica Litman,“Lawful Personal Use”(2007)85 Texas Law Review 1871.版權(quán)法中有關(guān)讀者的問(wèn)題并沒(méi)有消失。其一，至少在美國(guó)，讀者獲得作品是以放棄他們一大堆的個(gè)人隱私為代價(jià)。?See,e.g.,John M.Newman,“The Myth of Free”(2018)86 G.W.Law Rev.513,551-55;Geoffrey A.Fowler,“Your Data is WayMore Exposed than You Think”,Wall Street Journal,24 May 2017,at https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-data-is-way-more-exposed-than-yourealize-1495657390;SamSchechner &Nick Kostove,Google and Facebook Likely to Benefit from Europe,s Privacy Crackdown,Wall Street Journal,23 April 2017,at https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-europes-new-privacy-rules-favor-google-and-facebook-1524536324.盡管美國(guó)政策制定者已經(jīng)開(kāi)始意識(shí)到這種方式的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但現(xiàn)在去改變這些政策已為時(shí)已晚。其二，至少到目前為止，許多版權(quán)人通過(guò)強(qiáng)勢(shì)的終端用戶(hù)許可協(xié)議約束消費(fèi)者，從而成功剝奪了版權(quán)法賦予使用者的權(quán)利。?See Aaron Perzanowski &Jason Schultz,The End of Ownership (Cambridge,MA 2016),15-101;Margaret Jane Radin,Boilerplate (Princeton 2013),33-51,168-76;see,e.g.,Lewis Hyde,Common As Air:Revolution,Art,and Ownership (New York 2010),66-68.本文所顧慮的乃是從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，這種做法會(huì)侵蝕版權(quán)體系。盡管版權(quán)法中有關(guān)讀者的問(wèn)題依舊存在，但是在某種程度上，版權(quán)法的宗旨之一還是以不同方式、不同價(jià)格向讀者提供接觸作品的機(jī)會(huì)。就這而言，當(dāng)前版權(quán)體系還是極為成功的。

另一方面，作者的處境更加令人沮喪。實(shí)際上，版權(quán)體系并沒(méi)有很好地提供作者向公眾傳播作品或者從中收益的可供選擇的渠道。?See,e.g.,Doctorow,note Information Doesn,t Want to be Free,pp.xxii-xxv.假如作者的目標(biāo)是將他們的作品傳播給最好的讀者并且從中獲利，那么他們的選擇十分有限。即使版權(quán)人通過(guò)最合適的渠道將作品傳播給讀者，但他仍然需要接受這樣的事實(shí)，即那些控制著傳播渠道的中間商也可能控制了作品傳播并且截留了大部分收益。?See Litman,“Real Copyright Reform”,pp.8-12.

從十八世紀(jì)到 二十世紀(jì)，中間商控制大部分收益的做法才看似合理。因?yàn)槟菚r(shí)紙質(zhì)價(jià)格昂貴，?See Michael A.Carroll,“Whose Music is it Anyway? How We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of Property”(2004)72 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1405,1471.大眾傳播需要紙并伴隨著印刷出版、書(shū)店、倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)、卡車(chē)、電影攝像機(jī)與電影院、廣播站與通信衛(wèi)星等一系列環(huán)節(jié)，這些都需要投入大量的資本。?See,e.g.,Jessica Litman,“Sharing and Stealing”(2004)26 Hastings Communication &Entertainment Law Journal 1,2.在此背景下，中間商希望從作品所產(chǎn)生的收益中截取一部分是合理的，而其中大部分的收益被用于支付復(fù)制與分銷(xiāo)等成本。

到了二十一世紀(jì)，上述這種解釋就很難成立了。至少許多當(dāng)下流行的復(fù)制品和分銷(xiāo)的替代方式是價(jià)格低廉的。?See,e.g.,Hyde,common as Air,pp.64-65;Mark A.Lemley,“IP in a World Without Scarcity”(2015)90 NYU Law Review 460,482-94.數(shù)字復(fù)制、數(shù)字下載與在線(xiàn)流媒體十分廉價(jià)，任何人都有能力支付。同時(shí)，該實(shí)際情形也被認(rèn)為是導(dǎo)致消費(fèi)者盜版增加的主要原因。?See,e.g.,Orin Kerr,“A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act”in Adam Thierer &Clyde Wayne Crews (eds.),CopyFights:The Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age (Washington 2002),163,165-67;Fred Von Lohmann,“Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet:Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures”(2004)24 Loyola Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 635,638-43.據(jù)說(shuō)這個(gè)時(shí)候傳播與消費(fèi)作品所產(chǎn)生的收益處于歷史最高水平。?See,e.g.,Joshua P.Friedlander,RIAA Year-End Music Industry Revenue Report,22 March 2018,at http://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/RIAA-Year-End-2017-News-and-Notes.pdf;Stephen E.Siwek,Copyright Industries in the US Economy:The 2016 Report (Dec.2016),at https://iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/01/2016CpyrtRptFull-1.pdf;Andrew Szamosszegi and Mary Ann McCleary,Fair Use in the US Economy(2017),at https://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fair-Use-in-the-U.S.-Economy-2017.pdf.Reports focusing on particular income streams earned by some legacy intermediaries don,t count all of the revenue that new-fangled intermediaries are collecting as a result of the online dissemination of works of authorship.See,e.g.,Statista,Dossier:Film Industry in the U.S.(2018),at https://www.statista.com/study/11472/filmindustry-in-the-united-states-statista-dossier/.That money is of course part of the total that should be available for author compensation.Moreover,those industry sector-specific reports indicate that legacy intermediaries are earning impressive profits,despite the large amounts of money paid to platforms and other new-fangled intermediaries.See,e.g.,ibid.;Friedlander,“RIAA Year-End Music Industry Revenue Report”,p.1.然而，作者們卻指出他們現(xiàn)在的收益反而比過(guò)去少很多。?See,e.g.,Katherine Cowdray,“ALCS Survey Finds 15% Drop in Average Author Earnings Since 2013”The Bookseller,27 June 2018,at https://www.thebookseller.com/news/alcs-reveals-average-author-earnings-even-lower-four-years-ago- 818891;David Dupont,“Composer Maria Schneider Warns Students about the Future of the Music Industry”Bowling Green Independent News,31 March 2018,at http://bgindependentmedia.org/composer-maria-schneider-warns-students-about-the-future-of-the-music-industry/;Malcolm Harris,“How Much is a Word Worth?”Medium,16 April 2018 at https://medium.com/s/story/how-much-is-a-word-worth-7fcd131a341c;Douglas Preston,“Why is it So Goddamned Hard to Make a Living as a Writer Today?”(Summer 2017)Authors Guild Bulletin 63.

有觀(guān)點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，上述問(wèn)題是由版權(quán)密集產(chǎn)業(yè)的“贏(yíng)者通吃”結(jié)構(gòu)所致。例如，J.K.羅琳27See James B.Stewart,“In the Chamber of Secrets:J.K.Rowling's Net Worth”New York Times,24 November 2016,at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/business/in-the-chamber-of-secrets-jk-rowlings-net-worth.html.、達(dá)明安·赫斯特28See Eileen Kinsella,“Damien Hirst and Anish Kapoor Land on UK Rich List(Again)”Artnet News,8 May 2017,at https://news.artnet.com/art-world/artists-on-sunday-times-rich-list-952055.、碧昂斯·諾里斯29See Zack O,Malley Greenburg,“The World,s Highest Paid Women in Music 2017”Forbes,20 November 2017,at https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2017/11/20/the-worlds-highest-paid-women-in-music-2017/.、喬治·盧卡斯30See Zack O,Malley Greenburg,“America,s Wealthiest Celebrities:The Top 10 by Net Worth”,Forbes,18 December 2017,at https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2017/12/18/americas-wealthiest-celebrities-2017-the-top-ten-by-networth/.和林·曼努爾·米蘭達(dá)31See Michael Paulson &David Gelles,“Hamilton,Inc.:The Path to a Billion-Dollar Broadway Show”8 June 2016,at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/theater/hamilton-inc-the-path-to-a-billion-dollar-show.html.通過(guò)版權(quán)作品賺得“盆滿(mǎn)缽滿(mǎn)”。而大部分作者通常都要面臨著在貧困邊緣生活或者白天再做一份工來(lái)養(yǎng)活家庭的現(xiàn)實(shí)困境。32See,e.g.,Todd London &Ben Pesner,Outrageous Fortune:The Life and Times of the New American Play(New York 2009),50-96;Rachel Deahl,“New Guild Survey Reveals Majority of Authors Earn Below Poverty Line”P(pán)ublishers Weekly,Sept.11,2015,at https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/68008-new-guild-survey-reveals-majority-of-authors-earn-below-povertyline.html ;Johanna Gibson,Phillip Johnson,&Gaetano Dimita,The Business of Being an Author:A Survey of Authors’ Earnings and Contracts(April 2015),at https://orca.cf.ac.uk/72431/1/Final%20Report%20-%20For%20Web%20Publication.pdf;Martin Kretschmer,“Does CopyrightLaw Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Creators Earnings”(21 May 2012),available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2063735 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/4899875.pdf.盡管反差明顯，但這并不新鮮。33See,e.g.,Herman Finklestein,“The Copyright Law:A Reappraisal”(1956)104 U.Penn.Law Review 1025,1051;Maureen O’Rourke,“Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini”(2003)53 Case Western Reserve Law Review 605,613-14.作者收益比從前還少，還有其他因素導(dǎo)致的。

