Atul Bhardwaj

Belt and Road Initiative: An Idea Whose Time Has Come

Atul Bhardwaj

Ideas are more powerful than money or military. They can penetrate architectural foundations and cause paradigm shifts. A nation with a new idea and the vision to implement it often transforms the world order. In the 1990s, when the world was transiting out of the Cold War tunnel, two American authors, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington attempted to explain the emerging world order. Fukuyama’s contributions wereThe End of History and the Last Manand Huntington wroteThe Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. The former was about the final victory of the Western idea of liberal democracy and the latter advocated international conflict along cultural faultlines. The two ideas rooted in parochialism have had a short shelf-life. After almost two-and-ahalf decades, liberal democracy is struggling to survive in the Euro-Atlantic world. At the same time, waging continuous wars in West Asia, despite victories, have fatigued the Western civilization and rendered it bankrupt. These ideas merely represent the American strategic temptation to shape the discourse for short-term gains. Today, Western decline is discernible because of a lack of a collective transformative idea. Ideas can enhance clashes or connectivity between people.

It is in the midst of such overwhelming winds of Western thought that China bloomed into a substantial world economic power in the early twenty-first century. In the initial years, the Chinese growth story was devoid of ideas that could contribute to global well-being. The American foreignpolicy literature termed the Chinese as “Free Riders.” It was in 2013 that President Xi Jinping unfurled the idea of “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR), now officially identified as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). The idea was audacious because it talked about conventional connectivity involving brick and mortar when the world was busy discussing cloud computing and 3-D printing.

BRI that falls in the realm of international transportation network has caught the attention of the world. It gradually veered international discourse away from conflict towards connectivity. The emerging global consensus on BRI is reflected in the recent United Nations Security Council Resolution 2344 unanimously adopted by the 15-member Security Council in March 2017, that incorporated the concept of building a community of shared future for mankind. The resolution gave a one-year extension to its Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and urged the countries involved to further advance the BRI initiative and strengthen its security safeguards. The Resolution has also acknowledged the importance of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a harbinger of stability and prosperity in the region. Almost one hundred nations have shown their willingness to participate in the various projects of connected rail, road and port networks initiated by Chinese capital and expertise.

Does the idea have the potential to cause a paradigm shift in the international order? Any substantial change would involve the rupture of the monolithic edifice of the global political economy based on ocean routes for transportation. That shift would be inconsequential for the rest of the world if China was to replace America as the controller of the maritime commons on which 90 percent of global trade moves. For a systemic shift to occur, the world needs bifurcation of international trade routes because only that will help proliferate global wealth to cities other than port cities such as New York, London, Amsterdam, Bombay, Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Singapore, Hong Kong, San Francisco, Shanghai, and Los Angeles. The concentration of cosmopolitan elites in these port cities is one of the major reasons for global inequality.

This article argues that alternative transportation routes of BRI promise a “community of shared future for mankind.” Countries with reservations about the new Silk Road initiative need to re-examine its potential for providing more choices for transportation of trade and break free from the stranglehold of oceanic monopoly. A more diversified and democratic international trade regime would open up vistas for greater dialogue between countries, continents and people.

The Land-Sea Synergy

Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote, “Maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the world; because, however great the wealth product of the land, nothing facilitates the necessary exchanges as does the sea.”1As cited in “Who Rules the Waves?” The Economist, October 17, 2015, http://www.economist.com/ news/international/21674648-china-no-longer-accepts-america-should-be-asia-pacifics-dominant-navalpower-who-rules.The question is: Why should sea be the only medium capable of facilitating necessary exchanges? Why should the value of wealth on land remain dependent on Oceans? Why do land borders suffer conflict? Why are borders fenced and disputes common? Is it to ensure that Oceans remain the primary choice for the movement of trade and commerce?

The movement of trade on the high seas neither encounters national boundaries nor does it have to negotiate with people during its journey. This border-free flow of trade is smooth as long as a big naval power does not overwhelm the oceans with its warships. Since battle on the high seas is expensive, the chances of resistance become minimal, thus making the maritime power hegemonic. It is this monopoly over international trade flows that first gave the British and later the Americans the power to spread their empire across the globe.

