Wu Xinbo

Prospects for China-US Relations under the Trump Administration

Wu Xinbo

Since the end of the Cold War, China-US relations have shown different stage characteristics. In the 1990s, the two countries began to explore a new framework for post-Cold War bilateral relations. At that time, China was facing how to deal with the United States in the international structure featuring multiple great powers with the US retaining primacy, while the US was facing a rising China.1Tao Wenzhao, et al., Studies of Contemporary China-US Relations (1979-2009), China Social Sciences Press, 2012, pp.148-149 & 184-186.In the early 21st century, China-US relations took on a new format: while intensifying its strategic guard on China, the US started to pay more attention to China’s role in economic and international affairs; China, on the other hand, was trying to advance its interests on economy and the Taiwan issue by expanding cooperation with the US. At this stage, relations became more mechanismfixed, and the symmetry of interdependence and the overall stability of relations were improved. After 2008, the bilateral relationship reached a new stage. Changes in the balance of power has accelerated and the two countries, with clearer strategic adjustments, have become more competitive with each other.2Wu Xinbo, “On the New Normal in Sino-US Relations,” Fudan Journal (Social Sciences), No.3, 2015, pp.143-149; Wu Xinbo, “Features and Trends of China-US Relations in the ‘New Normal’ Period,”International Studies, No.2, 2016, pp.14-28.The inauguration of Donald Trump as the new US President implies adjustments of the US domestic and foreign policies, leading to changes in the climate, agenda and pattern of China-US interactions and new challenges and opportunities for the development of bilateral relations.

New Reality of China-US Relations

China has improved noticeably in military strength and the gap between China and the US is narrowing. In the Western Pacific region, especially within the first island chain, the balance of military power is leaning favorably toward China.6Hu Bo, “Sino-US Military Competition and Strategic Balance in the Western Pacific Ocean,” World Economics and Politics, No.5, 2014, pp.64-84; David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, “War with China: Think through the Unthinkable,” RAND Corporation, 2016.

China’s diplomatic posture becomes more proactive.Since the reform and opening up in 1978, in order to develop the domestic economy, the basic direction of China’s foreign policy has been actively seeking to integrate into the US-dominated world system and has generally accepted the international rules made by the US. China has largely been a player in the US-designed chess game. In recent years, with an increase in strength and confidence, China has become more proactive in diplomacy and has started to put forward new ideas in international cooperation. The development of some political and economic platforms, such as the BRICS, the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), shows that China is becoming more and more competent in setting new agendas. This will expand the maneuvering space between China and the US and add to China’s resources to deal with the US.

Changes in the pattern of interactions.After the end of the Cold War, changes in the international environment gave the US an edge, and the US took the lead in the relationship with China and dominated its discourse and agenda. China was left in a passive position in bilateral interactions. In recent years, however, China has become increasingly active in interactions with the US. In the context of a power shift, China proposed to build a new type of major-country relationship to avoid the deleterious effects of great-power politics and the Thucydides Trap. This demonstrates China’s constructive attitude towards the development of bilateral relations. Since 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping has had almost every year an in-depth discussion with US President Obama. From the Annenberg Retreat summit to the Yingtai nighttalk, and from the autumn White House meeting to the West Lake walk, President Xi Jinping expressed to President Obama China’s two centenary goals, introduced him to Chinese history and culture, elaborated on the vision of China-US relations, and shared his opinions on major international issues while steadfastly safeguarding the core interests of China. All this has made the Obama administration understand China’s domestic and foreign policies better and pushed the US to expand cooperation with China and manage any emerging differences. In addition, China, through enhancing its strategic capabilities in the Western Pacific region and effectively managing its relations with other major and neighboring countries, has on one hand activated the positive side of the US, while on the other putting strains on the negative, effectively improving its position in the relationship.

As Donald Trump took office, China-US relations may enter another period and take on new features. However, the bilateral relations will not be fundamentally changed but may evolve based on the status quo. The existing structure and features will affect the future direction of bilateral relations to a large degree. To be specific, the implications will be in the following areas.

