□文/Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

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東盟互聯(lián)互通與中國(guó)的“一帶一路”

□文/Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

《東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃總體規(guī)劃》與中國(guó)的“一帶一路”倡議有著驚人的相似點(diǎn)。兩者都把交通互聯(lián)互通當(dāng)成是緊密聯(lián)系各成員國(guó)，促進(jìn)貿(mào)易、投資、旅游和人文領(lǐng)域交流的手段。基于這樣的共同愿景來(lái)探討兩者如何互補(bǔ)、以及可能存在哪些問題是非常有意思的。

通過(guò)擴(kuò)大投資與政府開發(fā)援助（ODA）來(lái)支持基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目是贏得周邊發(fā)展中國(guó)家支持和友好的方法之一。從這個(gè)角度來(lái)看，兩者的利益趨同十分明顯。然而，盡管東盟和中國(guó)共同致力于交通互聯(lián)互通，東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃與中國(guó)的絲綢之路相容性到底有多大還有待進(jìn)一步觀察。

近來(lái)，中國(guó)加大對(duì)東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃的援助，這是一個(gè)積極的信號(hào)。鑒于《東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃總體規(guī)劃》的執(zhí)行需要很高的成本，任何捐助和資金支持都是受歡迎的。亞洲發(fā)展銀行和日本政府開發(fā)援助已經(jīng)參與到《東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃總體規(guī)劃》中來(lái)了，但仍有很大的空間留給亞投行、絲路基金以及中國(guó)政府開發(fā)援助。中國(guó)在港口、碼頭、高鐵等基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目方面已經(jīng)建立了很高的聲譽(yù)，可以提供相關(guān)技術(shù)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)支持東盟的計(jì)劃。東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃也提供機(jī)會(huì)給中國(guó)的基建企業(yè)，與東盟當(dāng)?shù)氐钠髽I(yè)合作，參與公私合作事業(yè)。這是一種吸引私營(yíng)企業(yè)投資公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目的新興模式。

中國(guó)與東盟在《東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃總體規(guī)劃》方面的合作勢(shì)頭持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)。例如，在東盟地區(qū)，長(zhǎng)達(dá)7000公里的新加坡—昆明鐵路連接與東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃的趨同性越來(lái)越明顯。最近，泰國(guó)與中國(guó)達(dá)成該鐵路泰國(guó)段的建設(shè)項(xiàng)目，這對(duì)該鐵路的建設(shè)將起到極大的推動(dòng)作用。然而，盡管東南亞大陸上的合作正在加速進(jìn)行，中國(guó)對(duì)東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃另外一個(gè)組成部分——海上互聯(lián)互通的支持還不是很明顯。2013年3月的一份報(bào)告確定了東盟滾裝船網(wǎng)絡(luò)的多條航線，其中三條被確定為2015年的重點(diǎn)實(shí)施航線：杜邁（印度尼西亞）—馬六甲（馬來(lái)西亞）航線；巴拉望（印度尼西亞）—檳城（馬來(lái)西亞）—普吉島（泰國(guó)）航線；達(dá)沃/桑托斯將軍城（菲律賓）—比通（印度尼西亞）航線。其他航線，如穆阿拉港（文萊）—納閩島（馬來(lái)西亞）—布魯克斯波因特（巴拉望）航線和穆阿拉港—三寶顏（菲律賓）航線也得以確認(rèn)。但是，這些次要航線的建設(shè)受到了基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和機(jī)構(gòu)管理等方面的限制。報(bào)告同時(shí)還指出了亟待解決的一些問題，如滾裝碼頭無(wú)法使用，以及港口與內(nèi)陸地區(qū)需要一個(gè)有效的公路體系來(lái)連接。這就為中國(guó)政府開發(fā)援助或是中國(guó)企業(yè)投資提供了一個(gè)新的領(lǐng)域。

近年來(lái)，中國(guó)加大了在東盟基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施領(lǐng)域的投資。中國(guó)遠(yuǎn)洋運(yùn)輸集團(tuán)（COSCO）是世界最大的海運(yùn)物流公司之一，持有中遠(yuǎn)新加坡港務(wù)局碼頭有限公司49%的股份。而廣西北部灣國(guó)際港務(wù)集團(tuán)則持有關(guān)丹港口財(cái)團(tuán)38%的股份，擁有管理、經(jīng)營(yíng)馬來(lái)西亞關(guān)丹港30年的特許權(quán)。同時(shí)，中國(guó)還投資印度尼西亞基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)，利用其石油、天然氣、煤炭以及礦產(chǎn)等自然資源。盡管如此，不同于中國(guó)在東南亞大陸的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資，中國(guó)在東盟海島國(guó)家的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資與東盟滾裝船網(wǎng)絡(luò)沒有趨同性。