The current system of trade and commerce at sea works on the logic of “freedom of navigation” that is largely controlled and underwritten by the US navy. Postwar the sea has rarely been a politically contested space.According toThe Economist, “Since the Second World War, America’s hegemonic power to maintain access to the global maritime commons has been challenged only once and briefly” by the Soviet Navy in the 1970s.2“Who Rules the Waves?”America and a few of its Western allies enjoy exclusive rights to regulate the degree of freedom that others enjoy on these routes. They hold a tight grip over the marine service industry that supports the Sea Lane of Communication (SLOCs), helps them earn huge revenues but also keeps international trade under their watchful eyes. They control the insurance and reinsurance of goods and ships that ply on SLOCs. The freight rates are under their jurisdiction. The institutions that declare parts of the sea dangerous or hostile reside in Western capitals. The power to impose sanctions and stop ships from coming in and out of a particular harbor remains the sole preserve of the United States. The complete American control over the flow of global goods and commodities through unilateral command of the oceans is inimical to multi-polarity in world affairs.

Under such circumstances, the freedom of navigation is a misnomer. The irony is that an order highly tilted in Anglo-American favor is termed as liberal and free. The preservation of this skewed maritime order is considered critical, as Yoshihara and Holmes say any “compromise on the commons and the edifice of the US foreign policy crumble.”3Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Responding to China’s Rising Sea Power,” Orbis, Vol. 61, No.1, Winter 2017, p. 93.Retaining the existing maritime order may be in American interest but it certainly does not represent the changing global reality, where the postwar order is crumbling with the rise of Asia.

The idea of alternative channels of communication has the potential to shake the roots of Western hegemony that has long sustained itself on the strength of its navy and the ability to underwrite ocean-bound international trade. Trade through land involves numerous stoppages and direct human interactions along geographical settings. It has to cater to sensibilities and sensitivities of national, continental or other culturally and politicallydefined boundaries. In comparison to ocean routes, a hegemon would find it difficult to control land routes. Multi-polarity is in-built in land routes. For example, China cannot monopolize the rail route to Germany. The viability of the route is directly dependent on Russian cooperation. If Russia or some Central Asian nation was to withdraw from the project the entire edifice could crumble. Incidentally, the BRI does not pitch for exclusivity of land routes connecting the Eurasian land mass but lays as much emphasis on the Maritime Silk Road. In fact, what it talks about is a wider system of interaction between the Oceans and the hinterland, so that prosperity does not remain confined to coastal communities alone. Thus land-sea equilibrium is a must to dissuade hegemony and imperialism.

The maritime powers pay lip service to connectivity - cross-border trade and people to people contact - as themantrafor good neighborly relations but they rarely back it up with tangible plans and investments. Only when borders are closed that trade has no option but to seek SLOCs. The British and American involvement in both Kashmir and Tibet issues have ensured that India, China and Pakistan do not talk or trade with each other through their land borders and are forced to depend on ocean routes.

Reasons for India’s Reticence

The Chinese connectivity idea is viewed through three different lenses -utilitarian, pragmatic and revisionist. According to the utilitarian view BRI is nothing but a Chinese economic necessity, to use surplus capacities and rectify the imbalance between its landlocked provinces in the west and the rich coastal provinces in the east. However, such imbalances are not unique to China. The coastal regions across the world are more prosperous than non-coastal towns because maximum international trade is bound to ocean routes. This littoral-inland disparity is as pronounced in the developing world as it is among the developed nations. According to a study, in 13 out of the 20 European Union member states, coastal regions generate higher GDP per inhabitant than non-coastal regions. Forexample, in the coastal regions of Belgium the GDP figures are €34,477 per inhabitant as compared to €28,058 for inhabitants in non-coastal regions.4Eurostat, “Maritime Economy Statistics - Coastal regions and sectoral perspective,” http://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Maritime_economy_statistics_-_coastal_regions_and_sectoral_ perspective.This dichotomy is not only harmful for the non-coastal lands but also threatens the eco-system of coastal regions that are unable to sustain the pressure of excessive urbanization and population migrations. The belt and road concept can alter this imbalance by making available modern infrastructural provisions for inland people and reduce their dependence on sea outlets.