Stability of China-US relations will be strengthened.Because of the increase in China’s importance to the US economically and in other fields, policy-makers in the US will have to reconsider its policies towards China and deal with the relations more cautiously. In the face of frictions and divergences, actions that would seriously disrupt the relationship will not be adopted lightly. On the other hand, the established dialogue mechanisms have become important ways to maintain bilateral relations and will facilitate better understanding of each other to reduce any threat and ease tension in a timely manner.

Positive energy in bilateral relations will increase.Chinese leaders have always paid attention to the relationship with the US and underscored that the relations should be seen from a strategic height and long-term view, and that cooperation should be pushed forward, differences be managed and efforts be made to make cooperation the normal facet of bilateral relations. But for the US, due to influences of political cycles like the presidential andmid-term congressional elections, relations with China are often managed with short-term interests in mind, leading to constant fluctuations. Therefore, from a historical perspective, relations between the two countries have seen China provide more positive energy than the US. With the rise of China’s status globally, China’s ability to shape its relations with the US will increase and so will the level of positive energy. Besides, compared with policy changes in the US arising from partisan divides, China’s foreign policies are far more stable than that of the US and this enables China to consistently shape the bilateral relations in a positive and constructive manner.

Bilateral relations will become more mature.In recent years, as the new normal of China-US relations, the two countries have seen more frictions together with more cooperation; sometimes, the intense frictions and divergences between them have not affected cooperation on different levels. Furthermore, the settlement of some frictions and divergences has brought about new opportunities for cooperation. This shows that the two countries can deal with relations with a more mature state of mind than before. As President Xi Jinping said, broad mind is needed to handle differences and disagreements.7“Xi Jinping Attends Welcome Ceremony Held by US President Barack Obama at White House,”Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/ t1302430.shtml.This indicates that the bilateral relationship has become more mature, which will help improve its resilience.

Since President Nixon’s visit to China, the bilateral relations, affected by changes in international and respective domestic situations, have assumed different features in different stages. More importantly, the relations have been constantly developing, the interdependence has become deeper, frequency of exchanges has increased, and cooperation has been ever expanding. There are more and more interactions between the two sides and the ability to manage bilateral relations has considerably improved. In changing domestic and international environment, this trend has kept China-US relations stable and continuous and the pattern would also apply to the relations under the Trump administration.

Direction of Trump’s China Policy

Trump’s China policy is determined by the following factors: the political philosophy held by Trump and his administration team, overall policy orientation of the US, and preference in policy towards China.

Trump’s political philosophy has the following characteristics.8“Donald Trump Accepts the Republican Nomination for President,” NBC New York, July 21, 2016, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/politics/Transcript-Donald-Trump-Accepts-Republican-Nomination-For-President-387846862.html; The White House, “The Inaugural Address,” January 20, 2017, https://www. whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address.First, he is an advocate of “America First” policies. Compared with presidents after the Second World War, Trump is less ambitious to lead the world. He is opposed to excessive US involvement in world affairs or shouldering too many overseas burdens, and believes that the focus should be on domestic affairs and doing better in its own business. Second, he is an economic nationalist and cares about domestic economic interests and welfare. He is dissatisfied with the negative impacts of globalization on the US economy and employment, and has a clear tendency towards protectionism. Third, with a concept of international relations centered on traditional nationstates and lacking global insights and awareness, Trump casts doubt on global governance and international cooperation. Last, Trump is a representative of the interests of traditional industries rather than advanced sectors. As a real estate businessman, he is concerned about traditional pillar industries like manufacturing, construction, steel and oil. He seldom mentions how to develop high-tech industries in his election campaign.

Aides and cabinet officials nominated by Trump are mostly former big merchants and hardline military personnel, showing that the new government will focus on economy and effective execution of policies. There have traditionally been two factions inside the Republican Party, one emphasizing economy and the other concerned more about national security. The Trump administration is a combination of both, but Trump’s own background as abusinessman means that there will be more emphasis on economy and more policy-making powers in this area. Trump set up the National Trade Council in the White House to push forward the revival of manufacturing, reduce trade deficits, and avoid job loss to overseas companies, confirming that he pays most attention to traditional manufacturing and trade.

