Ning Tuanhui

Relations between China and Australia have remained on a very low level in recent years due to a series of events， which have thrown their bilateral relationship into its most difficult period since diplomatic ties were established. Since late 2017， the Australian media and individual politicians began to play up the issue of political “penetration”by China in Australia， which severely undermined the atmosphere for sound bilateral relations. In August 2018， the Australian government barred Huawei， China’s leading company in information and communications technology， from its 5G network on national security grounds， which set a notorious precedent of rejecting Huawei’s 5G technology among Western countries and cast a shadow upon the prospects of improving relations. In April 2020， without any justification， the Australian government once more called for an independent investigation into China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic， a political stunt which strongly exacerbated tensions between the two countries. In July 2020， the Australian government went even further and directed a note verbale to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral， which plainly rejected the legitimacy of China’s South China Sea claims. In April 2021， the Australian federal government resolved to scrap the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI） memorandum of understanding and framework agreement that the Victoria state government previously signed with China. Both moves have aroused China’s strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition.1

Since the two countries established diplomatic ties following the improvement of China-US relations in the 1970s， Australia has adopted a China policy featuring engagement and a balanced approach. However， a number of incidents that occurred in recent years seem to have caused a shift in Australia’s China policy to one of precaution and recalibration. Politically， the institutional and ideological divide between the two sides has grown continuously， leading to more distrust and a stronger sense of vigilance on Australia’s part with respect to China. In terms of security， discussions about an alleged “China threat” have once again flared up in Australia due to the influence of the United States’ confrontational policy against China. Similarly， in Australia’s military strategic deployment， an increasingly explicit intention of targeting China has become evident. Formerly pure economic matters are now permeated with security concerns. On issues related to Taiwan， Hong Kong， Xinjiang， Tibet， the South China Sea and the coronavirus pandemic， Australia has also been making repeated criticisms and accusations against China.

Judging from the historical background of China-Australia relations， it has always been beneficial for Australia to maintain favorable ties with China， as its balanced views and fair dealings with China have been profitable in the past. Therefore， it is appropriate to ask what motivated Australia to fundamentally change its China policy towards a more confrontational posture against China in recent years and what factors have contributed to this major shift. The article tries to disentangle this phenomenon from the perspective of party politics.

Party Politics and Australia’s Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy， so that the former can only be understood on the basis of understanding the latter. Among the various domestic factors that influence foreign policy， the role of political parties is especially prominent， and thus serve as a qualified first choice of domestic perspectives for foreign policy analysis.2 This is also the case in Australia， whose foreign policy is deeply influenced by the different traditions and preferences of its two mainstream parties， namely the Liberal-National Coalition and the Labor Party. In these two political groupings， different factions also pursue different interests and represent various viewpoints on foreign policy issues. The disputes and compromises between parties and factions within one party collectively affect and shape the agenda and direction of Australia’s foreign policy.

First， the Coalition and Labor have formed different traditions and preferences on foreign policy over the course of their development. The Coalition has a more Western-oriented nature and advocates the strengthening of traditional ties with Europe and of the alliance with the United States. In contrast， Labor puts more emphasis on the independence of Australian diplomacy and values the relations with Asian countries more highly， while supporting multilateralism and internationalism in its foreign policy.3 The diplomatic traditions and preferences of the two parties are reflected to varying degrees in their positions on major issues of Australia’s foreign policy.

Second， disputes and compromises between the Coalition and Labor have a direct bearing on Australia’s foreign policy. On the one hand， the ruling party can enforce its policy goals simply because of its dominance over formulation and implementation of the country’s foreign policy. On the other hand， the opposition party is capable of influencing foreign policymaking through parliamentary debates and by mobilizing public opinion， or by demonstrating its policy positions using external contacts.

Third， apart from the quarrels and compromises between political parties， intra-party fights and concessions can also affect the trajectory of foreign policy. Australia’s political landscape is deeply influenced by intraparty strife. Its domestic and foreign policies can not only witness major turns because of party and government leadership changes following power struggles within the ruling party， but they are also likely to be influenced by inner-party personal contests. Any lack of authority among the party members will make the party leader’s policy decision-making susceptible to restraints from other factions. In addition， the party chief is likely to utilize some of his or her foreign policy positions as negotiating tools to win more internal support and conciliate other partisan factions. Whereas internal struggles within the opposition and the subsequent party leadership changes may not directly affect national policies， they will nevertheless result in relative shifts in the party’s policy orientation.