這可以從幾個(gè)方面來(lái)解釋。首先，中國(guó)和東盟滾裝船網(wǎng)絡(luò)之間沒有直接的聯(lián)系。昆明—新加坡鐵路把昆明與東盟港口直接連接起來(lái)，而東盟管裝船網(wǎng)絡(luò)與中國(guó)大多數(shù)港口相隔太遠(yuǎn)，很難形成連接。盡管如此，從經(jīng)濟(jì)立場(chǎng)上講，東盟滾裝船網(wǎng)絡(luò)或許對(duì)中國(guó)并不重要，但作為《東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃總體規(guī)劃》的一部分，它提供給中國(guó)展示其周邊外交政策的機(jī)會(huì)。同樣，從能源安全優(yōu)勢(shì)角度講，從非洲和中東駛往東北亞（包括中國(guó)）的大型運(yùn)郵輪可能會(huì)選擇途徑東盟東部增長(zhǎng)區(qū)海域（龍目島或望加錫海峽—蘇祿海和民都洛海峽——中國(guó)南海），而非馬六甲海峽。

此外，東盟海島國(guó)家賦予海洋經(jīng)濟(jì)和國(guó)家利益更高的意義。菲律賓通過(guò)共和國(guó)水上高速線路來(lái)加強(qiáng)島嶼之間的互聯(lián)互通。印尼提出“全球海洋支點(diǎn)”計(jì)劃，強(qiáng)調(diào)國(guó)內(nèi)各港口以及與東盟主要港口互聯(lián)互通的重要性。因此，中國(guó)支持東盟滾裝船網(wǎng)絡(luò)可以贏得東盟海島國(guó)家以及整個(gè)東盟的認(rèn)可。對(duì)《東盟互聯(lián)互通計(jì)劃總體規(guī)劃》和東盟滾裝船網(wǎng)絡(luò)的支持將為中國(guó)贏得投資以及鄰國(guó)的友好，并證明政治上的原則性分歧不會(huì)妨礙基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施領(lǐng)域的合作與發(fā)展。

馬金羽編譯來(lái)源： 外交學(xué)者網(wǎng)站

（作者系菲律賓中國(guó)研究協(xié)會(huì)研究員）

ASEAN Connectivity and China's "One Belt,One Road"

By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

T he ASEAN Master Plan for Connectivity (AMPC) and China’s “One Belt,One Road”initiative share striking similarities and parallels.Both envisage transport connectivity as a way to bring member or participating countries closer to one another,facilitating better access for trade,investment,tourism and people-to-people exchanges.Like the “One Belt,One Road” project,AMPC calls for a system of roads and railways to link contiguous Southeast Asian countries with one another,as well as a system of ports for RoRo (roll-on roll-off) vessels and short sea shipping to link insular Southeast Asian countries with one another as well as with mainland Southeast Asia.Given this shared vision,it is interesting to consider how the two could complement one another and what issues could stand in the way.

China has since 2009 been ASEAN’s biggest trading partner and ASEAN has been China’s third largest trading partner since 2011.Trends indicate that twoway trade will only increase further in the coming years.In 2015 alone,it is expected to hit $500 billion.And since seamless transportation infrastructure can better spur trade,plans to enhance connectivity between the two sides are mutually benefi cial.China also puts great emphasis on neighborhood diplomacy,and extending investments and offi cial development assistance (ODA) to fi nance infrastructure projects is one way of winning the support and goodwill of neighboring developing countries.From this perspective,then,the convergence of interests is very apparent.However,while ASEAN and China shared an aspiration of enhancing transport connectivity,it remains to be seen how compatible AMPC and China’s Silk Road project really are.