The Trump administration is a combination of pro-economy and pro-security sectors in the Republican Party, but Trump’s own background as a businessman means that there will be more emphasis on economy and more policymaking powers in this area.

Given the abovementioned factors, the China policy of the Trump administration may assume the following features. First, ideological and geopolitical factors will play a less important role while attention will be paid most to economy. Second, more efforts will be spent by the US in seeking interests, not increasing the sphere of influence. The US will pay more attention to tangible influences of China’s rise on its interests such as economic and trade interests and military superiority, and will consider less from the perspective of China’s influence on the leadership position and the world order dominated by the US. Third, in the pattern of interactions, the US will emphasize bilateral rather than multilateral relations. Trump’s worldview is a traditional one centered on nation-states instead of an international or global one; he will not care much about interactions with China in globalization and global governance.

To be specific, Trump’s China policy will probably revolve around the following areas: economy and trade, Taiwan, the South China Sea, the North Korean nuclear program and other global issues.

The economic and trade issue is without doubt a priority in Trump’s China policy. In view of Trump’s determination to revitalize the US manufacturing industry to bring jobs back to American blue-collar workers, he targeted China and Mexico as the two countries which “steal”millions of jobs from the US and export lots of manufactured products. In his campaign, his criticism against China is mainly in the area of tradeand he threatened to impose limitations on China’s exports to the US and dismissed China as a currency manipulator. The platform of the Republican Party, passed in its 2016 national convention, criticized China’s currency manipulation, exclusion of US products from government purchases, subsidization of domestic companies to thwart US imports, and offenses against intellectual property rights. The three high-ranking officials in trade nominated by Trump, namely Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, and Director of the National Trade Council Peter Navarro, are all hardliners on the issue of trade with China. There is no doubt that China and the US will see more trade frictions. The US will take more anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures against China and place pressure on China over issues like the renminbi currency rate, IPR protection and market access. Though it’s not likely that Trump would impose a 45% tariff on Chinese imports into the US as he threatened in the campaign, nor is it likely that the US would wage trade wars against China, it is possible that the US would set its eyes on certain products and increase tariffs of steel, aluminum, computers, electronics and motor spare parts, with the first aim to reduce China’s imports into the US and the second aim to increase its own exports to China. In view of the experience of US-Japan trade frictions, the US would probably seek to reach some kind of bilateral understanding with China and make China voluntarily give up some exports to the US and expand imports from the US. To this end, the Trump administration would wrestle with China for a considerably long time.

On the other hand, Trump would probably welcome China’s investment in the US, especially in manufacturing and infrastructure, to revitalize the US manufacturing industry, create more jobs, and improve the US infrastructure. Given that the bilateral investment treaty was not reached under the Obama administration, it is likely that Trump would continue the negotiations and through signing the agreement to encourage Chinese investment in the US and push for expansion of the US investment access in China.

On the Taiwan issue, considering the Republican Party’s consistent closeness to Taiwan and the presence of pro-Taiwan aides and advisors inthe Trump administration, the US policy towards Taiwan under President Trump is worth attention. Trump’s unprecedented phone call with the leader of Taiwan after being elected and subsequent indiscreet comments on the One-China policy made people worry that he intended to break the current US policy towards Taiwan. If Trump intended to fundamentally change the One-China policy, China-US relations would suffer incalculably and if so, Trump’s economic ambition with China would also fail. Therefore, a more likely scenario would be Trump using the Taiwan issue as a bargaining chip to extract China’s concessions on the issues where there is more US concern (mainly economy and trade). The US would not break the existing policy framework towards Taiwan. As Trump said in his phone conversation with President Xi Jinping on February 10, the US will adhere to the One-China policy.9“Xi Jinping Holds Telephone Talks with President Donald Trump of US,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 10, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1438306.shtml.Within the current framework, in order to either apply pressure on China (for gains from Mainland China) or give more support to Taiwan (for benefits from Taiwan), or both, the US might adopt the following measures: improve the quality of arms sold to Taiwan, conduct higher-level official communication with Taiwan, expand the scope of their official contact, and give support to Taiwan’s seeking for “international space.”