Fourth， small parties may play a crucial role in some foreign policy issues. In recent years， small parties that are independent of the mainstream Liberal， National and Labor Parties have garnered increasing electoral support and have become a force not to be overlooked in Australian politics. In the latest general elections， minor parties， which hold several seats in the Senate， have been approached by both the Coalition and Labor for political support. Despite their focus on domestic issues， most small parties have their own distinct positions on foreign policy. For example， the Greens put more emphasis on the role of the United Nations in international affairs and plead that human rights must be at the forefront of foreign policy.4 The One Nation Party is active on the Australian political stage due to its ultraconservative position of opposing foreign investment and high immigration rates. The United Australia Party， founded by mining magnet Clive Palmer in 2013， also provides a right-wing and conservative platform.

The attitude toward China constitutes an important part of Australia’s foreign policy， and party politics has shaped many of the modifications in Australia’s China policy. After the Donald Trump administration took office in 2017， the United States explicitly identified China as its top strategic competitor and began to contain and suppress China’s development in a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. The successive Joe Biden administration， despite some major adjustments， has basically retained the competitive tone of Trump’s China policy.5 This qualitative shift concerning the United States’ China policy has also influenced Australia’s domestic discussions on its own response to China. In this context， Australia’s major political parties and the various factions within them have fiercely debated and competed over the handling of relations with China， which eventually led to a radical reorientation of Australia’s China policy. In fact， party politics remains a factor overshadowing major events in China-Australia relations in the past few years. This article will take the Belt and Road Initiative and the “China penetration” rhetoric as two examples of how party politics affected the deterioration of ChinaAustralia relations.

The Belt and Road Initiative and Australia’s Change of Attitude toward China

Australia’s stance toward China’s Belt and Road Initiative has undergone a complex transition. The two countries are linked by close economic and trade ties， with China being Australia’s largest trading partner， source of import and destination of export for consecutive years. Both countries are major economies in the Asia-Pacific region， and the BRI has created unique opportunities for the development of bilateral economic cooperation and overall ties， which is why the Chinese initiative has drawn extensive attention in Australia since it was first proposed.

Australia’s official position on the BRI was initially prudent but generally open. Compared to the domestic business community which took a more welcoming attitude， the government carefully chose its words on the BRI-related issues and avoided taking sides on public occasions. On the other hand， the Australian government did not rule out the possibility of participating in the BRI at first， and once engaged with the Chinese side on Belt and Road cooperation. The Australian business community in general held a positive view on the BRI and the development opportunities it brought about， and encouraged the government to consult with China on Australia’s participation in the initiative. Trade officials within the Australian government shared this positive attitude ， because they hoped it would provide more opportunities for Australian enterprises.6 During the bilateral strategic economic dialogue in 2015， China and Australia even agreed to establish a working group on the synergy between the BRI and the Northern Australia Development Program （NADP）.7

Since 2017， however， the Australian government’s attitude toward the BRI showed clear signs of change for the worse. First， right before Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit in March 2017， the Australian government indicated that it would not sign a formal memorandum of understanding on cooperation under the BRI framework.8 Although the absence of a cooperation agreement stopped short of a rejection and denial of the BRI， its negative effect was instantly felt. Second， Australian government officials began to publicly criticize Belt and Road projects. In 2018， the minister for international development and the Pacific and the minister for foreign affairs both expressed concerns on different occasions about China’s Belt and Road infrastructure construction in Pacific island countries and the debt burden that this would impose on these countries. The ministers even accused China of using the BRI to expand its political and strategic influence in the region.9 Third， the memorandum of understanding and framework agreement on Belt and Road cooperation signed between Australia’s Victoria state government and China’s National Development and Reform Commission was eyed with suspicion and was continuously scrutinized by the federal government. The memorandum was eventually abolished by Foreign Minister Marise Payne under new laws passed in 2020 that allowed her to review and cancel a range of international agreements struck by states and territories.10 Lastly， Australia began cooperating with the United States and Japan on infrastructure investment， in a bid to provide an alternative to the BRI. The three countries announced a trilateral partnership for infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific region in July 2018 and signed a memorandum of understanding to operationalize the trilateral partnership in November of the same year， vowing to “mobilize and support the deployment of private sector investment capital to deliver major new infrastructure projects，” and intending to “work with other members of the G20 to promote quality infrastructure development” at the G20 summit in Osaka.11

Australia’s shift from a wait-and-see and hesitant standpoint to a rejecting and negating attitude toward the BRI was heavily influenced by domestic party politics.