Countries like Pakistan take a pragmatic view of BRI that promises to bring in large amounts of investment and infrastructure to their land under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. For the past seventy-odd years, Pakistan has been deprived of development funds and fed with loans to buy military equipment from the United States. It is natural for Islamabad to seek CPEC because it wants to transform from a mere military service provider to the West to being a more meaningful economic actor. Similarly, Sri Lanka, envious of Dubai and Singapore for grabbing the attention of US capital, sees the arrival of Chinese investments in Hambantota and Colombo ports as a ray of hope for their people.

Bangladesh and Nepal have endorsed BRI and they are urging India to join the connectivity bandwagon. China has freight train connections with 17 European cities, including London. However, India, the founding member of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and a votary of connectivity, remains an indifferent spectator. It prefers to view BRI through the revisionist prism, where surplus Chinese capital is merely seen as a tool to encircle its neighbors. India maintains that BRI is a Chinese national initiative; its unilateral character deprives it of multilateral appeal. India feels China should have consulted it before introducing its plans passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), a disputed land between India and Pakistan. India considers itself an equal and from time to time NewDelhi has hinted that Beijing must seek its support for BRI rather than take it for granted. India wants China to appreciate that it is not desperate for investments like Pakistan or the Philippines.

When it comes to participation in BRI projects on the ground, India feels trust building between nations must precede cooperation and connectivity. At the same time, New Delhi does not quantify the steps that it is undertaking to tender Chinese sensitivities and concerns. India-China relationship is now caught in a vortex of one-upmanship. From border to Buddhism, everything is an arena of competition between the two Asian giants. The view that India’s China policy must involve candid diplomacy backed by force is widely prevalent among the Indian strategic community. According to Manoj Joshi, a veteran Indian defense and foreign policy analyst, “The reason why Sino-Indian relations are in a bad state has a lot to do with the way India conducts its foreign policy, rather than their much talked up geopolitical rivalry.”5Manoj Joshi, “Letting NSG and Masood Azhar Get in the Way of Indo-China Ties. Is It Worth It?” The Hindustan Times, April 4, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-is-letting-nsg-and-masoodazhar-get-in-the-way-of-good-relations-with-china-it-it-worth-it/story-nOz4gGmHFblFBLnO0To70H.html.Indian foreign policy is constricted by its perceptions of Chinese threat and irredentism. The perception of the Indian elite about China is a key factor impending India-China relations despite a large constituency for trade in both countries.

China finds Indian foreign policy closely linked to achieving American strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific. This perception has grown because the Indian security matrix continues to be indifferent and unruffled by the American “Pivot to Asia.” India’s concerns related to the Indian Ocean do not take cognizance of the US nuclear-powered and armed vessels lurking in the area. That President Trump is likely to “persevere with the Pivot or rebalance to the Pacific” does not figure in Indian maritime strategic calculus.6Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Responding to China’s Rising Sea Power,” p.93.It remains unclear as to why Indian policy is essentially “status quoist” when it comes to preserving American maritime hegemony. Why does Indian strategy not measure the constraints that American dominanceof the maritime domain imposes on its pursuit to be a great power?

In another twenty years, the Indian economy is slated to touch the $10 trillion mark and occupy the number three slot in the global list of economic powers. Therefore, India has a legitimate desire to shape the international agenda commensurate with its size and economic might. However, the Indian strategic approach lays greater emphasis on looking great by acquiring foreign military arms rather than being a leading power through internal political and economic consolidation. One reason for India’s insistence on the security-first approach is that over the years it has been accused by the West of being too ambivalent about the use of power “to shape its own destiny and the fate of its region.”7“Can India Become a Great Power?” The Economist, March 30, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/ leaders/21574511-indias-lack-strategic-culture-hobbles-its-ambition-be-force-world-can-india.Commenting on why India needs to avoid seeking great power labels from others, Shivshankar Menon, former National Security Advisor says, “It is only a way existing power holders use to encourage conformity with their wishes and preferences. If you conform, you are labelled “responsible,” if not you are “irresponsible” or a “rogue.”We should worry less about the labels and the attempts by the world to fete us as a great power, and more about our own accretion of hard power and influence.”8Menon Shivshankar, “India Will Not Become a Great Power by Loudly Proclaiming Its Intentions,”The Wire, November 22, 2015, https://thewire.in/16049/india-will-not-become-a-great-power-by-loudlyproclaiming-its-intentions.