這是一個(gè)多方原因?qū)е碌膹?fù)雜問(wèn)題，其中一個(gè)原因就是許多中間商想方設(shè)法既要賺得更多，又要向作者支出更少。本文已經(jīng)提到這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)發(fā)生在老式中間商與新潮中間商之間，在面對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)服務(wù)提供者與平臺(tái)收刮了大部分版權(quán)作品收益時(shí)，老式中間商被激怒了。他們自創(chuàng)了一個(gè)口號(hào)叫“價(jià)值缺口”（value gap）來(lái)表達(dá)新式中間商擁有太強(qiáng)的談判權(quán)力并且會(huì)用該權(quán)力拿下一個(gè)更低價(jià)格的訴求。34See Glenn Peoples,“War of Words:Labels and Trade Groups Target YouTube,s ‘Value Gap,”Billboard,13 April 2016,at https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7333110/war-of-words-labels-trade-groups-youtube-value-gap;see,e.g.,Joint Comments of the American Association of Independent Music et.al.,In re:Section 512 Study,31 March 2016,at https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Music-Community-Submission-in-re-DMCA-512-FINAL-7559445.pdf;International Federation of the Phonographic Industry,Europe’s Creators,Cultural and Creative Industries’ Call to the European Council:Secure the Aims of the Proposed Copyright Directive in the DSM (12 April 2018),at http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/EU_Creators_Cultural_and_Creative_Industries_Call_to_European_Co uncil.pdf.出版社、唱片公司與電影制片廠(chǎng)認(rèn)為法律制定者應(yīng)當(dāng)改變法律向他們傾斜，如此一來(lái)他們可以要到更高的價(jià)格。35See,e.g.,IFPI,Rewarding Creativity:Fixing the Value Gap,http://www.ifpi.org/value_gap.php (visited April 19,2018).與此同時(shí)，他們通過(guò)構(gòu)建許可交易將支付給作者的版稅降至最低，從而彌補(bǔ)他們覺(jué)得少得可憐的許可費(fèi)用。36See,e.g.,Kristiella Garcia,“Private Copyright Reform”(2013)20 Mich.Telecom.7 Technology Law Review 1,22-23,27-29.舉個(gè)例子，如果Spotify或者YouTube網(wǎng)站通過(guò)向音樂(lè)出版商和唱片公司提供公司股權(quán)，或者通過(guò)向版權(quán)所有人一攬子預(yù)付年度許可費(fèi)用的方式為音樂(lè)的使用支付對(duì)價(jià)，則這些許可費(fèi)用無(wú)需轉(zhuǎn)給作曲家或音樂(lè)家。37See,e.g.,19 Recordings v.Sony Music Entertainment,No.14-CV-1056 (SDNY filed 24 June 2015);Zack O,Malley Greenburg,“Revenge of The Record Labels:How the Majors Renewed Their Grip on Music”,Forbes,15 April 2015,at https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2015/04/15/revenge-of-the-record-labels-how-the-majors-renewed-their-grip-on-music.In 2016,major record labels in the United States announced that musicians would eventually be paid a share of the prof its that the labels earned from selling their equity stakes in Spotify,but have been slow to disclose specifics.Zack O’Malley Greenburg,“Spotify Goes Public at $30 Billion.When will Artists See Any of That?”Forbes,3 April 2018,at https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2018/04/03/spotify-ipo-goes-public-at-30-billion-when-will-artists-seeany-of-that.Sony Music Entertainment sold half of its equity stake on Spotify in April of 2018,earning an estimated $761 million.In June of 2018,the company promised that it would pass along a portion of the proceeds from the sale to artists and independent labels beginning in August.See Melinda Newman,“Sony Music Entertainment to Start Paying Indie Artists and Labels Spotify Sale Proceeds as Early as August”Billboard,14 June 2018,at https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8461117/sony-music-canada-spotify-pay-indie-artists-labels.Warner Music sold 75% of its stake in Spotify in May of 2018,but,as of this writing,has not revealed its plans for sharing the money with creators.

類(lèi)似的是，出版商通過(guò)重新解釋既有合同條款與重新起草合同以降低作品數(shù)字傳播的許可費(fèi)率。在二十世紀(jì)圖書(shū)、音樂(lè)出版與復(fù)制的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)合同中，作者往往取得出版與分銷(xiāo)作品復(fù)制件收入中極小一部分和作品許可給其他商家的收入的大部分。38See,e.g.,Richard Curtis,How to Be Your Own Literary Agent:An Insider,s Guide to Getting Your Book Published (New York 2003),62-76,295-97;Nina Aragon,“Note:Calculating Artists’Royalties:An Analysis of the Courts’Dualistic Interpretations of Recording Contracts Negotiated in a Pre-Digital Age”(2017)2017 Cardozo Law Review De Novo 180,184-88;Lawrence Blake &Daniel K.Stuart,“Analysis of a Recording Contract”in Mark Halloran (ed.)The Musician,s Business and Legal Guide (Upper Saddle River 2008),282,312-13.這種情況很合理，因?yàn)閺?fù)制作品的許可費(fèi)低反映了復(fù)制件生產(chǎn)與分銷(xiāo)上的高昂成本，而許可交易中并不涉及這些成本。盡管獲得許可的出版商和唱片公司致力于音樂(lè)和電子書(shū)發(fā)行服務(wù)使作品可付費(fèi)數(shù)字下載，但是，他們堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為他們只需支付以前用于銷(xiāo)售復(fù)制品的較低版稅率——這就是他們支付的費(fèi)率。39See,e.g.,FBT Productions v.Aftermath Records,621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir 2010);Tavares v.Capitol Records,LLC,2013 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 34317 (ND Cal.2013);cf.Keiler v Harlequin Enters.,751 F.3d 64 (2d Cir.2013)(book publisher evaded 50% license royalty by sublicensing to its own subsidiary for an artificially low price).There,s been some litigation over this,with mixed results.One court concluded that the plain language of particular contracts obliges record labels to pay the larger licensing royalty for digital downloads.FBT Productions v Aftermath Records,621 F.3d at 964-66.A different court held that the plain language of an essentially similar contract supports the argument that royalties for digital download licenses should be the same as royalties for the sale of hard copies.Malmsteen v.Universal Music Group,940 F.Supp.2D 123,132-33 (SDNY 2013).

在某個(gè)層面上，這些做法都不會(huì)讓我們感到驚訝，因?yàn)榭刂坪贤瑮l款的人將以最能促進(jìn)自身利益的方式來(lái)構(gòu)建這些條款。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)，值得注意的是：最近的這些舉動(dòng)很少引起法律學(xué)者的關(guān)注。事實(shí)上，盡管我們都有可能意識(shí)到這些動(dòng)態(tài)發(fā)展（因?yàn)槲覀兩钤谶@個(gè)世界上），但是如果你閱讀了大部分美國(guó)版權(quán)學(xué)者關(guān)于版權(quán)法修訂的文章，你會(huì)得出結(jié)論：我們不認(rèn)為此事的發(fā)展像其他問(wèn)題那樣令人擔(dān)憂(yōu)。40這種說(shuō)法是有爭(zhēng)議的。的確，有些學(xué)者會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)它具有攻擊性。每個(gè)撰寫(xiě)版權(quán)文章的人都認(rèn)為她的工作是專(zhuān)業(yè)創(chuàng)造者和專(zhuān)業(yè)創(chuàng)造，并認(rèn)為她的建議將改善系統(tǒng)的運(yùn)作方式，以便使創(chuàng)造者最終收益。我并不是說(shuō)學(xué)者們不關(guān)心創(chuàng)作者，或者沒(méi)有提出旨在使他們受益的提案。相反，我認(rèn)為我們的研究很少關(guān)注許多創(chuàng)作者在利用版權(quán)法賦予版權(quán)所有者權(quán)利時(shí)所面臨的實(shí)際障礙。我們幾乎所有人（我并不排除自己）未能檢查最近的版權(quán)實(shí)踐和提案如何為創(chuàng)作者提供比過(guò)去的做法和提案更少的金錢(qián)和控制。如果我們?cè)趯?shí)踐中對(duì)版權(quán)制度的機(jī)制有不完全的理解，那么我們解決它的想法很可能就會(huì)失敗。歐洲學(xué)者最近對(duì)這一系列問(wèn)題給予了更多的關(guān)注，作為修改《歐盟數(shù)字單一市場(chǎng)版權(quán)指令》的一部分，41See European Commission,Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market,14 Sept.2016,at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-593-EN-F1-1.PDF.Most of the controversy centres on whether proposals to rebalance the law to provide more robust rights to publishers and impose more onerous obligations on platforms are good or bad policy.See,e.g.,Pamela Samuelson,“Legally Speaking:The EU,s Controversial Digital Single Market Directive”61 Communications of the ACM (forthcoming November 2018);“Google Criticized for Push Against EU Copyright Reform”Financial Times,26 June 2018,at https://www.ft.com/content/a8031d7a-78a0-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d;Martin Banks,“MEPs Rally Against Planned EU Copyright Reform”The Parliament,8 June 2018,at https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/meps-rally-against-planned-eu-copyright-reform;K.G.Orphanides,“The EU,s Bizarre War on Memes is Totally Unwinnable”Wired,18 June 2018,at http://www.wired.co.uk/article/eu-meme-war-article-13-regulation.他們的報(bào)告令人沮喪?，F(xiàn)實(shí)中由法律賦予作者享有的權(quán)利和接受補(bǔ)償方面遇到重大障礙。42See,e.g.,Lionel Bently,Between a Rock and a Hard Place:The Problems Facing Freelance Creators in the UK Media Marketplace,A Briefing Document on Behalf of the Creators Rights Alliance,29 June 2009,at http://www.creatorsrights.org.uk/media/between.pdf;Gibson,et.al.,“The Business of Being An Author”;Kretschmer,“Does Copyright Law Matter?”然而，提出的解決方案看起來(lái)既溫和又不太可能帶來(lái)顯著改善。43目前歐盟指令草案第3章要求成員國(guó)確保作者和表演者定期收到關(guān)于其作品產(chǎn)生的收入和他們有權(quán)獲得的報(bào)酬的報(bào)告，并為作者和表演者提供申請(qǐng)額外報(bào)酬的機(jī)制。從他們的作品中獲得的收入與談判版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓或許可協(xié)議時(shí)預(yù)期的收入嚴(yán)重不成比例。See note 40,above.然而，對(duì)于目前美國(guó)版權(quán)法改革來(lái)說(shuō)，即便是這些細(xì)微修改似乎也是不可想象的措施。