First， the Coalition， preferring the US-Australia alliance in its diplomacy， has been deeply cautious about developing economic ties with China. Compared to the Labor Party， the Coalition conducts distinctively pro-Western diplomacy and views the US-Australia alliance as the cornerstone of Australian foreign policy. Therefore， the China policies of Coalition governments are more susceptible to US influence. Out of the need to contain China， the Trump administration did its utmost to stigmatize the BRI. As Trump called on all of his allies to closely coordinate their actions with the US’s strategic focus， the policy direction of Australia’s Coalition government was not given much room for maneuver of its own. Coupled with its own pro-American tradition， the Coalition’s perception of the BRI turned increasingly negative. Moreover， geopolitical thinking plays a crucial role in the Coalition’s handling of Australia-China relations. Concerning the BRI， Coalition policymakers tend to analyze the situation and make decisions from a strategic and geopolitical perspective， largely ignoring the BRI’s nature as an economic cooperation initiative rather than a strategic competition tool. Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop once indicated that any participation in the BRI would accelerate American withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific at a time when Australia was seeking more strategic investment for the region coming from the US.12

Second， partisan conflicts have largely influenced Australia’s perception of the BRI as the issue has become a hotly debated topic between the Coalition and Labor. Australia’s opposition Labor Party holds a more positive attitude toward the BRI. Part of the reason is that it has always attached more importance to development opportunities in Asia， especially China， expecting closer bilateral economic and trade ties through the BRI. The fact that the Labor party has been more open-minded and positive about Australia’s participation in the BRI， is often highlighted in their members’ criticism against the ruling party’s views on China.13 The Labor Party’s endorsement of the BRI and criticism of Coalition policies have won them substantial domestic support， which has imposed much public opinion pressure on the Coalition government. That is why， despite its overall negative attitude toward the BRI， the Malcolm Turnbull government refrained from a total rejection or pushback. Instead， it adopted an ambiguous approach： it declined to sign an agreement on Belt and Road cooperation， but at the same time concluded a memorandum of understanding with China on third-party market cooperation. In addition， senior Australian administration officials were sent to attend the two Belt and Road Forums for International Cooperation in 2017 and 2019.

Nevertheless， the Coalition’s China policy has turned much more confrontational under the influence of the United States’ containment strategy against China， and its position on the BRI has witnessed continuous regression. Ever since bilateral relations began to deteriorate in 2017， all China-related factors have been placed under greater suspicion and scrutiny， while the BRI has been particularly stigmatized as a “debt trap”and a “vehicle for Chinese influence.” In May 2020， then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a warning that America would “simply disconnect” if Victoria’s decision to join China’s Belt and Road plan impacted Australia’s telecommunications security.14 Seizing the opportunity， the Coalition government launched bruising attacks on the BRI， and in particular launched damning accusations against the Victoria state’s Labor government.15 Drawing upon the new Foreign Relations （State and Territory Arrangements） Act of 2020， the Scott Morrison government forced the Victorian government to scrap the Belt and Road memorandum.16 The Coalition government’s turnaround from its originally supportive position on the BRI was thus not only aimed at catering to conservative anti-China interests at home and abroad， but also at crippling the Labor Party by leveraging China-related issues.

In face of the Coalition party’s charges， then Labor leader Bill Shorten initially came to Victoria’s defense in November 2018， arguing that doing business deals with China is “normal day to day work” for the states.17 Labor’s federal foreign affairs spokeswoman Penny Wong accused the Morrison government of seeking to “weaponize foreign policy” against the Victorian government.18 Despite these defenses from the party leadership， Labor’s policy position on the BRI has since eroded remarkably. The current Labor leader Anthony Albanese distanced himself from Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews， saying that he wouldn’t sign Australia up to the BRI if he became prime minister.19 Labor’s BRI policy shift occurred after the political atmosphere had been poisoned by continuous Coalition attacks. Right-wing conservatives in Australia have been concocting and playing up various antiChina stories， which not only does severe harm to China-Australia bilateral relations， but also creates an irrational political atmosphere domestically. In such an environment， any positive statement or action concerning China runs the risk of being treated as collusion. Taking advantage of such a political climate， the Coalition accuses Labor of not being tough enough on China-related issues and criticizes the state of Victoria’s Belt and Road agreement as undermining Australia’s national interests， forcing Labor to also retreat from its originally positive attitude toward the BRI.

Third， conservative forces within the Coalition have exerted major influence on the government’s BRI policy. Factional strife is a prominent feature in Australia’s party landscape， which is often characterized by unreconcilable policy disputes. Frequent exchange of leadership caused by factional infighting has influenced the Coalition government’s foreign policy considerably. During his tenure from 2015 to 2018， Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had been constantly restrained by conservative groupings within his party represented by his predecessor Tony Abbott. Due to the Coalition’s narrow victory in the 2016 federal election with a slight majority of 76 seats in the House of Representatives， Turnbull did not acquire enough authority and support both within and outside his party to advance his preferred agenda， which partly explains his reluctant and distanced attitude toward the BRI.20

The hawks within the Coalition have to a large degree been able to dominate Australia’s policies towards China by instrumentalizing anti-China topics and continuously discrediting and attacking the BRI. In their opinion， Australia’s excessive economic dependence on China makes them susceptible to economic coercion， which is undermining Australia’s sovereignty and national interest. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic， Australian politicians became increasingly suspicious and accusatory. Concetta Fierravanti-Wells， Liberal Senator and former Minister for International Development and the Pacific， urged for more diversification of Australia’s trade relations and less dependence on China. She accused China of “taking advantage of the pandemic to further its insidious debt-trap diplomacy by taking advantage of economically stressed nation-states through the Belt and Road Initiative.”21 Liberal Senator James Paterson took aim at Australia’s over-reliance on international students coming from China.22 By discrediting the BRI and hyping up the alleged “China threat” theory， these and other hawkish parliamentary members have directly swayed the Coalition party’s response to the BRI.