AMPC is apparently more mature and is at a relatively advanced stage,having been the product of several highlevel discussions and technical working group meetings since 2009.In contrast,the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) was only officially announced in 2013.As such,while many of the key pieces of AMPC had already been laid out,much of MSR’s details remain sketchy and China still has to engage potential partners.China had recently stepped up its efforts to provide assistance in executing ASEAN’s connectivity plan and this is a positive sign.Given the high costs involved in executing AMPC,donors and financial assistance should be welcomed.The Asian Development Bank and Japanese ODA are already engaged in AMPC,but there is still ample scope for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),the Silk Road Fund,as well as Chinese ODA.China has developed an impressive reputation in infrastructure projects such as ports,terminals and high-speed trains,and can offer such technology and expertise to support ASEAN’s plan.AMPC may also present opportunities for Chinese companies engaged in infrastructure work to partner with their local ASEAN counterparts in public-private partnership undertakings,an emerging mode for attracting private sector investment in public infrastructure projects.

Indeed,it can be said that momentum for China-ASEAN cooperation in realizing the AMPC is growing.On mainland Southeast Asia,for instance,the convergence of the 7,000 km-Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) with ASEAN’s railway connectivity plans is becoming apparent; the recent deal between Thailand and China to construct the Thai section of the route may give this a big boost.If completed,the SKRL will link Kunming,the capital of China’s southwest Yunnan province,with all the capitals of mainland ASEAN countries (except Malaysia,since the line will bypass Kuala Lumpur on its way to Singapore).However,while cooperation on mainland Southeast Asia is picking up steam,Chinese support for the other component of the plan – maritime connectivity – is not yet in evidence.A March 2013 report identified several routes for the ASEAN RORO network (ARN),three of which were designated as priority routes for implementation in 2015:1) Dumai (Indonesia)-Malacca (Malaysia); 2) Belawan (Indonesia)-Penang (Malaysia)-Phuket (Thailand) and; 3) Davao/General Santos (Philippines)-Bitung (Indonesia).Otherroutes were also identified,such as Muara (Brunei)-Labuan (Malaysia)-Brooke’s Point (Palawan) and Muara-Zamboanga (Philippines),but these secondary routes were hampered by such constraints as infrastructure and institutional arrangements.The report cited the unavailability of capable RoRo terminals and the need for a good road system to link ports with hinterland areas as among the issues that need to be addressed.This presents a new frontier for Chinese ODA or investments by Chinese enterprises.In addition,China also has an extensive experience in RoRo and short sea shipping with neighbors Japan and Korea and these lessons and best practices could be shared with appreciative maritime ASEAN states.

In recent years,China had upped the ante in its investments in ASEAN’s infrastructure sector.State-owned COSCO,one of the world’s largest shipping and logistics company,has a 49 percent stake in the COSCO-PSA terminal in Singapore.Beibu Gulf Holding (Hong Kong) Co.Ltd has a 38 percent equity share in a consortium that received a 30-year concession to manage,operate and develop Kuantan Port in Malaysia.This Port is poised to serve as a catalyst for the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park.China has also been investing in Indonesian infrastructure to facilitate access to the latter’s natural resources,such as oil and gas,coal,and mines.However,unlike in peninsular ASEAN,the patterns of Chinese infrastructure investments in maritime ASEAN states do not suggest convergence with the ARN.

Several factors can explain this.One is the absence of a direct link between China and the ARN.Unlike the rail connection in mainland ASEAN that could provide a landlocked Kunming direct access to an ASEAN port through SKRL,the ARN is too distant from most Chinese ports to facilitate a link.However,while the ARN may have marginal importance to China from an economic standpoint,being part and parcel of AMPC turns it into an opportunity for China to showcase its neighborhood diplomacy.Likewise,from an energy security vantage point,very large crude carriers from Africa and the Middle East bound for Northeast Asia (including China) may pass by BIMP-EAGA waters (through Lombok or Makassar Straits proceeding to the Sulu Sea and Mindoro Strait out to South China Sea) as an alternative to Malacca Strait.

Moreover,maritime ASEAN states are already according greater significance to their maritime economies and national interests.The Philippines had been promoting its Strong Republic Nautical Highway to enhance inter-island connectivity.Indonesia recently unveiled its Maritime Axis/Maritime Fulcrum doctrine which stresses,among other things,the importance of port connectivity not only within the country but also with other major ASEAN harbors.Thus,for China,support for the ARN could win it recognition from individual maritime ASEAN states as well as from ASEAN generally.

Support for AMPC as a whole and the ARN in particular will enable China to win not only investments,but also the goodwill of its neighbors.It may even show that principled disagreement on political issues do not constitute a hurdle to pursuing practical cooperation in infrastructure development.

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a member of the Philippine Association for China Studies (PACS).