如果我們所有人都能看到這些問(wèn)題，或者至少看出個(gè)大概，并且至少我們中有些人會(huì)認(rèn)為這些問(wèn)題破壞了版權(quán)制度的價(jià)值和合法性，那么，為什么我們沒(méi)有提出更好的解決方案呢？

一種可能性是，我們中的許多人已經(jīng)得出結(jié)論認(rèn)為這是無(wú)望的、無(wú)法解決的。版權(quán)中間商有太多機(jī)會(huì)利用創(chuàng)作者，但很少有理由不去剝奪他們。在過(guò)去的三百年中，版權(quán)法已經(jīng)納入了各種旨在保護(hù)創(chuàng)作者免受強(qiáng)勢(shì)中間商的規(guī)定，但沒(méi)有一個(gè)特別有效。在美國(guó)，版權(quán)的歷史充滿(mǎn)了法院判決，但是這些判決扼殺了法律保障作者權(quán)利的可能性。

盡管美國(guó)版權(quán)法一直要求只有通過(guò)簽名形式才能轉(zhuǎn)讓版權(quán)。44See,e.g.,Copyright Act of 1790,§ 2,1 Stat.124,1st Cong.2d Sess.(1790);Act.Of February 3,1831,§ § 6,7,21st Cong.2d Sess.(1831);Rev.Stat.§ § 4964,4965.但是，在十九世紀(jì)，出版商說(shuō)服法院并提出這一先決條件并未限制他們從那些沒(méi)有登記和出版的作品中獲得版權(quán)的資格。45See,e.g.,Parton v Prang,18 F.Cas.1273,1278 (C.C.D.Mass.1872);Lawrence v Dana,15 F.Cas.26 (C.C.D.Mass 1869);Pulte v Derby,20 F.Cas.51 (C.C.D.Ohio 1852).See generally Jessica Litman,What Notice Did (2016)96 Boston University Law Review 717,724-31.版權(quán)保護(hù)期的延長(zhǎng)46譯者注：the copyright renewal term中“renewal”原意是指期限的續(xù)展；從版權(quán)保護(hù)期限而言，是指在原版權(quán)法規(guī)定的期限上再延長(zhǎng)版權(quán)保護(hù)的期限。根據(jù)《美國(guó)版權(quán)法》有關(guān)版權(quán)保護(hù)期限的規(guī)定，1978年1月1日之前首次出版的作品，其首次版權(quán)保護(hù)期限為28年，但可續(xù)期一次，續(xù)展保護(hù)期限亦為28年，后由美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)規(guī)定在此基礎(chǔ)上再擴(kuò)張保護(hù)19年，使得續(xù)展保護(hù)期限長(zhǎng)達(dá)47年，而作品總的保護(hù)期限為78年。1978年1月1日之后制作的作品，其版權(quán)保護(hù)期則為作者有生之年加50年，但不能延長(zhǎng)保護(hù)期限。旨在使在第一個(gè)版權(quán)保護(hù)期限內(nèi)轉(zhuǎn)讓其版權(quán)的作者能夠重新協(xié)商任何許可或轉(zhuǎn)讓條款。47H.R.Rep.No.2222,60th Cong.14 (1909).See James J.Guinan,Jr.,“Duration of Copyright:Study No.30”77-79 (1957),reprinted in Copyright Society of the USA,Studies on Copyright vol.1,473,495-97 (1963);Barbara A.Ringer,“Renewal of Copyright:Study No.31”(1960)121-22 reprinted in Copyright Society of the USA,Studies on Copyright vol.2 (1963)503,517-18.然而，1943年音樂(lè)出版商M.Witmark＆Sons說(shuō)服了內(nèi)部存在很大分歧的美國(guó)最高法院，即在原先保護(hù)期限內(nèi)簽訂的轉(zhuǎn)讓延長(zhǎng)保護(hù)期限的約定可以得到保護(hù)。48red Fisher Music Co.v M.Witmark &Sons,318 US 643 (1943).大多數(shù)人駁斥了這樣的論點(diǎn)，即法律應(yīng)被解釋為保留作者重新協(xié)商許可或轉(zhuǎn)讓條款的機(jī)會(huì)：我們被告知，版權(quán)法的政策是保護(hù)作者——如果需要的話(huà)，保護(hù)自己——以及作者無(wú)權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓其續(xù)展利益的解釋進(jìn)一步促使了這一政策。要求我們承認(rèn)作者本性具有不負(fù)責(zé)任，他們經(jīng)常非?？释@得資金，以至于他們?cè)敢庖晕⒈〉膬r(jià)格出售他們的作品，因此他們的轉(zhuǎn)讓不應(yīng)該得到支持。這也不是由法院裁判作者利益是否取決于該問(wèn)題的一方而不是另一方。如果作者沒(méi)有對(duì)其續(xù)展轉(zhuǎn)讓采取有效行為，那么，在他最需要時(shí)候就毫無(wú)意義。沒(méi)有人會(huì)因?yàn)樗麩o(wú)法出售的東西而向作者支付費(fèi)用。我們不能從熟悉的有關(guān)文學(xué)天才的貧困生活的故事中抽出法律原則。即便是我們這樣做了，我們也不能說(shuō)這些人可以得到法律規(guī)則的幫助以阻止他們?cè)谕饷孀钚枰Y金的時(shí)候意識(shí)到自己的財(cái)產(chǎn)。Ibid.at 656-57.在1976年的美國(guó)版權(quán)法中，國(guó)會(huì)用不可剝奪的權(quán)利取代續(xù)展期以終止任何轉(zhuǎn)讓、授權(quán)或者許可，并且明確規(guī)定作者有權(quán)終止“即使存在任何相反的約定”。4917 USC § 203(a)(5).See generally R.Anthony Reese,“Termination Formalities and Notice”(2016)96 Boston University Law Review 895;Authors Alliance,Termination of Transfers (2017),at https://www.authorsalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/20180315-ToT-Templates.pdf.美國(guó)眾議院報(bào)告解釋說(shuō)，與續(xù)展期的所有權(quán)相反，“采取此行為的權(quán)利不能提前放棄或者以合同約定的方式予以排除”。50H.R.Rep.No.1476,94th Cong.125 (1976).然而，版權(quán)的受讓人已經(jīng)制定了旨在破壞不可剝奪終止權(quán)的方案，并且在很大程度上成功地說(shuō)服了法院。51E.g.,Larson v Warner Brothers,640 Fed.Appx.(9th Cir.2016);Marvel Characters .Kirby,726 F.3d.119 (2d Cir.2013);DC Comics v.Pacif ci Pictures Corp.,545 Fed,Appx.678 (9th Cir.2013);Penguin Group (USA)Inc.v Steinbeck,537 F.3d 193,196 (2d Cir.2008),cert.denied,129 S.Ct.2383 (2009);Milne v Stephen Slesinger,Inc.,430 F.3d 1036,1039 (9th Cir.2005).See,e.g.,Lydia Pallas Loren,“Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the Inalienable Right to Terminate”(2010)62 Fla.Law Review 1329;Peter Menell &David Nimmer,“Judicial Resistance to Copyright's Inalienable Right to Terminate Transfers”(2010)33 Columbia Journal of Law &the Arts 227.因此，在實(shí)踐中，作者重新獲得版權(quán)的能力受到了極大的限制。52版權(quán)所有者似乎也不愿意允許他們尋求的新的或增強(qiáng)的版權(quán)權(quán)利受到類(lèi)似的重新收回條款的約束。美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)目前正在考慮“CLASSICS法案”，這項(xiàng)法案將確定在美國(guó)法律將版權(quán)保護(hù)擴(kuò)展到錄音之前錄制的錄音數(shù)字傳輸版稅的權(quán)利。See S.2334,title 2,115th Cong.(2018).雖然該法案被唱片業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)描述為“最終確保那些制作這些永恒歌曲的音樂(lè)家和歌唱家終于得到應(yīng)有的利益”，但請(qǐng)參閱美國(guó)唱片業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)新聞稿：《213位音樂(lè)藝術(shù)家的歷史性聯(lián)盟呼吁國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)經(jīng)典法案，修復(fù)傳統(tǒng)藝術(shù)家的“1972年以前”漏洞》，載https：//www.riaa.com/historic-coalition-213-musical-artists-calls-congress-pass -classics-act-fix-pre-1972-loophole-legacy-artists/，最后訪(fǎng)問(wèn)日期：2018年2月13日。它沒(méi)有任何條款允許錄音的原作者重新獲得他們分配給唱片公司的權(quán)利的所有權(quán)。

同樣在1976年的法案中，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)縮小了獨(dú)立承包者創(chuàng)作的作品被視為雇用作品、依法由創(chuàng)作者的雇主作為作者的情形。根據(jù)美國(guó)現(xiàn)行版權(quán)法，員工創(chuàng)作的作品屬于雇傭作品。然而，由獨(dú)立承包者創(chuàng)作的作品，只有在創(chuàng)作者簽訂了雇傭作品合同時(shí)，才被視為雇用作品。5317 USC §§ 101,201.See Community for Creative Non Violence v Reid,490 US 730 (1989).In addition to imposing the requirement of a signed writing,section 101 limits the category of commissioned works made for hire to nine specific subject matter categories.See United States Copyright Office,Circular No.9:Works Made for Hire (2012),at https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf.但上述法律規(guī)則并不妨礙法院作出以下判決：出于勞動(dòng)與稅法原因，那些不被視為雇員的個(gè)人創(chuàng)作的作品被認(rèn)定為雇員創(chuàng)作的雇用作品54See,e.g.,JustMed v Byce,600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.2010);JAH IP Holdings v Mascio,2014 US Dist Lexis 16246 (D.Colo.2014).；未簽署雇用作品合同的獨(dú)立承包商創(chuàng)作的作品，由支付其創(chuàng)作的實(shí)體作為作者，因?yàn)樵搶?shí)體的決策機(jī)關(guān)使其成為作品的“主要作者”。55See 16 Casa Duse v Merkin,791 F.3d 247,260 (2d Cir.2015).