Fourth， small right-wing parties such as the One Nation Party and the United Australia Party have exacerbated the controversy on the BRI. In the 2016 federal election， the One Nation Party won four seats in the Senate and became an influential force in the parliament. The party has consistently voiced its opposition to Chinese immigrants， to a China-Australia free trade agreement and to Chinese investment.23 Pauline Hanson， head of One Nation， called the memorandum on Belt and Road cooperation that Victoria’s Premier Andrews signed with China a “secret agreement，” which was inconsistent with Victoria’s interests and was bound to increase the state’s debt burden. Hanson claimed that China would “take over the assets” if the Victoria state could not repay the debt.24 Another party with a right-wing and conservative political ideology is the United Australia Party， which takes an even more radical position on China-related issues. Its leader， mining magnet Clive Palmer， has made several startling remarks about China with the intention of gaining political capital and economic interests through the propagation of anti-Chinese issues.25 He accused the Chinese government of “attempting to infiltrate Australia through the states and bypass the Federal Government” by making Belt and Road deals directly with state governments. For this reason， he is strongly opposed to Western Australia joining Victoria in signing up to the BRI.26

As its major trading partner in the region， Australia has always been solicited by China to join the Belt and Road Initiative， which is China’s flagship proposal for international cooperation to date. Australia’s eventual rejection of a Belt and Road cooperation document with China reflects a marked change of its China policy， for which there are reasons at both domestic and international levels. With the qualitative change of the United States’ China policy， Australia’s domestic disputes over China issues have also erupted accordingly. The views on China that are held by different political forces and interest groups are ultimately reflected in Australia’s party politics and shape national policy formation through formal and informal mechanisms.

The “China Penetration” Rhetoric and the Deterioration of China-Australia Relations

The narrative of China’s strategy of political “penetration” has recently become a hot button topic in the domain of China-Australia relations， and constitutes a major reason for the deterioration of the bilateral relationship. In June 2017， a program jointly produced by Australia’s Fairfax Media and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation （ABC） conducted an “in-depth investigation” into China’s political influence in Australia， implying that the Chinese government has given donations to Australian political parties， through Chinese citizens in the country， in exchange for their support for China’s positions. The program， once broadcast， sparked fierce domestic discussions about China’s political “penetration” and “interference” in Australia. In December of the same year， then Prime Minister Turnbull decided to ban foreign political donations out of fear for growing Chinese influence in the country. Later， Turnbull publicly accused China of using its influence to interfere in Australian politics， while declaring in rather poor Mandarin that “the Australian people have stood up.”27 Under this pretext， the government submitted to parliament a proposal for new legislation against espionage and foreign interference， with China identified as a target of special focus. In response， the Chinese government reiterated its position on multiple occasions and sternly criticized the irresponsible remarks of individual Australian media outlets and politicians.28 However， the groundless and unfounded denunciation against China did not end there. Playing up the fabricated threat of Chinese interference， the Turnbull government managed to push parliament to adopt the National Security Legislation Amendment （Espionage and Foreign Interference） Act and the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme before the July 2018 parliamentary by-election. Another bill that bans foreign political donations was also put on the legislative agenda， which was later passed and took effect in 2019. Not even then did the controversy around the alleged Chinese penetration and interference subside. In the process， Australian citizens with Chinese origin， overseas Chinese in Australia and Chinese students studying in the country were seriously stigmatized， and the hard-won mutual trust between the two countries was almost completely wiped out， which has created major obstacles for the restoration and further development of bilateral relations.

The role of party politics is also visible behind the narrative of “China penetration.”