The predominance of US concepts, theories and media analysis of international affairs and security in India is not a new phenomenon. Even when Soviet Union was India’s most trusted exporter of arms, the American channels of communication were the biggest source of strategic analysis. In 1982, while writing on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Bhabani Sen Gupta, a well-known Indian political analyst, “counted 500 articles written by Americans and printed in major Indian dailies in English within a span of two years. Not a single article was written by Soviet analysts.”9Bhabani Sen Gupta, “Thank God for the Communication Gap,” in Robert M. Crunden, Traffic of Ideas between Indian and America, Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1985, p.12.One finds similar deluge of American viewpoint in Indian media when it comes toissues like Tibet, South China Sea and CPEC. It is largely for this reason that the Chinese were bad communists and continue to be equally poor capitalists in Indian eyes. Perhaps, this is one of the reasons that ever since the channels of trade became oceanic under Western control, the flow of ideas has been unidirectional: largely flowing from the West to the East.

As in the 1950s India continues to be equated with China and the two are projected as rivals engaged in fierce competition for regional supremacy. Such attention from the West engulfs some Indian elite with a false sense of pride. It is probably the same feeling that led the Indian elite in the 1940s and 50s to imagine that they were the true inheritors of the British legacy in the Indian Ocean region. There are two examples of the Indian tendency (under Nehru’s leadership) to punch above its weight and the lack of a sense of timing in strategic thought. In 1946 even before attaining independence, India planned the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi. In continuation of the British policy, a separate delegation from Tibet was treated at par with the Chinese, merely to irritate Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. The second example of India-in-a-hurry is provided by its purchase of the aircraft carrier from Britain in 1957, when it was mired in a foreign exchange crisis and its second five-year plan was in jeopardy. Even in the twenty-first century, Indian strategy continues to seek short cuts to attain great-hood. Circumventing the long arduous path to become a substantial economic and financial power, the Indian discourse hinges on the acquisition of blue water navy, “othering” China, and the application of the Monroe Doctrine in the region as short cuts to success.

The Indian strategic outlook is ideologically inclined towards America and unable to comprehend that Asia will only rise when the extra-territorial power, the so-called “offshore balancer” is restricted in its ability to maneuver in the region. Until very recently, America relied on Pakistan for its operations in Afghanistan and control of West Asia, now it is India’s turn to provide military succor to American forces engaged in keeping China under check.

The fact that both China and India are quintessential to Asia’s riseand America is a roadblock has to be grasped by India’s strategic elite. Or else, the West will continue to enlist Indian support in its grand strategy. In the Western scheme of things, India is to be a constant irritant to China and in times of hostility, probably, act as military base for launching a land offensive and also contribute a few ships for enforcing a temporary blockade of China.

Furthermore, India’s “Look East” policy ignores the shifting dynamics to its west where Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia are converging to stabilize the region. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is attempting to implement a framework within which to discuss and reach comprehensive agreements for dispute and conflict resolution between the parties involved. Moscow has now taken the lead in hosting sixparty regional talks on the Afghan issue. The ongoing initiative that includes China and Iran has been able to ensure that India and Pakistan are alongside to discuss the problem. The achievement of Moscow talks is that for the first time regional peace talks have been held without including America or any European country. Relations between Pakistan and Russia have witnessed substantial improvement over the past few years. Their defense and strategic cooperation has registered positive trends and the two also have convergence of views on Afghanistan. In December 2016, the Russian military for the first time participated in war games with their Pakistani counterparts. This is an interesting development because for the first time Pakistan is coming under the influence of two continental powers, China and Russia.