此外，盡管法院將法律按照有利于作者的原則進(jìn)行解釋?zhuān)沁@些解釋對(duì)作者控制作品或從作品中獲益的機(jī)會(huì)幾乎沒(méi)有實(shí)際改變。1993年，自由撰稿人起訴《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》，聲稱(chēng)《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》將其作品轉(zhuǎn)許可使用在電子和在線(xiàn)數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)上侵犯了他們的復(fù)制、發(fā)行和公開(kāi)表演權(quán)。他們認(rèn)為其最初允許《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》在報(bào)紙上刊登他們的文章，但并沒(méi)有允許《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》將文章轉(zhuǎn)許可給電子數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)服務(wù)。《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》則認(rèn)為，這是法律中的例外情形，即允許匯編作品出版者重印匯編作品中的一部分作品、對(duì)匯編作品的修改或者同一系列中的后期匯編5617 USC § 201(c).，并且有權(quán)將其報(bào)紙的內(nèi)容全部許可給電子出版商。對(duì)該觀(guān)點(diǎn)，初審法院持贊成態(tài)度。57Tasini v NY Times,972 F.Supp.804 (SDNY 2007),rev,d 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.2000),a ff’d 533 US 483 (2001).到了2001年，美國(guó)最高法院在判決指出，法定例外的目的在于保護(hù)作者將作品許可給其他出版商的權(quán)利，同時(shí)使匯編作品的出版者可以印刷修訂版而無(wú)需再次獲得每個(gè)作者的許可。如果出版商可以將匯編作品中獨(dú)立作品許可給電子數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)，那么法定例外的目的就會(huì)受挫。58NY Times v Tasini,533 US 483,499-506 (2001).

為了應(yīng)對(duì)美國(guó)最高法院的判決，《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》宣布，他們不是對(duì)未經(jīng)授權(quán)而將作品許可給電子數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)的行為賠償27,000名自由撰稿人，而是基于作者放棄所有針對(duì)《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》與電子數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)轉(zhuǎn)許可訴求的情況下，允許個(gè)人作者要求《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》繼續(xù)以數(shù)字形式提供所有作品而無(wú)需支付額外費(fèi)用。否則《紐約報(bào)紙》將從其數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)中清除所有這些自由撰稿人的作品。59See Felicity Barringer,“Freelancers Suing Again on Copyright”New York Times,July 6,2001,at https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/06/business/freelancers-suing-again-on-copyright.html:The Times,s current offer to freelancers --about 27,000 are affected,the newspaper estimates --allows them to request that their material remain available electronically.It contains a provision that“should you opt to have your work restored,you agree that you will not be compensated and that you will release The Times from any claims relating to your work appearing in electronic archives such as Nexis.”Any request must cover all of a freelancer,s contributions to The Times;no freelancers can pick and choose how much of their work can remain available.Ibid.See“Tasini v.The New York Times:A Note on the Consequences”2 Complete Review Quarterly #3,August 2001,at http://www.complete-review.com/quarterly/vol2/issue3/tasini.htm.此外，為應(yīng)對(duì)訴訟，《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》和其他大型出版商堅(jiān)持要求所有自由撰稿人簽署雇傭或者包含授權(quán)出版商未來(lái)利用他們作品而無(wú)需支付額外費(fèi)用的全部權(quán)利的合同。60See O,Rourke,“Bargaining in the Shadow”,pp.13-605.正如莫林·奧洛克（Maureen O’Rourke）所說(shuō)，盡管在案件判決中給了自由撰稿人一個(gè)討價(jià)還價(jià)的籌碼，但是缺乏議價(jià)能力導(dǎo)致他們無(wú)法通過(guò)許可受到司法保護(hù)的權(quán)利獲得額外的對(duì)價(jià)。61Ibid.at 606.

美國(guó)境外作者的處境也差不多。最近針對(duì)旨在提高所有創(chuàng)作者數(shù)量的歐盟版權(quán)法改革的研究指出，作者們?nèi)狈τ憙r(jià)還價(jià)的能力導(dǎo)致目前為止所實(shí)施的改革效果不佳。62See,e.g.,Jane C.Ginsburg &Pierre Sirinelli,“Private International Law Aspects of Authors’ Contracts:The Dutch and French Examples”(2015)39 Colum.J.L.&Arts 171;Severine Dusollier,Caroline Ker,Maria Iglesias,&Yolanda Smith,Contractual Arrangements Applicable to Creators:Law and Practice of Selected Member States,Study Commissioned by the European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies(2014),at http://www.cross-innovation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IPOL-JURI_ET2014493041_EN.pdf;Europe Economics IViR,Remuneration of Authors of Books and Scientific Journals,Translators,Journalists and Visual Artists for the Use of their Works:Study Prepared for the European Commission (2016),at https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/remuneration_of_authors_final_report.pdf.

大多時(shí)候，版權(quán)學(xué)者的研究會(huì)忽視金錢(qián)問(wèn)題。即使我們專(zhuān)注于作者的補(bǔ)償，也不會(huì)總關(guān)注這些錢(qián)是否真正進(jìn)入創(chuàng)作者的口袋。最近，我們一直要求版權(quán)集體管理組織對(duì)那些使用時(shí)僅改變作品一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)內(nèi)容的情形予以管理。63See Ariel Katz,“Copyright Collectives:Good Solution but for Which Problem”in Rochelle C.Dreyfuss,Diane Zimmerman &Harry First (eds.),Working Within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property:Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (New York 2010);see,e.g.,Music Modernization Act,H.R.5447,115th Cong.§ 102 (2018)(establishing a new music publisher-owned collective to receive and distribute royalties for a new statutory blanket license for the reproduction of musical compositions in the course of digital streaming).See generally Daniel Gervais (ed.),Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights 3rd ed.(Frederick 2016).我們知道收錢(qián)很容易，但弄清楚如何將這些收入劃給有資格的主張者是非常困難的。64See,e.g.,William Fisher III,Promises to Keep:Technology,Law &the Future of Entertainment(Stanford,CA 2004),207-36;Daniel Gervais,(Re)structuring Copyright:A Comprehensive Path to International Copyright Reform (Cheltenham 2017),238-56;European Commission,Directive on collective management of copyright (4 February 2014),at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/management/;European Commission Sta ff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market 19-29 (11 July 2012)at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012SC0204&from=EN[hereinafter Commission Staff Working Document”].盡管根據(jù)法定的、監(jiān)管的與合同上的規(guī)定，授權(quán)集體許可需要將收益分配給創(chuàng)作者與其他版權(quán)所有人，但是目前我們用于決定如何分配和支付的機(jī)制是不完善的，65See,e.g.,Litman,“Real Copyright Reform”,p.50 &n.229.甚至是存在嚴(yán)重缺陷的。66See,e.g.,Copyright Royalty Board New Developments,10 March 2017,at https://www.crb.gov/ (announcing suspension of royalty distribution proceedings required by 17 USC § 1007);Commission Staff Working Document,pp.15-29.由于集體管理組織本身就是中間商，他們自然會(huì)保護(hù)自己在版權(quán)食物鏈中的位置。67See Jonathan Band &Brandon Butler,“Some Cautionary Tales about Collective Licensing”(2013)21 Michigan State International Law Review 687;see,e.g.,Molly Long,“Publishers Raise New Concerns Over SGAE Practices”IQ Magazine,June 11,2018,at https://www.iq-mag.net/2018/06/publishers-new-concerns-sgae-practices/#.Wx_5t1Mvw74.我們獲知有些集體組織直接將收入中至少一部分分給創(chuàng)作者，有些是向所有權(quán)人付費(fèi)并且依靠所有權(quán)人再向創(chuàng)作者轉(zhuǎn)移相應(yīng)的份額，還有些是向代表創(chuàng)作者的組織發(fā)放資金，并將這些組織的任務(wù)確定為是否以及如何將資金分配給其成員。還有一些是將這筆收入存入一個(gè)“有息賬戶(hù)”，直到潛在的主張者能夠就誰(shuí)有權(quán)收到多少份額的內(nèi)容達(dá)成一致，才根據(jù)他們的協(xié)議分配資金。還有一些根本不支付許可使用費(fèi)，而是將這筆錢(qián)用來(lái)支付行政費(fèi)用并資助好作品。68See,e.g.,Hester Wijminga et.al.,World Intellectual Property Association International Survey on Private Copying:Law and Practice 2016(2017),at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_1037_2017.pdf.