First， the Coalition lashed out at Labor under the pretext of“Chinese penetration.” The scandal of Labor Senator Sam Dastyari became a focus of the “Chinese penetration” drama. As a young senator of Iranian origin， Dastyari was found to have close ties with a Chinese businessman， whose donations he had received before making remarks on the South China Sea issue which were not in line with government and Labor positions. The Coalition launched attacks on Dastyari and the Labor Party the moment these facts became publicly know. Under the pressure Dastyari was removed from his post as Senate Deputy Opposition Whip and Senate Committee chair. However， even then the Coalition did not just let go in the matter.Turnbull indicated that the Labor Party must “boot Dastyari out” as the handling of the senator became a test of Labor leader Bill Shorten’s loyalty to the country.29 Other past statements made by Dastyari deemed as overly pro-China also came under fire by the Coalition. For example， he was criticized for one of his interviews on the China Economic Net website in 2015 for adopting China’s official terminology for its war with Japan， namely the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Turnbull scolded Dastyari for “betraying Australia，” while then Foreign Minister Julie Bishop accused the senator of being “hopelessly compromised.”30 Due to the tremendous pressure from the Coalition， Dastyari announced his resignation from the Senate in December 2017 and decided not to return to the chamber in 2018. Apart from Dastyari， other Labor politicians also came under suspicion because of their various ties with China.31

The Coalition’s relentless attacks on “pro-China” Labor members of parliament were not merely meant to allegedly safeguard Australia’s national interests. Its fierce offensive against political donations in late 2017 and the new legislation on foreign interference served to weaken the Labor Party and win itself more political support.32 By lashing out at the so-called proChina profile of Labor’s parliamentarians， the Coalition was not only able to severely damage Labor’s image among voters， but also to highlight its own position of resolutely safeguarding national interests. Moreover， at a critical moment before the parliamentary by-election and general election， the Coalition， which was under much electoral pressure， resorted to the “China threat” rhetoric as an instrument to target its political opponents and garner right-wing and conservative support. By playing up the issue of alleged Chinese penetration， the Coalition launched stinging attacks on Labor， making China-related issues become a tool for political finger-pointing and China-Australia relations a victim of partisan battles.

Second， the China hawks within the Coalition had long harbored resentment at growing Chinese influence in Australia. With strong ideological bias against China， some Liberal members of parliament， headed by Andrew Hastie， had been canvassing for their narrative of a “Chinese threat” and “Chinese penetration.” Hastie claimed that a Chinese-Australian businessman co-conspired to bribe a senior United Nations official，33 and played up the allegation of Chinese defector and self-proclaimed former spy Wang Liqiang，34 in a bid to corroborate his narrative of Chinese political penetration in Australia. As chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security， Hastie’s privileged status gave him much influence over public opinion and policy debates. Within the Coalition and especially among conservatives， Hastie’s assertion was widely supported， and he and some other members of parliament with strong anti-China convictions formed a group called the Wolverines. The club， characterized by its Cold War mentality and ideological bias on China-related issues， exaggerated the differences and disputes between China and Australia and severely strained bilateral relations.

Apart from Hastie and other ultra-conservative Coalition members， another conservative faction represented by Peter Dutton has also seen its influence on the rise within the Coalition. Despite his failure to succeed Turnbull after launching a leadership challenge in August 2018， Dutton still assumed the key position of Home Minister and later of Defense Minister in the Morrison government. On issues concerning China， Dutton has held a rather conservative stand， once accusing the Chinese Communist Party of behaving in ways that are “inconsistent” with Australian values. He also urged for heightened alert to foreign interference， cyber hacks， and theft of intellectual property in Australian universities.35

The emergence of conservatives and ultra-conservatives within the Coalition has not only disrupted Australia’s political landscape， but also influenced the trajectory of the country’s China policy. Moreover， right-wing conservative politicians in the Coalition have been actively lending support to the United States’ strategic layout regarding China and have kept close ties with China hawks in the US to that end. Confronted with external and internal pressure， the more moderate Turnbull was forced to occupy a much tougher position， in order to appease to the conservative wing in his own party and to avoid being vulnerable for too moderate views on China.

Third， to counter the Coalition’s offensive， the Labor Party began to expose the “pro-China” behavior of Coalition members. It was not only the Coalition party taking advantage of the “Chinese penetration” narrative to launch political attacks and taint the public image of multiple Labor members in federal and state parliaments. To rid itself of the Coalitionconstructed weak image on China-related issues， Labor itself began to hit back at Coalition accusations using the same tactic. While reiterating its resolute determination to safeguard Australia’s national interests， Labor also took aim at the “pro-China” behavior of Coalition members. The case of Gladys Liu， Coalition member in the House of Representatives， is an instructive example. After her victory in the May 2019 federal election， Liu was reported by ABC in August of the same year to have once been appointed honorary chairperson of the World Trade United Foundation， an organization said to be “affiliated with China’s efforts to exert influence on foreign governments and expatriate Chinese.”36 She was also revealed to be a council member of the Guangdong provincial chapter of the China Overseas Exchange Association between 2003 and 2015.37 The Chinese background and these “suspicious” activities of Liu quickly became a hotly debated issue in Australia， with Labor publicly urging Liu to clarify. Penny Wong， Labor spokesperson on foreign affairs， called it a test for Prime Minister Morrison， very similar to the one for Labor leader Bill Shorten in the case of Sam Dastyari. “He needs to come to the parliament， make a statement and assure the Australian parliament and through them the Australian people that Gladys Liu is a fit and proper person to be in the Australian parliament.”38 Dastyari， who resigned earlier because of a political donations scandal， also told Liu to consider stepping down.39 The Labor Party’s tit-for-tat approach of self-defense not only damaged its own image， but also exacerbated the political atmosphere for discussing China issues in Australia， which naturally was no help for shaping an objective and rational China policy.