On the South China Sea issue, Trump’s administration team has made some hardline voices such as forbidding China to build artificial islands and denying China’s access to those islands and reefs. But the comments sound more like an expression of a hardline position than a deliberate policy elaboration.10Zhang Wang and Chen Xin, “US Challenge on South China Sea Worries the World,” Global Times, January 25, 2017, p.3.In early February 2017, US Defense Secretary James Mattis visited Japan and said that the US supported diplomatic efforts to address the South China Sea issue and there was no need to take military action for the moment. This statement is closer to a considered policy expression.11“US Defense Secretary Softens Position on South China Sea,” Cankao Xiaoxi, February 6, 2017, http:// www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/world/20170206/1661741.shtml.To look at the big picture, the Trump government would have a different policy onthe South China Sea from the Obama administration, who put forward the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and regarded the South China Sea issue as an important strategic pivot. The Trump administration is in general inwardlooking and would give more attention to domestic affairs. The government would keep the US military supremacy but would not expand military intervention. Therefore the South China Sea issue is not that high on the regional agenda of the US. Besides, with improvement in relations between China and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and other South China Sea parties, the issue is cooling down. The countries all seek to resolve conflicts through bilateral or multilateral efforts. Therefore, the US would have no excuse to intervene with the South China Sea issue. But there is another possibility that the US military, especially the Pacific Command, would push Trump’s national security team to flash a green light to more provocative actions. For example, the US fleets would probably more frequently intrude into the 12-nautical-mile sphere of the islands and reefs China controls. The fleets might go even closer to the islands and reefs of Xisha. The US might conduct joint patrols with Japan and other allies. These tactical provocations would definitely exacerbate the confrontations between the US and China on the South China Sea issue and create tensions in the region.12Guo Yuandan and Chen Xin, “US Military to Increase Navigation in South China Sea,” Global Times, February 14, 2017, p.3.

The direction of US policy on North Korea needs particular attention. In view of accelerated nuclear and missile projects by North Korea,13North Korea carried out two nuclear tests in 2016. On February 12, 2017, North Korea successfully launched a surface-to-surface intermediate-range strategic ballistic missile.who has vowed to acquire the capability to conduct nuclear strikes that reach US soil, this is an issue for the US about whether to tolerate North Korea to cross the bottom line. Trump is very likely to face this challenge, and therefore the North Korea issue will occupy a prominent position in Trump’s Asia-Pacific policy. In addition to enhancing coordination with South Korea and Japan, the US would also hope to cooperate with China. Trump said during the election campaign that China had not done enough on the North Koreaissue and that he would use economic, diplomatic and security means to press China to mount more pressures on North Korea, such as cutting the supply of grains and energy. However, given that China and the US have very different interests about the Korean Peninsula issue, it is not possible for China to follow the US lead. With the North Korean nuclear issue becoming increasingly salient, the divergence between the US and China would enlarge and the negative spillover effect of North Korea on China-US relations would increase. On the other hand, the US use of the North Korean nuclear threat as a justification to deploy the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea has challenged China’s interests and would impinge on bilateral interactions on the Peninsula. What is more noteworthy, in view of Trump’s style and the hardline tendency of the Republican Party on security issues, the US would possibly conduct surgical strikes on North Korea’s nuclear facilities, which the North would definitely fight back and the Peninsula would sink into war, affecting the whole Northeastern Asia.14Wu Xinbo and Da Wei, eds., Where is the United States Heading for? The Trend of the United States after the 2016 Election, Collaborative Innovation Center for New Model of China-US Major-Country Relationship, Fudan University, November 2016, p.68.In this situation, China could not isolate itself given its own national interests, and is bound to take effective measures by then. The China-US interactions would exceed the diplomatic boundary and pose severe challenges to China-US relations.