大多數(shù)學(xué)者都沒(méi)有過(guò)多關(guān)注上述這個(gè)問(wèn)題，或試圖確定不同的集體組織使用何種機(jī)制來(lái)決定分配他們收益。這種做法就像是只要規(guī)定消費(fèi)者和使用者必須購(gòu)買(mǎi)門(mén)票才能欣賞版權(quán)保護(hù)的作品，我們的工作就已完成了。作為行使權(quán)力的外在表現(xiàn)形式，收費(fèi)具有政策上的正當(dāng)性，如此一來(lái)，作品使用者能夠明白欣賞一件受版權(quán)法保護(hù)的作品是具有商業(yè)價(jià)值的。當(dāng)許多人因無(wú)法負(fù)擔(dān)或者不愿意支付費(fèi)用而錯(cuò)過(guò)接觸作品時(shí)，這在某種意義上，會(huì)導(dǎo)致作品的浪費(fèi)。盡管如此，但是我們?nèi)匀徽J(rèn)為消遣版權(quán)作品是需要付費(fèi)的。69Cf.Jane C.Ginsburg,“Fair Use for Free,or Permitted-but-Paid?”(2015)29 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1383.即使這就是我們這樣做的原因，我們還是得這樣說(shuō)。另一方面，如果我們聲稱(chēng)收費(fèi)是為了將錢(qián)存入創(chuàng)作者的口袋，那么在說(shuō)這是一個(gè)好主意之前，需要瞧瞧到底有多少錢(qián)可以轉(zhuǎn)入創(chuàng)作者手中。至少在美國(guó)，這個(gè)問(wèn)題并沒(méi)有受到法學(xué)學(xué)者的關(guān)注。70But see Peter DiCola,“Money From Music:Survey Evidence on Musicians,Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives”(2013)55 Arizona Law Review 301.There are a number of recent economic and legal studies from Europe,with discouraging conclusions.See,e.g.,Martin Kretschmer,“Copyright and Contracts:Regulating Creator Contracts:The State of the Art and a Research Agenda”(2010)18 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 141;Ruth Towse,“Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies and Digital Rights:Is there a Case for a Centralised Digital Copyright Exchange?”(2012)9 Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 3;Christian Handke &Ruth Towse,“Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies”(2007)38 International Review of Intellectual Property &Competition Law 937;Ruth Towse,“Copyright and Artists:A View From Cultural Economics”(2006)20 Journal Economic Surveys 567;Europe Economics IViR,”Remuneration of Authors”;Martin Kretschmer,Private Copying and Fair Compensation:An Empirical Study of Copyright Levies in Europe(2011),at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310183/ipresearch-faircomp-201110.pdf.

一些版權(quán)學(xué)者已經(jīng)開(kāi)始提出“創(chuàng)作者是否以及何時(shí)回應(yīng)版權(quán)所承諾的回報(bào)”這樣的問(wèn)題，并嘗試?yán)萌缃?jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、心理學(xué)、神經(jīng)學(xué)、歷史等法學(xué)學(xué)科之外的觀(guān)點(diǎn)來(lái)分析是否可能給出答案。71E.g.,Glynn Lunney,Copyright's Excess:Money and,Music in the US Recording Industry (Cambridge 2018);Christopher Sprigman,“Copyright and Creative Incentives:What We Know(and Dont)”(2017)55 Houston Law Review 451;Rebecca Tushnet,“Economies of Desire:Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions”(2009)51 William &Mary Law Review 513;Diane Zimmerman,“Copyr,ight As Incentives:Did We Just Imagine That?”(2010)12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 29;Martin Senftleben,“Copyright,Creators,&Societys Need for Autonomous Art -The Blessing and Curse of Monetary Incentives”(2017)in Giblin &Weatherall,What If We Could Reimagine Copyright? p.25.See also CREATeCopyright Research Centre at the University of Glasgow,Copyright Evidence Wiki,at http://www.copyrightevidence.org/evidence-wiki/index.php/Copyright_Evidence (cataloguing empirical studies).但是，在不知道創(chuàng)造者是否以及會(huì)在什么情況下確切會(huì)收到這些回報(bào)時(shí)，很難評(píng)估這個(gè)問(wèn)題的答案是否具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。

由于人們認(rèn)為探究作者報(bào)酬問(wèn)題毫無(wú)希望，我們多數(shù)已經(jīng)放棄了對(duì)該問(wèn)題的審視。如果這個(gè)認(rèn)識(shí)是正確的話(huà)，那么現(xiàn)在可能到了重新審視這個(gè)問(wèn)題的時(shí)候。然而，這要求我們面對(duì)我們不再思考的問(wèn)題以及我們很少注意到的版權(quán)體系的特征，因?yàn)槲覀円呀?jīng)習(xí)慣了版權(quán)體系無(wú)法兌現(xiàn)版權(quán)理論承諾的方式。

二、版權(quán)與財(cái)產(chǎn)

在余下部分，本文將會(huì)提出我們很少涉及但應(yīng)當(dāng)提及的一個(gè)原因，即版權(quán)制度通常無(wú)法回報(bào)創(chuàng)作者是在于我們對(duì)合法財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的假設(shè)會(huì)扭曲我們對(duì)版權(quán)法運(yùn)作方式的看法。版權(quán)專(zhuān)家認(rèn)為版權(quán)體系運(yùn)作的方式與應(yīng)該采用的方式是理所當(dāng)然的。身為專(zhuān)業(yè)法律人士的我們應(yīng)當(dāng)明白：財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的法律特征是法律教育最基本的基石，版權(quán)作為一種財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)，也應(yīng)當(dāng)具有財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的法律特征。

控制權(quán)是財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的一個(gè)內(nèi)容。針對(duì)將版權(quán)視為一種財(cái)產(chǎn)形式的爭(zhēng)議，絕大多數(shù)是關(guān)于財(cái)產(chǎn)所有人有權(quán)行使的控制權(quán)上。72See,e.g.,Lawrence Lessig,Free Culture(New York 2004),83-173;Patry,Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars,pp.109-132;Sandra Aistars,Devin Hartline,&Mark Schultz,“Copyright Principles and Priorities to Foster a Creative Digital Marketplace”(2016)23 George Mason Law Review 769;Michael Grynberg,“Property is a Two-Way Street:Personal Copyright Use and Implied Authorization”(2010)79 Fordham Law Review 435;Robert P.Merges,“The Concept of Property in the Digital Era”(2008)45 Houston Law Review 1239;Adam Mossoff,“Is Copyright Property?”(2005)42 San Diego Law Review 29.盡管控制權(quán)是財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)一個(gè)重要內(nèi)容，但是控制權(quán)不是唯一或者最重要的內(nèi)容。畢竟我們有很多不同的方法在不賦予他人財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的情況下給予各人一項(xiàng)法律控制權(quán)。

財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)之所以特別是在于權(quán)利的可轉(zhuǎn)讓性。73Accord,Ginsburg,“The Place of the Author in Copyright”,at pp.66-67.由于將某物視為財(cái)產(chǎn)可更易銷(xiāo)售，那么我們將一項(xiàng)權(quán)利定義為財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)也就是為了鼓勵(lì)權(quán)利的交易。74See,e.g.,Jessica Litman,“Information Privacy/Information Property”(2000)52 Stanford Law Review 1283,1295-1301.財(cái)產(chǎn)可轉(zhuǎn)讓性這一本質(zhì)特征極易被律師視為財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的應(yīng)有之義。版權(quán)作為財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)，按照財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的可轉(zhuǎn)讓性特征，作者轉(zhuǎn)讓因創(chuàng)作而享有版權(quán)之后，版權(quán)人便享有版權(quán)所具有的權(quán)力。這使得出版商、唱片公司和其他中間商機(jī)構(gòu)按照自己的行為方式行事。75See,e.g.,Fisher,Promises to Keep,pp.47-70,204-05;Bently,“Between a Rock and a Hard Place”,pp.15-21;Kretschmer,“Does Copyright Law Matter?”,pp.32-33.這種觀(guān)點(diǎn)會(huì)讓非法律人士感到詫異，但對(duì)法律人士而言，這就是財(cái)產(chǎn)的第二屬性罷了。由于出版商和唱片公司擁有版權(quán)，版權(quán)體系賦予出版商和唱片公司為自身利益構(gòu)建許可交易以及設(shè)置許可期限與條件。

因?yàn)槲覀兪欠蓪?zhuān)業(yè)人士，所以我們知道財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的受讓人能夠取代轉(zhuǎn)讓人的地位，并且有權(quán)行使財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)所具有的權(quán)力。我們之所以假定原始財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)人有機(jī)會(huì)從權(quán)利的價(jià)值中獲取補(bǔ)償，是因?yàn)檫@就是財(cái)產(chǎn)運(yùn)作的方式。實(shí)際上，版權(quán)律師和學(xué)者有時(shí)會(huì)互換使用“作者”和“版權(quán)所有者”這兩個(gè)詞，并將它們視為同義詞。76See,e.g.,Jane C Ginsburg,“Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet”(2000)24 Columbia-VLA Journal of Law &the Arts 1,41;Ralph Oman,“Going Back to First Principles:The Exclusive Rights of Authors Reborn”(2008)8 Journal of High Technology Law 169,176-77,180.畢竟，作者是最初的版權(quán)所有者，而接受她轉(zhuǎn)讓的這些權(quán)利的人有權(quán)取代她的地位。在大多數(shù)情況下，在法律的眼中，所有者就是作者。77See,e.g.,Bhamati Viswanathan &Adam Mossoff,Open-Access Mandates and the Seductively False Promise of“Free”,Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property Briefing Paper 4 (April 2017),at http://apo.org.au/node/93506.Moral rights,of course,are an important exception to this rule.Even in countries with robust moral rights protection,however,those rights appear to have negligible economic value and restrain the exploitation of copyrighted works only in extreme cases.

我們可以更加細(xì)致地了解版權(quán)作為財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)在世界上的實(shí)際表現(xiàn)，應(yīng)該審視我們對(duì)財(cái)產(chǎn)的看法，以確定我們的假設(shè)可能阻止了我們所能看到的事。

三、《美國(guó)道斯法案》與《英國(guó)安娜法令》

本文將岔開(kāi)講述一則小故事，該故事粗看起來(lái)似乎與版權(quán)法毫無(wú)關(guān)聯(lián)。距離現(xiàn)在大約400年的十六、十七世紀(jì)，歐洲殖民者航行到北美洲并以自己主權(quán)的名義開(kāi)發(fā)這片新領(lǐng)地。78See generally Robert T.Anderson,Bethany Berger,Sarah Krakoff &Philip E.Frickey,American Indian Law:Cases and Commentary 3rd ed.(St.Paul 2015),22-25.