Fourth， small parties also stoked the fire on the “Chinese penetration”issue. The continuous spread of populist sentiment in the West has also impacted Australia， where ultra-right-wing populist parties have re-emerged in domestic politics. Under the banner of de-globalization and anti-immigration， these parties have frequently targeted China. Throughout the evolution of the “Chinese penetration” narrative， leaders of the populist parties also joined the accusations of China’s influence peddling and interference. One Nation leader Pauline Hanson claimed that China was putting its “tentacles around the world” and that the Australian people were sick and tired of Chinese influence.40 Leader of the United Australia Party Clive Palmer tweeted in May 2019 that “Communist China” had “hundreds of thousands of spies in Australia” and that “The National Security Law of China required every Chinese citizen and company to spy for China.”41 Cassy O’Connor， leader of the Tasmanian Greens， alleged that Chinese interference in foreign governments was something “from Canada to the USA， New Zealand， Australia， we know this is happening.”42 In the Tasmanian parliament， she also frequently played up fears about the Chinese Communist Party’s “penetration”in the state and its threat to Australian democracy， and called for Tasmania to reduce reliance on China.43 Although these small parties do not dominate the policy-making landscape， they have much larger influence on public opinion and policy debate than can be expected from their small size， thus indirectly affecting Australia’s policy formation on China.

In their attack on China’s so-called “political penetration" the Coalition party government which initiated the whole affair and forced the Labor Party to get embroiled into it， dealt a heavy blow to Labor Senator Sam Dastyari with the help of alleged “clues” from the intelligence community. The Turnbull government then seized the opportunity to amend the national security legislation， and successfully established the ruling party’s image as a strong defender of national interests. In this process， the “China threat”rhetoric and the “Chinese penetration” narrative were instrumentalized by the Coalition to weaken the Labor Party， and indeed won it some support from right-wing and conservative voters， which temporarily consolidated Turnbull’s position in the party. To counter the Coalition， the Labor Party also took up the “Chinese penetration” issue and attacked its rival in a titfor-tat exchange on “security implications” concerning China. Obviously， the issue has far deviated from the domain of policy debate and has become a convenient instrument for partisan battles. Small parties such as One Nation and United Australia were not major players in the drama， but the narrative of “Chinese penetration” fit well into their long-held policy positions and got them more attention， making them indirect beneficiaries. Unfortunately， China-Australia relations， which have yet to find a path out of this downward spiral， became the largest victim of this political mud fight.

Conclusion

Designing foreign policy is a complex process， and the observed changes in Australia’s China policy are the result of many intersecting factors. In previous research by Chinese scholars， external perspectives， such as the international power structure， the evolution of the world order， the United States’ China policy and the rise of China， were usually adopted in understanding and analyzing Australia’s China policy. In comparison， there is a scarcity of specific research on the relationship between Australia’s domestic politics and its China policy.

This article has chosen to take the viewpoint of domestic politics to uncover the motives and complex nature of Australia’s behaviour as a sovereign state and a middle power. Domestic politics is the foundation for understanding foreign policy， and party politics plays a particularly prominent role among the various domestic factors for policymaking. With the United States’ China policy having shifted since 2017， the political climate in Australia for domestic discussions on relations with China has also witnessed gradual changes. Heated debates and quarrels among and within various parties over how China-Australia relations should be conducted finally led to a major shift in Australia’s China policy. Despite the significant influence of US incentives and pressure in the process， party politics directly contributed to this policy change. The disputes and the competition between different political forces on China-Australia relations were ultimately reflected in the formulation and implementation of government policies. This becomes especially clear in Australia’s handling of the Belt and Road Initiative and the “Chinese penetration” issue.

1 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on July 27， 2020，”Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， July 27， 2020， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ s2510_665401/2511_665403/202007/t20200727_693308.html； “Chinese Embassy Spokesperson’s Remarks，” Embassy of China in Australia， April 21， 2021， https：//www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceau//eng/ sghdxwfb_1/t1870484.htm.