On global issues, the Trump administration is generally adopting strategic retrenchment, which might lead to a reduction in the sphere of interactions and a change in its nature. China and the US would continue cooperation on the issues of anti-terrorism, the Korean Peninsula and Afghanistan, which would have a positive effect on bilateral relations. On the other hand, the Trump administration might well not try to undermine China’s influence by interfering with China’s neighboring affairs. Instead, the US would adopt an offshore balance policy and enhance its military supremacy in Western Pacific to reshape China’s neighboring geopolitical and economic environment. In this way, the geopolitical and geo-economic competition between them would ease and the factors causing frictions would decrease. In view of Trump’santi-globalization position, the US would not actively seek cooperation with China on global governance. From combating climate change to maintaining the stability of international financial system, the momentum for bilateral cooperation would decrease. This means that cooperation on global governance, which has been the new growth point for China-US relations in recent years, would be weakened. Given the fact that globalization is the trend of the times and that the US is a major beneficiary, and that globalization is naturally a component of global governance whose effect directly concerns the security and well-being of the US, Trump’s personal preference would not fundamentally change the US policies towards globalization and global governance. As both China and the US have been playing an important part in the area, cooperation on related issues would still be part of bilateral relations, but its importance would decline. Under the Obama administration, China and the US cooperated on international and global issues like the Iranian nuclear issue and climate change, which helped buffer their frictions in other fields. Such effect would decline in Trump’s term of office.

Trump’s China policy would be a dynamic one and its direction would be affected by such various factors as the learning curve of Trump’s administration team, domestic political and economic changes, the external environment, and especially China’s diplomatic influence. In the process, what needs particular attention is the implications of US domestic changes and major international affairs on its China policy. In fact, since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Ronald Reagan and subsequent US Presidents have had a China policy when they left office quite different from their positions at the beginning of their administrations. The trajectory of Trump’s China policy might again testify this pattern.

Opportunities and Challenges of China-US Relations under the Trump Administration

There would be some major changes to China-US relations due to Trump’s political philosophy and policy preference. First, different from George W.Bush and Barack Obama, who saw China-US relations at the international level, Trump would see the relations from a domestic point of view. This change from international to national perspective would lead to a change in the interaction environment and focus of bilateral relations, and domestic factors would have more weight than before. Second, viewed from the basis of China-US relations, economic cooperation and cooperation in international affairs have been two pillars of bilateral relations. In Trump’s term of office, the importance of cooperation in international affairs is likely to be undermined, thus highlighting the importance of economic cooperation. On the other hand, Trump’s protectionism tendency would add to economic frictions, which would shake the most important pillar of bilateral relations. How to manage bilateral economic and trade relations would become a focus of the interactions between China and the US under the Trump administration. Third, considering Trump’s America First strategy and his devotion to reviving the American economy in an economic nationalist way, and the fact that both countries would concentrate on improving their respective economy and strength, there would be more competition between the two countries. Although the high interdependence between the two necessitates that they must proceed with economic cooperation, the two sides would calculate more carefully their respective gains (both relative and absolute) and wrestle with each other in the process. Cooperation would become more pragmatic and look more like trade than before. Finally, due to his worldview and mindset, Trump has a narrow vision about China-US relations and would confine the relations to certain areas, which makes it difficult to form a broad framework. Unless this shortcoming could be overcome by his top aides, the quality of high-level dialogues and the room for bilateral interactions would be discounted.

The change from international to national perspective under the Trump administration would lead to a change in the interaction environment and focus of China-US relations, and domestic factors would have more weight than before.