不幸的是，在他們來(lái)之前，這片領(lǐng)地已經(jīng)有幾個(gè)世紀(jì)一直生活在這的人。無(wú)論如何，歐洲定居者還是進(jìn)來(lái)了。有時(shí)候，這些歐洲定居者有可能和土著部落共同生活在這片土地上，至少最初是可以的。在其他區(qū)域，土著印第安部落占據(jù)著歐洲人想要控制的區(qū)域。79See generally,e.g.,Nell Jessup Newton,(ed.),Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law:2005 edition (Newark 2005).畢竟印第安人不是白人，也不是基督徒和農(nóng)民，他們并沒(méi)有將土地用于歐洲人認(rèn)為的最好的和最有效的目的。80See ibid.;Eric Kades,“The Dark Side of Efficiency:Johnson v.M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands”(2000)148 U.Penn.Law Review 1065,1076-77.一些歐洲定居者對(duì)于從土著那里奪取土地沒(méi)有絲毫歉疚。暴力沖突由此發(fā)生。81See Bethany Berger,“Red:Racism and the American Indian”(2009)56 UCLA Law Review 591,603-07.See,e.g.,Ethan A Schmidt,The Divided Dominion:Social Conflict and Indian Hatred in Early Virginia (Boulder 2014),45-61 (Anglo-Powhatan wars between English settlers in the Virginia Colony and the Powhatan tribe);Stephen Feeley,“Before Long to be Good Friends:’ Diplomatic Perspectives of the Tuscarora War”in Michelle LeMaster &Bradford J.Wood (eds.),Creating and Contesting Carolina (Columbia 2013),140 (Tuscarora war between Tuscarora tribe and British,German and Dutch settlers in North Carolina);Evan Haefeli,“Kieft,s War and the Cultures of Violence in Colonial America”in Michael A.Bellesiles,(ed.),Lethal Imagination:Violence and Brutality in American History(New York 1999),17 (war between Dutch settlers in the New Netherland colony and the Lenape tribe).

最終，在殺了足夠多的人與破壞了足夠多的財(cái)產(chǎn)后，定居者與部落約定劃分他們之間有爭(zhēng)議的土地。82See Stuart Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land (Cambridge,MA 2005),85-111.但是，定居者一直在尋求擴(kuò)大領(lǐng)土的機(jī)會(huì)，致使之前的約定處于不穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)。在接下來(lái)兩百年左右的時(shí)間里，定居者利用金錢(qián)、游說(shuō)、威脅、公民暴力和軍事力量來(lái)說(shuō)服或強(qiáng)迫印第安部落向西遷移到更偏遠(yuǎn)和不太理想的地方。83See,e.g.,Anderson et.al,American Indian Law,p.50;Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land,pp.191-227.在遷移這一路上，隨之而來(lái)的是針對(duì)印第安部落人的更多暴力事件。84See,e.g.,Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land,pp.121-29;Newton,Cohen’s Handbook,pp.35-36,39-40,44;Angie Deboe,A History of the Indians of the United States(Norman,OK 1970)101-16;Angie Deboe,The Road to Disappearance:A History of the Creek Indians (Norman,OK 1966)72-107.在十九世紀(jì)的大部分時(shí)間里，美國(guó)軍隊(duì)都忙于與印第安部落進(jìn)行一場(chǎng)又一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。85See Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land,pp.237-47;see,e.g.,Newton,Cohen,s Handbook,pp.51-54,71;E.A.Schwartz,The Rogue River Indian War and Its Aftermath:1859-1980(Norman,OK 1997)69-160.

美國(guó)的法院認(rèn)為，盡管印第安人實(shí)際上沒(méi)有控制這些土地，但是他們占領(lǐng)這些土地的權(quán)利是可被強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行的。86E.g.,Johnson’s Lessee v.M’Intosh,21 US 543 (1923);see Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land,pp.150-90;Lindsay G.Robinson,“The Judicial Conquest of Native America:The Story of Johnson v.M,Intosh”in Carol e Goldberg,Kevin K.Washburn &Philip P.Frickey (eds.),Indian Law Stories (New York 2011),29.美利堅(jiān)合眾國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府因?yàn)橄驓W洲裔美國(guó)人開(kāi)放印第安人土地以供定居面臨巨大的壓力。87See Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land,pp.195-226.同時(shí)，通過(guò)金錢(qián)和戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的方式趕走部落的人。那些曾同意重新安置在密西西比河以西的印第安部落又被要求搬遷到其他地方，但是他們?cè)絹?lái)越不愿意這種“連根拔起式”的遷移88See ibid.at pp.197-201,212-17,222-26;Newton,Cohen’s Handbook,pp.51-54,73.，再加上政府的土地已經(jīng)用完。89See Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land,228-36.隨之而來(lái)的是出現(xiàn)更多暴力事件。90See,e.g.,Anderson et.al,American Indian Law,pp.74-77;Newton,Cohen,s Handbook,pp.70-71,73.

美國(guó)白人憎惡部落控制著這些土地，他們認(rèn)為這些土地理應(yīng)歸于他們。他們通過(guò)一系列包括一些非法手段在內(nèi)的方式，從土著部落人手里搶奪土地。91See Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land,pp.214-27,237-45.

最終，一系列法律終止了美國(guó)白人的這些伎倆，其中最著名的是《美國(guó)道斯法案》，也稱(chēng)為《1887年分配法案》。92General Allotment Act of Feb.8,1887,24 Stat.388,ch.119.See also Act for the Protection of the People of Indian Territory,Pub.L.55-515,30 Stat.495 (1898)(“Curtis Act”);Dawes Act Amendment of 1891,26 Stat.794 (1891);General Allotment Act Amendment of 1906,Pub.L.59-149,34 Stat.182 (1906)(“Burke Act”);Act Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to allot homesteads to the natives of Alaska,Pub.L.59-171,34 Stat.197 (1906).For historical background on the allotment policy and a brief description of initial allotment efforts preceding the Dawes Act,see generally Newton,Cohen’s Handbook,66-69,75-78.《美國(guó)道斯法案》并沒(méi)有剝奪部落人手中的土地，而是將部落土地的所有權(quán)劃給印第安人。該法案將印第安部落控制的大片土地分成了160英畝的地塊，并以短期信托與絕對(duì)地產(chǎn)所有權(quán)的方式將每個(gè)地塊分給每一個(gè)印第安戶(hù)主。在信托期間，法律允許印第安權(quán)利人將其土地再轉(zhuǎn)租給美國(guó)白人。信托期屆滿(mǎn)之后，擁有土地的印第安戶(hù)主可以自由地將其出售給任何買(mǎi)主。任何未分配的地塊被當(dāng)成“剩余土地”，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府可以從部落手中購(gòu)買(mǎi)，之后還可出售給非印第安人。本文認(rèn)為，在支持當(dāng)時(shí)法案的人中間，有一部分人是相信該法案賦予了印第安人對(duì)地塊的所有權(quán)。但是，也有部分人的想法是消極的。無(wú)論如何，若法律的目的之一是鼓勵(lì)土地從印第安部落流轉(zhuǎn)到美國(guó)白人的話(huà)，那結(jié)果無(wú)疑是成功的。很快，絕大多數(shù)印第安部落的土地通過(guò)印第安人的手轉(zhuǎn)售給了非印第安人。最終獲勝的是白人定居者與土地投機(jī)者，而印第安人最終只能陷入貧困和流離失所。93Banner,How the Indians Lost their Land,pp.257-93;see Judith V.Royster,“The Legacy of Allotment”(1995)27 Ariz.St.L.J.1,10-14.In 1934,Congress repudiated the allotment program.The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 prohibited further allotment of Indian land and sought to return to the tribes some portion of the 90 million acres of Indian land that had passed into non-Indian ownership.Indian Reorganization Act,Pub.L.No.73-383,48 Stat.984 (1934)(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.§§ 461-479 (1976).See Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v.State of Montana,729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir.1984)(en banc),aff,d 471 US 759 (1985).

本文試圖從上述故事中析出與版權(quán)律師所熟知的法律之間的幾個(gè)相似點(diǎn)。這個(gè)故事出現(xiàn)的時(shí)間與上述故事差不多。在十六世紀(jì)至十七世紀(jì)，英國(guó)出版同業(yè)公會(huì)（Stationers’Company）的成員壟斷了出版，并且通過(guò)限于成員之間的橫向貿(mào)易來(lái)進(jìn)一步鞏固壟斷。94See,e.g.,L.Ray Patterson,Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville 1968),28-77;Ian Gadd,“The Stationers Company in England Before 1710”in Isabella Alexander &H.Tomas Gomez-Arostegui (eds.),Research Handbook on the History of Copyright Law (Cheltenham 2018),81,88-92.經(jīng)過(guò)一個(gè)多世紀(jì)的出版業(yè)務(wù)的控制，出版同業(yè)工會(huì)確信他們有權(quán)繼續(xù)享有這樣的壟斷權(quán)。畢竟，他們?cè)谟∷⒑弯N(xiāo)售文本上面投入了大量資金和精力。當(dāng)議會(huì)拒絕重新授權(quán)出版同業(yè)公會(huì)成員印刷壟斷的許可法案時(shí)，出版同業(yè)公會(huì)進(jìn)行了艱苦的游說(shuō)，以說(shuō)服政府恢復(fù)原來(lái)的許可法案。95See Cyprian Blagden,The Stationers Company:A History 1403-1959(London 1960),153-77;Ronan Deazley,On the Origin of the Right to Copy (Oxford 2004),1-50;Isabella Alexander,“All Change for the Digital Economy:Copyright and Business Models in the Early Eighteenth Century”(2010)25 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1351;Gadd,“The Stationers Company in England Before 1710”,pp.92-95.

本文不想過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)化《英國(guó)安娜法令》制定過(guò)程中所涉及的復(fù)雜的衡量因素96Statute of Anne,8.Anne,c.19 (1710).See,e.g.,Deazley,On the Origin of the Right to Copy,pp.31-50;Alexander,“All Change for the Digital Economy”,pp.1354-62;H.Tomas Gomez-Arostegui,“The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit under the Statute of Anne in 1710”(2010)25 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1247,1251-58;Jessica Litman,“Readers’ Copyright”(2011)58 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 325,332-35.，或者減少有關(guān)包括保護(hù)大學(xué)、讀者與消費(fèi)者的規(guī)定97See ArielKatz,“Copyright,Exhaustion,and the Role of Libraries in the Ecosystem of Knowledge”(2016)13 I/S Journal of Law &Policy for the Information Society 81,84-86;Litman,“Readers, Copyright”,pp.333-35.，或者建議那些法律支持者不要相信法律會(huì)賦予作者權(quán)利。因?yàn)闊o(wú)論何種意圖，最終法律都很好地服務(wù)于出版同業(yè)公會(huì)的成員。法律鼓勵(lì)作者將版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓給印刷商和出版商，畢竟這些人都是出版業(yè)者。此后三百年，版權(quán)交易局面就這樣維持著。98See Patterson,Copyright in Historical Perspective,pp.143-50,213-21.