2 Zhang Qingmin， Foreign Policy Analysis， Peking University Press， 2019， p.145.

3 Laurie Brereton， “The Outlook for Australian Foreign Policy—a Labor Perspective，” Australian Journal of International Affairs， Vol.55， No.3， 2001， pp.343-349； Tanya Plibersek， “Australian Foreign Policy： The Labor Approach，” Australian Journal of International Affairs， Vol.70， No.5， 2016， pp.460-466.

4 Scott Ludlam， “Australian Foreign Policy： The Greens’ Approach，” Australian Journal of International Affairs， Vol.70， No.5， 2016， pp.467-470.

5 Wu Xinbo， “China-US Strategic Competition under the Biden Administration，” China International Studies， No.2， 2021， p.5.

6 Shen Yujia， “Australia’s Attitude towards the Belt and Road Initiative and its Reasons，” Pacific Journal， No.8， 2018， pp.87-98.

7 “Free Trade Agreement Injects Fresh Momentum in China-Australia Relations，” People’s Daily， December 19， 2016， p.3.

8 “Australia Rejects China Push on Silk Road Strategy，” Financial Times， March 22， 2017， https：// www.ft.com/content/e30f3122-0eae-11e7-b030-768954394623； “China Snubbed on Road and Port Push，”The Australian， March 20， 2017， http：//www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/chinasnubbed-on-road-and-port-push/news-story/1534e4f7de0ab0031818854d24ae0a91.

9 “China Funding White Elephant Infrastructure Projects in the Pacific， Says Australian Minister，”South China Morning Post， January 10， 2018， https：//www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/ article/2127626/china-funding-white-elephant-infrastructure-projects； “Australia Will Compete with China to Save Pacific Sovereignty， Says Bishop，” The Sydney Morning Herald， June 18， 2018， https：//www. smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-will-compete-with-china-to-save-pacific-sovereignty-says-bishop-20180617-p4zm1h.html.

10 “Federal Government Tears Up Victoria’s Belt and Road Agreements with China，” The Guardian， April 22， 2021， https：//www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/apr/21/federal-government-tears-up-victoriasbelt-and-road-agreements-with-china.

11 “The U.S.， Australia and Japan Announce Trilateral Partnership on Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific，” US Embassy & Consulates in Australia， July 30， 2018， https：//au.usembassy.gov/the-u-saustralia-and-japan-announce-trilateral-partnership-on-infrastructure-investment-in-the-indopacific； “Joint Statement of the Governments of Australia， Japan， and the United States of America on the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific，” Prime Minister of Australia， November 17， 2018， https：//www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-governments-australia-japan-and-united-states.

12 Shen Yujia， “Australia’s Attitude towards the Belt and Road Initiative and its Reasons，” p.89.

13 Penny Wong， “Looking Forward -- Looking Back： Australia and the Asian Century，” August 8， 2017， https：//pennywong.com.au/media-hub/speeches/looking-forward-looking-back-australia-and-theasian-century-address-to-the-australia-360-conference-canberra-08-08-2017； “The Hon Chris Bowen MP Address： The Case for Engagement with Asia，” Asia Society， September 29， 2017， https：//asiasociety.org/ australia/leaders-asia-hon-chris-bowen-mp.

14 “Pompeo Warns of ‘Disconnect’ over Victoria’s Belt and Road Deal，” Sky News， May 24， 2020， https：//www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/coronavirus/pomepo-warns-of-disconnect-over-victorias-beltand-road-deal/video/ad17391f19c22f3b6587fe9c872c0892.

15 “China’s Belt and Road Initiative： What Is It and Why Is Victoria under Fire for its Involvement，” The Guardian， May 25， 2020， https：//www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/25/chinas-belt-and-road-initiativewhat-is-it-and-why-is-victoria-under-fire-for-its-involvement.

16 “Coalition to Pursue Power to Block Deals such as Victoria’s Belt and Road Agreement with China，”The Guardian， August 26， 2020， https：//www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/aug/26/coalition-topursue-power-to-block-deals-such-as-victorias-belt-and-road-agreement-with-china.

17 “Shorten Defends Victoria’s Decision to Join Belt and Road Initiative，” Sky News， November 12， 2018， https：//www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/shorten-defends-victorias-decision-to-join-belt-androad-initiative/video/9c439bca784ad3225c31d1564447e549.

18 “‘Sinister Intentions’： China Ups Stakes in Belt and Road Stoush with Dutton Attack，” The Age， May 27， 2020， https：//www.theage.com.au/national/sinister-intentions-china-ups-stakes-in-belt-and-road-stoushwith-dutton-attack-20200527-p54x1d.html.

19 “Andrews Stands by Victoria-China Deal，” The Canberra Times， June 2， 2020， https：//www. canberratimes.com.au/story/6777620/andrews-stands-by-victoria-china-deal.