With regard to opportunities, in view of the fact that Trump hasno strong desire to export US values and US social system or any strong intention to shape China to the American preference,15Some Chinese experts point out that Trump’s diplomatic philosophy is pro-pragmatism rather than based on the promotion of systems and values of American democracy and human rights. He might reduce intervention in China’s internal affairs. See Wang Dong and Sun Bingyan, “Comprehensive Interpretation of Trump’s China Policy,” Contemporary International Relations, No.12, 2016, p.19.China and the US would have fewer contradictions in politics, thus consolidating strategic trust between the two. China would face less pressure from the US in its neighboring diplomacy and security due to the lower possibility of Trump interfering with China’s neighboring affairs in an effort to undermine China’s influence. In this way, China would be able to more effectively conduct neighboring diplomacy, stabilize relations with neighboring countries, and better manage and deal with some maritime disputes. Since Trump is much more concerned about the US economy, he might downplay the political and security factors in his management of trade and economic issues with China. He would do something in relaxing the limitations on exports to China, and improving the investment environment in the US for China. It is also likely that in his term of office, China and the US would reach the bilateral investment treaty and other bilateral trade and economic agreements. With Trump announcing the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the geo-economic pressures China felt would ease, which makes it easier for China to conduct negotiations with ASEAN countries to promote the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). China could also press ahead with other regional economic cooperation agendas. Given the relatively low interest of the Trump administration in geopolitical rivalries, the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative would probably encounter less obstruction from the US. Finally, Trump lacks the strong desire to consolidate the American leadership in the world and he is not that interested in promoting global governance. China would play a more active role in international and global affairs and improve its international standing. This would make it easier for China to reform and shape international mechanisms and rules and safeguard China’s national interests.

As for challenges, the first one is Trump’s attitude towards China and the way his administration team deals with China. Trump’s team in general consists of hardliners against China covering the fields of economy and trade, geopolitics and ideology.16Wang Dong and Sun Bingyan, “Comprehensive Interpretation of Trump’s China Policy,” pp.17-21; Da Wei,“Prospects of Trump’s Strategy on China: Certainties and Uncertainties,” American Studies, No.6, 2016, p.19.Furthermore, there are many green hands in Trump’s team who are not familiar with certain policy areas and likely to make unexpected moves. This may subvert the “well-established understanding of diplomatic and political strategies and interaction patterns the two sides have got accustomed to.”17Cui Liru, “Be Prepared to Deal with New Challenges in China-US Relations,” Global Times, February 3, 2017, p.14.A hardline attitude towards China and changes in the way of dealing with China would lead to difficulties in building channels of contact in the early stages of Trump’s term of office, and hinder the diplomatic teams of both sides from establishing an effective working mechanism.

The second challenge is in trade and economy. The implementation of Trump’s economic policy would have far-reaching influences on Chinese economy and China-US trade and economic relations. Trump’s economic stimulus measures and the interest rate increase would make the US dollar stronger and place the renminbi under pressure of deflation, pushing an outflow of capital. Trump’s policies to revitalize the US manufacturing sector would carry the outbound US capital back to the US. More importantly, the expected hardline policies on trade with China would increase bilateral frictions in trade, which is likely to escalate into a trade war. In investment, Trump may urge China on reciprocity grounds to expand opening to US capital, and might use the leverage of restricting Chinese investment in the US. IPR protection issues (including commercial cyber espionage) may also become an area where Trump could put pressure on China.

The last challenge is security. The Trump administration believes in the philosophy of “seeking peace by force” and is determined to invest more in national defense to improve US military strength. This might increase the supremacy of the US military over China, and put China under more pressurein the Western Pacific. At the same time, given the many hawks from the military in Trump’s administration team, it is likely that the US adopts more assertive actions in the South China Sea, creating confrontations against China. The possibility of Trump to take tough measures against North Korea would also increase the frictions between China and the US. In addition, since Trump would adopt an offshore balance strategy in the Western Pacific, he would encourage Japan to develop its military strengths to restrain China. The Abe government of Japan, in turn, would take this opportunity to accelerate its military buildup and strengthen its strategic presence against China in the Western Pacific. This would not only mean a cold and stagnant relationship between China and Japan, but also an increase of risks in maritime crises.