Ever since the departure of the British Empire from South Asia, America enjoyed a high degree of leverage both in New Delhi and Islamabad. It has used both the countries from time to time to achieve its strategic objectives. Over the past sixty odd years America has given Pakistan enough weapons and a perceived perception of power to deal with the asymmetries vis-a-vis India, but done little to ameliorate the condition of its povertystricken people. It is now incumbent on a big power like India to avoid the American trap and not allow itself to be used against China, in the same manner as Pakistan was against India. South Asia needs to decolonizeits mind and jettison the strategic baggage it has been carrying since the“transfer of power” days in the 1940s.

Conclusion

There is no denying the fact there is geopolitics involved in BRI. It also involves promotion of Chinese national interests. The Chinese are seeking fresh avenues to invest their capital and make profits from it. As the Chinese capital spreads it will also increase China’s influence in the region and beyond. Postwar America was in a similar position when its production capacities had enabled it to accumulate capital that could be invested in Europe and elsewhere. After the British departure it was America and not India that held sway over South Asia including the Indian Ocean. Therefore, if at all the Chinese capital is displacing someone in the region; it is America and not India. This was evident when India helped Bangladesh attain freedom in 1971: the post-freedom Bangladesh became friendlier to America than to India. Similarly, India just cannot match the American influence over countries in Southeast Asia.

India may desire to launch its own connectivity idea that is different to BRI. But will the idea be powerful enough to alter the existing and upcoming networks? China floated the connectivity idea when its annual exports were in the range of $2.5 trillion. Had China begun working on the routes in the 1990s, with very little to trade, the entire idea would have fizzled out in no time. It is for this reason that timing is as important in the strategic game as it is in a stand-up comedy. Under the current circumstances India like a true-blue non-aligned nation should seek maximum advantages from the BRI. Much like currency swaps, the opening up of borders should be seen as a positive sign to diminish the ocean-dollar hegemony in the world.

The latest idea from the West that offers competition to the idea of BRI owes its origin to Thomas Piketty. His bestsellerCapital in the Twenty-First Centurydeals with the uncomfortable issue of inequality. Paul Krugman, acolumnist withThe New York Timeshailed the book as “discourse-changing scholarship.”10Paul Krugman, “The Piketty Panic,” The New York Times, April 24, 2014, https://www.nytimes. com/2014/04/25/opinion/krugman-the-piketty-panic.html?_r=0.Piketty’s work has made the rich acknowledge the existence of inequality. The 2017 Global Risk Report by the World Economic Forum11World Economic Forum, The Global Risk Report 2017, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_ Report_web.pdf.sees the rich-poor income hiatus as one of the main reasons behind the UK’s Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s election victory in the US. However, this idea too merely represents the American strategic temptation to shape the discourse for short-term gains. Riding piggy back on the inequality juggernaut, right-wing populism is now an international ideological movement, raising its head not just in Europe but also in countries like India, Turkey and Japan. However, keeping in mind the ideological moorings of the right-wing political class, one would be na?ve to expect any mitigation of the ever widening class divide. Much like democracy, the inequality rhetoric is likely to be incorporated into American strategic doctrines to target unfriendly regimes across the globe.

The BRI has the potential to change the unipolar, post-WWII Euro-Atlantic world order to a multipolar world. This change steered by Eurasian states is on the anvil and America is unlikely to withstand the transformative power of the Belt and Road Initiative. India’s outlook on BRI is currently burdened by its security considerations. India needs to adopt a more pragmatic approach towards the connectivity opportunities coming up in its neighborhood. The opening up of Pakistan and the shift in its focus from terrorism towards development is a positive change that could result in more stability and prosperity in the region. The economic opportunities that BRI brings to the table are enormous. It is ushering in a new service sector to cater to the growing demand of managing trade flows on the new Silk Road. India could easily participate in this endeavor and benefit from it just as the English, European and American companies are.

Atul Bhardwaj is an analyst on defense and strategic affairs based in New Delhi.