世界其他地方都遵循這一模式。99See,e.g.,OrenBracha,“The Adventures of the Statuteof Anneinthe Land of Unlimited Possibilities:The Life of a Legal Transplant”(2010)25 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1427.幾乎每個(gè)國(guó)家，都將保護(hù)作者視為版權(quán)保護(hù)的第一要義。隨后通過(guò)版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓?zhuān)霭嫔毯推渌虚g商控制與擁有了版權(quán)。100See Jane C.Ginsburg &Edouard Treppoz,International Copyright Law US and EU Perspectives:Text and Cases (Cheltenham 2015);Paul Goldstein &Bernt Hugenholz,International Copyright 2nd ed.(Oxford 2010),244-69;Ginsburg,“The Place of the Author in Copyright”,pp.63-66.在資本主義既是經(jīng)濟(jì)制度又是主流信仰的美國(guó)，法院都特別渴望得出這樣的結(jié)論：即使沒(méi)有證據(jù)證明版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓?zhuān)ㄔ阂琅f假定作者已將版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓給出版商。法院的這種傾向性觀(guān)點(diǎn)到現(xiàn)在依然存在。101See Litman,“What Notice Did”,pp.732-34;see,e.g.,Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co.,188 U.S.239,248-49 (1903);Edward Thompson Co.Am.Law Book Co.,119 F.217,219 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1902);Colliery Eng'r Co.v United Correspondence Schs.,94 F.152,153(C.C.S.D.N.Y.1899).當(dāng)版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓這一情況不能簡(jiǎn)單地假定時(shí)，法院在版權(quán)制度中創(chuàng)造了雇傭作品規(guī)則的學(xué)說(shuō)。102See Catherine Fisk,“Authors at Work:The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine”(2003)15 Yale J.L &Humanities 1.

上述兩則故事的寓意在于，當(dāng)最初不擁有某一資源的控制權(quán)時(shí)，通過(guò)將該資源認(rèn)定為財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的對(duì)象是獲得資源控制權(quán)極為有效的辦法。103譯者注：在《美國(guó)道斯法案》的故事中，原本美國(guó)白人對(duì)土地并不享有控制權(quán)，這些土地天然屬于印第安部落。但是，美國(guó)白人希望控制這些土地。他們通過(guò)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、金錢(qián)等合法的、非法的方式，奪走印第安部落的土地，但帶來(lái)了一系列的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)?！睹绹?guó)道斯法案》的出現(xiàn)雖然客觀(guān)上并沒(méi)有“明擺著”瓜分印第安人的土地，而是通過(guò)先將部落土地分割給部落個(gè)人，然后再鼓勵(lì)印第安人轉(zhuǎn)售手里的土地給美國(guó)白人。如此一來(lái)，美國(guó)白人通過(guò)土地轉(zhuǎn)讓的方式獲得的土地就洗去了搶奪印第安人土地的“罪惡”。土地轉(zhuǎn)讓成為美國(guó)白人獲得土地控制權(quán)的合法方式，而原先的土地控制者——印第安人失去了土地所有人的地位。同樣，在《英國(guó)安娜法令》這則故事中也是同樣的邏輯。在十八世紀(jì)至十九世紀(jì)，盡管出版商壟斷了出版行業(yè)，但是并不天然享有作者的版權(quán)。出版商獲得版權(quán)的方式很簡(jiǎn)單也很壟斷，因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)社會(huì)背景下，出版作品是需要付出包括印刷、銷(xiāo)售等各個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)的高昂成本。很顯然作者是無(wú)法支付的，他們只能將作品轉(zhuǎn)讓給出版商以換取作品的出版。也正是因作者轉(zhuǎn)讓了作品，出版商獲得了作品的控制權(quán)并且取代了作者的地位。出版商要求法律針對(duì)作者的保護(hù)也應(yīng)當(dāng)同等轉(zhuǎn)移到他們身上。當(dāng)法律將以前不屬于財(cái)產(chǎn)的東西轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樨?cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)對(duì)象時(shí)，將對(duì)導(dǎo)致對(duì)財(cái)產(chǎn)的控制最終流向具有最大議價(jià)能力的人手中。如果你們希望獲得諸如印第安部落的土地，或者希望重新控制作品文本的印刷，那么創(chuàng)建新的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)將會(huì)是一個(gè)好辦法。盡管有時(shí)會(huì)財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的原始權(quán)利人會(huì)在轉(zhuǎn)讓中受益，但多數(shù)情況并非總是如此。有時(shí)世界會(huì)因財(cái)產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)讓而改善，有時(shí)候卻沒(méi)有。

四、財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的代價(jià)

所以這就是財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓的結(jié)果——巨額資金充斥著當(dāng)下版權(quán)制度，但真正落入作者手里的卻只是一小部分。有觀(guān)點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，作者手里的這一小部分的比重還在一直降低。正如本文上述所言，我們生活的世界充斥著作者收益過(guò)少這樣的證據(jù)，但是當(dāng)我們談及版權(quán)法改革時(shí)，我們卻常選擇對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題視而不見(jiàn)。在過(guò)去的三百年里，我們一再擴(kuò)張版權(quán)并且通過(guò)新的許可與支付義務(wù)來(lái)增加版權(quán)法的內(nèi)容。104See,e.g.,Neil Weinstock Netanel,Copyright,s Paradox(Oxford 2008),54-80.然而，我們還是沒(méi)有充分關(guān)注控制作品收益的中間商是否以及如何將其中的收益分配給作者。因?yàn)槲覀兦宄?cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的運(yùn)作方式，并且相信版權(quán)擴(kuò)張中得到的收益會(huì)惠及作者的假設(shè)，所以我們不會(huì)去調(diào)查作者將版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓給他人這一“黑匣子”般的過(guò)程。

但是實(shí)際情況是，我們知道或應(yīng)當(dāng)知道這些中間商通常不會(huì)這樣做。如果我們認(rèn)為中間商的做法有問(wèn)題（我偶爾也認(rèn)為），但是我們不仔細(xì)檢查“黑匣子”里面，那么我們將無(wú)法弄清楚該如何修復(fù)它。這意味著我們要問(wèn)一些我們不習(xí)慣問(wèn)的而且版權(quán)人也不習(xí)慣回答的問(wèn)題。105I don,t mean to minimize the practical difficulties posed by intermediaries, insistence that contract terms and payments are proprietary information that they are entitled to keep secret.See,e.g.,Peter DiCola &David Touve,“Licensing in the Shadow of Copyright”(2014)17 Stanford Technology Law Review 397,443-57.（順便說(shuō)一下，如果我們認(rèn)為作者從他們的作品中獲得如此小部分的收益并不是一個(gè)問(wèn)題，那么對(duì)所謂的“價(jià)值差距”大驚小怪就沒(méi)有意義。如果我們相信經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和政策支持這樣的結(jié)論，即作者認(rèn)為作品所產(chǎn)生的巨額收益中的微小比例作為支付對(duì)價(jià)是合適的，那么，干涉中間商之間的談判進(jìn)而分析是誰(shuí)拿走了收益中最大一部分的做法是不正當(dāng)?shù)?。?/p>

如果上述問(wèn)題值得解決，那么我們現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該明白向版權(quán)人投入更多資金、給予他們更多控制，并且相信這次中間商會(huì)與作者分享更多收益的做法，并不是一個(gè)有用的解決方案。

本文所強(qiáng)調(diào)的是本文論點(diǎn)針對(duì)有限的范圍，本文的觀(guān)點(diǎn)并不是說(shuō)版權(quán)可轉(zhuǎn)讓性本身是個(gè)問(wèn)題，也不認(rèn)為我們可以通過(guò)限制版權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓或使版權(quán)不可剝奪來(lái)解決問(wèn)題。畢竟有德國(guó)這一例子存在。德國(guó)將版權(quán)視為可以轉(zhuǎn)讓的權(quán)利，至少在形式上是這樣106See German Copyright Act §§ 29,31.，但德國(guó)作者似乎也沒(méi)有比其他國(guó)家的作者享有收益上的優(yōu)勢(shì)。107See,e.g.,Martin Kretschmer &Philip Hardwick,Authors' Earnings from Copyright and Non-Copyright Sources:A Survey of 25,000 British and German Writers (Dorset 2007),avail able at https://microsites.bournemouth;Kretschmer,“Does Copyright Law Matter?”,pp.12-15;Sentfleben,“Copyright,Creators,and Society's Need for Autonomous Art”,p.53.See al so,e.g.,Ginsburg &Sirinel li,“Private International Law Aspects of Authors, Contracts”(examining private international l aw obstacles to implementing author-protective legisl ation enacted in France and the Netherl ands).本文認(rèn)為財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的可轉(zhuǎn)讓性具有雙重作用。一方面，無(wú)論何時(shí)，只要我們?cè)谪?cái)富與議價(jià)能力上存在巨大差異，轉(zhuǎn)讓自由的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的分配將會(huì)反映出并且還會(huì)加大這種差異的存在。另一方面，身為律師的我們，從學(xué)生時(shí)代就已接受有關(guān)財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)的法律信條，這導(dǎo)致我們無(wú)法理解財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)自由轉(zhuǎn)讓會(huì)導(dǎo)致上述差異的存在。我們不會(huì)充分關(guān)注財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓這種機(jī)制導(dǎo)致實(shí)力雄厚的人通過(guò)利用有價(jià)值的條款來(lái)控制不那么強(qiáng)大的人的做法。