The establishment of contact channels between China and the US began soon after Trump took office. On February 10, President Xi Jinping and Trump had a long and cordial phone conversation, representing the official start of high-level exchanges between the two sides. The importance of this conversation lies in Trump’s confirmation of the One-China policy on the part of the US and his willingness to establish a cooperative partnership and meet at an early date.18The White House, “Readout of the President’s Call with President Xi Jinping of China,” February 9, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/09/readout-presidents-call-president-xijinping-china.On February 17, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US State Secretary Rex Tillerson met in Bonn where Wang Yi hoped the two sides to “deepen cooperation along the track of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation, so as to ensure greater development of bilateral relations during President Donald Trump’s presidency,” and Tillerson expressed that the US “l(fā)ooks forward to working with China to conduct high-level exchanges, facilitate mutual understanding, maintain, improve and reinforce dialogue and cooperation mechanisms in all fields, and strengthen cooperation in such areas as economy, finance and security in order to push bilateral relations for greater development.”19“Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 17, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1440207.shtml.This marks the start of official contact between the foreign affairs authorities. Inaddition, the new US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin held phone calls with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang, Governor of the People’s Bank of China Zhou Xiaochuan, Minister of the office of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs Liu He, and Finance Minister Xiao Jie. In the conversations, he expressed the willingness to strengthen contact with China and develop a more balanced bilateral relationship.20US Department of the Treasury, “Readout from a Treasury Spokesperson of Secretary Mnuchin’s Call with Chinese Counterparts,” February 17, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ Pages/sm0008.aspx.On February 27-28, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited the US, which is an important step to promote high-level meetings and go through the contact building work with the Trump administration.21“US President Donald Trump Meets with Yang Jiechi,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 28, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1441893.shtml; “Yang Jiechi Meets with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/zxxx_662805/t1442579.shtml.

Nevertheless, it still needs to be seen as to how bilateral relations would unfold. There are roughly three scenarios in the evolution of bilateral relations. The first scenario is mutual adjustment. The two sides conduct cooperation in a cautious and pragmatic manner, and each plays a positive part in certain areas to accommodate each other’s key concerns and refrain from frictions. The second scenario is a confrontational one. The two sides stick to certain principles and refuse to make concessions or adjustments, or think that they can force the other side to compromise. The result is a series of confrontations. Without sound ability and willingness to communicate, the coordination measures taken are merely to minimize damages when conflicts occur, which is a very negative working mode. The third is a positive-negative type. The more aggressive side dominates the agenda setting and means of contact and the weaker side has no intention or ability to gain an equal interaction footing. Instead, the weaker party pursues its interests by wrestling with the stronger one in the interactions, and at the same time, the stronger side takes into consideration the concerns of the weaker side. In this scenario, large frictions could be avoided, and the two sides have good communication and stable interaction expectations. The relationship is predicable but lacks equality.

The abovementioned three interaction scenarios could be found in different development stages of China-US relations. In the current situation, China should try to make the mutual adjustment scenario the normal interaction pattern. There are many new features under the Trump administration and they represent new challenges for China to manage its relations with the US. However, compared to the past, China now has more resources, experience and ability. In dealing with the US under Trump’s presidency, the first thing is to eagerly analyze, contact and influence the US side and try to ensure peaceful transition of China-US relations. But China should also be prepared for struggles, considering historical experiences. Trump’s China policy is still in formation, and the starting point should not be aimed at hurting China-US relations but instead at gaining maximum benefits. But if the US has too large an appetite, or fails to deal with bilateral relations properly, China must respond firmly and struggle against the US in a sensible, beneficial and restrained manner. After relations with the new government enter a normal state, China should keep guiding the US in interactions. If Trump wants to “make America great again,” he must cooperate with China economically. Therefore, an economic win-win result is an important pivot to promote bilateral relations in the Trump era, and the cooperative partnership based on this is feasible and expected. In the process, China needs to actively improve the quality of the relations and make the relationship follow the principles of “no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation,” to further push ahead the new type of major-country relations between China and the US.

China should try to make the mutual adjustment scenario the normal interaction pattern, in which the two sides conduct cooperation in a cautious and pragmatic manner, and each plays a positive part in certain areas to accommodate each other’s key concerns and refrain from frictions.

Wu Xinbo is Professor and Director of the Center for American Studies, Fudan University.