五、正視我們所忽視的

這個(gè)問(wèn)題在某種程度上確實(shí)是難以解決的嗎？或者為了解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，我們可以做些什么呢？

二十一世紀(jì)的版權(quán)是拜占庭式（byzantine）108譯者注：拜占庭式是指四世紀(jì)至十五世紀(jì)在以君士坦丁堡（即古希臘城市拜占庭）為中心的拜占庭帝國(guó)（即東羅馬帝國(guó)）興起和流行的藝術(shù)風(fēng)格，拜占庭式的風(fēng)格強(qiáng)調(diào)華麗的外部形式與結(jié)構(gòu)。此處本文作者認(rèn)為當(dāng)下版權(quán)法生態(tài)系統(tǒng)就是拜占庭式的，言下之意是認(rèn)為版權(quán)法看似華麗實(shí)則問(wèn)題很多。的法律生態(tài)系統(tǒng)。本文認(rèn)為，我們仔細(xì)地從內(nèi)部探索該生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的真正價(jià)值是為了理解該系統(tǒng)一直漠然對(duì)待創(chuàng)作者的原因。這種做法將會(huì)涉及作者與版權(quán)人所構(gòu)建的交互方式，并且找出從何處——若有該處的話(huà)——干涉將會(huì)是有效的。

本文無(wú)法提出一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的解決辦法。我們或許可以——但（實(shí)際）不太可能——通過(guò)調(diào)整有關(guān)版權(quán)所有權(quán)的法律或者修改版權(quán)許可規(guī)則以實(shí)現(xiàn)改進(jìn)至少一部分作者的處境。109See,e.g.,Julie E.Cohen Configuring the Networked Self(New Haven 2012),223-66;Gervais,Colle tive Management of Copyright and Related Rights,pp.191-215;William Patry,How to Fix Copyright(Oxford 2011),177-88;Jessica Silbey,The Eureka Myth:Creators,Innovators and Everyday Intellectual Property (Stanford 2015)274-85;Loren,“Renegotiating the Copyright Deal”;R.Anthony Reese,“Optional Copyright Renewal:Lessons for Designing Copyright Systems,The 38 Annual Horace J.Manges Lecture”(2015)39 Columbia Journal of Law &the Arts 145;Molly Van Houweling,“Making Copyright Work for Authors Who Write to Be Read”(2015)38 Columbia Journal of Law &the Arts 381.但是賦予版權(quán)所有人更多權(quán)利110See,e.g.,H.R.1836,Fair Play Fair Pay Act,115th Cong.(2017)(giving sound recording copyright owners new exclusive right to perform their sound recordings over AM and FM radio);Christophe Geiger,Oleksandr Bulayenko,&Giancarlo Frosio,“The Introduction of a Neighbouring Right for Press Publishers at EU Level:The Unneeded (and Unwanted)Reform”(2017)39 EIPR 202.也無(wú)法惠及作者，除非直到我們對(duì)使創(chuàng)作者從他們創(chuàng)作中分得一小部分收益的動(dòng)因了解更加深入。另外，調(diào)整法律以提升出版商對(duì)平臺(tái)的議價(jià)能力或者提升平臺(tái)對(duì)出版商的議價(jià)能力111See,e.g.,Joint Comments of Amer.Ass’n of Independent Music et.al.,U.S.Copyright Office:In re Section 512 Study,Docket No.2015-7 (31 March 2016),at https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Music-Community-Submission-in-re-DMCA-512-FINAL-7559445.pdf;Judy Chu&Tom Marino,Victims of IP Theft Need Better Protection,The Hill,March 12,2014,at http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/200630-victims-of-ip-theftneed-better-protection;JonathanTaplin,“Is it Time to Break Up Google?”New York Times,22 April 2017,at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/opinion/sunday/is-it-time-to-break-up-google.html;StephenCarlisle,DMCA“Takedown”Notices:Why“Takedown”Should Become“Takedown and Stay Down”and Why It’s Good for Everyone,Nova Southeastern University Copyright Office Blog,23 July 2014,at http://copyright.nova.edu/dmca-takedown-notices/;Elliot Harmon,“Notice and Stay Down”is Really Filter Everything,Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog,21 Jan.2016,at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-stay-down-really-filter-everything.都無(wú)法讓作者的生活變得更好。到目前為止，并沒(méi)有在任何未通過(guò)的法律或條約提案中看到太多（與之有關(guān)）的可能?；蛘呤沁@些提案僅僅是提案而不會(huì)有任何機(jī)會(huì)被采納，因?yàn)榫拖窭锏隆?ài)思唯爾（Reed Elsevier）、維旺迪（Vivendi）、迪士尼或谷歌等公司，它們自然不會(huì)支持無(wú)法使它們變得更好的新法律或條約。版權(quán)中間商有足夠強(qiáng)的政治權(quán)力來(lái)沖淡改革提案，直到這些提案對(duì)創(chuàng)作者沒(méi)有實(shí)際用處，而且近期他們通過(guò)自己的權(quán)力按照有利于自己的方向修改立法與條約提案。112See,e.g.,Rebecca Giblin,“Should It Be Copyright,s Role to Fill Houses with Books?”in Susy Frankel &Daniel Gervais (eds.)Intellectual Property and Regulation of the Internet:The Nexus with Human and Economic Development (Wellington,NZ 2017);Margot E.Kaminski,“The Capture of International Intellectual Property Through the US Trade Regime”(2014)87 S.Cal.Law Review 977.在過(guò)去的20年，我們已經(jīng)見(jiàn)證了許多未能成功的努力，而這些努力試圖改革美國(guó)與國(guó)際版權(quán)法立法進(jìn)程以弱化強(qiáng)權(quán)力版權(quán)操縱者的影響。113See,e.g.,Gaelle Krikorian &Amy Kapczynski (eds.),Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property (New York 2010);Lawrence Lessig,Republic,Lost:How Money Corrupts Congress -And a Plan to Stop it (New York 2011).這些努力面臨著看似無(wú)法克服的障礙。版權(quán)中間商對(duì)于國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)際立法程序的執(zhí)念、以及他們當(dāng)前對(duì)調(diào)動(dòng)各種資源征服對(duì)手的熱情，意味著增強(qiáng)作者權(quán)改革的實(shí)際機(jī)會(huì)非常渺茫。

本文懷疑最終可能得出的結(jié)論是：那些有希望的提案卻與版權(quán)法無(wú)關(guān)。許多作者因缺乏議價(jià)能力導(dǎo)致無(wú)法行使法律賦予他們的權(quán)利。114See,e.g.,Bently,“Between a Rock and a Hard Place”;Ginsburg &Sirinelli,“Private International Law Aspects of Authors,Contracts”;O’Rourke,“Bargaining in the Shadow”.如果關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題是缺乏議價(jià)能力，那么新增財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)或增強(qiáng)財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)力度都不太可能解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題。為解決議價(jià)能力的缺失，我們不妨從另一個(gè)角度，即通過(guò)直接參與的方式或許能解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題。凱瑟琳·菲斯克（Catherine Fisk）認(rèn)為鼓勵(lì)作者參與集體議價(jià)可能是最有效的辦法，即便議價(jià)的代價(jià)是版權(quán)的喪失。115See Catherine Fisk,“Hollywood Writers and the Gig Economy”(2018)2017 University of Chicago Legal Forum 177.我可以想象要求目前沒(méi)有直接向作者支付許可費(fèi)的集體管理實(shí)體直接去支付的情形。116See,e.g.,Future of Music Coalition,Principles for Artist Compensation in New Business Models,2 April 2009,at https://www.futureofmusic.org/article/article/principles-artist-compensation-new-business-models.一些學(xué)者認(rèn)為，通過(guò)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)自行出版可能允許作者直接與中間商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，并從他們的作品中獲得更多的收益。117See e.g.,Jon M.Garon,“Digital Hollywood 2.0:Reimagining Film,Music,Television and Publishing Distribution as a Global Artist Collaborative”(2013)21 Mich.St.Int,l Law Review 563;O,Rourke,“Bargaining in the Shadow”,p.638.我的同事杰里米·皮德斯（Jeremy Peters）建議，我們可以通過(guò)鼓勵(lì)或要求版權(quán)人采用公認(rèn)的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則以及強(qiáng)制性的公開(kāi)年度審計(jì)來(lái)獲得更多收益。本文對(duì)標(biāo)簽規(guī)則（labelling rules）的效果持懷疑態(tài)度，該規(guī)則要求作品復(fù)制件或作品訪(fǎng)問(wèn)權(quán)限提供者公開(kāi)采購(gòu)價(jià)格中直接支付給作者的比例。118Cf.Rebecca Giblin,The Author Made 3p from the Sale of this Book,The Author,s Interest Blog,3 April 2018,at https://authorsinterest.org/2018/04/03/more-on-fair-trade-for-authors/.但是，通過(guò)設(shè)立與資助由政府建立或非營(yíng)利性機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)教育和支持作者，讓他們理解并且強(qiáng)化他們的權(quán)利來(lái)對(duì)抗那些受讓他們版權(quán)的企業(yè)，或許是個(gè)好辦法。119E.g.,O,Rourke,“Bargaining in the Shadow”,pp.637-38.See generally Bowker,Self-Publishing in the United States 2010-15 (2015),at http://media.bowker.com/documents/bowker-selfpublishing-report2015.pdf;Robert Shapiro &Siddartha Aneja,Unlocking the Gates:America,s New Creative Economy(2018),at http://www.recreatecoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ReCreate-Creative-Economy-Study-Report.pdf.

上述這些方法都不是來(lái)自版權(quán)學(xué)者通常所采用的方法。盡管如此，但是從不熟悉的有利點(diǎn)去探索版權(quán)制度還是有價(jià)值的。不出意外，它能幫助我們看到我們往往忽略的事情以及分析我們忽視它們的原因。