20 Shen Yujia， “Australia’s Attitude towards the Belt and Road Initiative and its Reasons，” p.94.

21 Concetta Fierravanti-Wells， “The Senate Adjournment COVID-19： China Speech，” https：//www. senatorcfw.com.au/assets/hansard_frag-May-12.pdf.

22 “Liberal Senator Hits Out at University China Reliance， Reveals Whistleblower Documents，” The Sydney Morning Herald， May 13， 2020， https：//www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/liberal-senator-hits-out-atuniversity-china-reliance-reveals-whistleblower-documents-20200513-p54sf9.html.

23 “Still Anti-Asian？ Anti-Chinese？ One Nation Policies on Asian Immigration and Multiculturalism，”Australia Institute Research Report， May 2017， https：//australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ P349-Is-PHON-still-anti-Asian-FINAL.pdf.

24 “‘Steer Clear of China’： Pauline Hanson，” Sky News， May 26， 2020， https：//www.skynews.com.au/ details/_6159172872001.

25 “Clive Palmer Attacks Chinese Government as ‘Mongrels’ Who ‘Shoot Their Own People’，”ABC News， August 19， 2014， https：//www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-19/clive-palmer-attacks-chinesegovernment/5679900； “China’s Economy ‘Would Collapse’ without Australia’s Iron Ore，” Sky News， September 1， 2020， https：//www.skynews.com.au/details/_6186562942001.

26 “Western Australia to Become a Chinese Province，” Mirage News， June 9， 2019， https：//www. miragenews.com/western-australia-to-become-a-chinese-province.

27 “Malcolm Turnbull Declares He Will ‘Stand Up’ for Australia in Response to China’s Criticism，” ABC News， December 9， 2017， https：//www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-09/malcolm-turnbull-says-he-will-standup-for-australia/9243274.

28 “Remarks of Spokesperson of Chinese Embassy in Australia，” Embassy of China in Australia， December 6， 2017， https：//www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceau//eng/gdxw/t1516965.htm； “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Comments on Australian Leader’s Remarks，” Embassy of China in Australia， December 8， 2017， https：//www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceau//eng/gdtp_16/t1518005.htm.

29 “Turnbull Says Shorten Must ‘Boot Dastyari Out’ to Prove He Is ‘on Australia’s Side’，” The Guardian， December 3， 2017， https：//www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/dec/03/turnbull-says-shorten-mustboot-dastyari-to-prove-he-is-on-australias-side.

30 “Sam Dastyari under Renewed Pressure in Parliament as New Chinese Interview Surfaces，” The Sydney Morning Herald， December 4， 2017， https：//www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/sam-dastyari-underrenewed-pressure-in-parliament-as-new-chinese-interview-surfaces-20171204-gzyaag.html.

31 “Beijing Worries a New McCarthyism： Foley，” The West Australian， June 28， 2018， https：//thewest. com.au/politics/beijing-worries-a-new-mccarthyism-foley-ng-s-1872628.

32 Sun Youzhong and Han Feng， eds.， Annual Report on Development of Australia （2017-2018）， Social Sciences Academic Press （China）， 2018， p.154.

33 “Chinese-Australian Billionaire Involved in UN Bribery Case， MP Claims，” The Guardian， May 22， 2018， https：//www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/22/chinese-australian-billionaire-involved-in-unbribery-case-mp-claims.

34 “‘Let Him Stay’： Influential Liberal MP Urges Asylum for Chinese Defector，” The Age， November 23， 2019， https：//www.theage.com.au/national/let-him-stay-influential-liberal-mp-urges-asylum-for-chinesedefector-20191122-p53d6j.html.

35 “Peter Dutton Vows to ‘Call Out’ China over Foreign Interference and Cyber Hacks，” ABC News， October 12， 2019， https：//www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-11/peter-dutton-calls-out-china-foreigninterference-cyber-hacks/11595750.

36 “Australian Liberal MP Gladys Liu’s Links to Secretive United Front Chinese Influence Arm，” ABC News， August 14， 2019， https：//www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-14/liberal-gladys-liu-linked-to-secretivechinese-influence-network/11288210.

37 “Questions Raised about Liberal MP Gladys Liu amid Claims of Links to Chinese Political Influence Operations，” ABC News， September 10， 2019， https：//www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-10/gladys-liuparliament-eligibility-in-question-amid-accusations/11493632.

38 “Labor Targets PM over Gladys Liu’s Alleged Links to Chinese Communist Party，” The Guardian， September 11， 2019， https：//www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/sep/11/gladys-liu-proud-australianquestions-raised-ties-with-china.

39 “Sam Dastyari Says Gladys Liu Should Resign over Alleged China Links，” SBS News， September 9， 2019， https：//www.sbs.com.au/news/sam-dastyari-says-gladys-liu-should-resign-over-alleged-china-links. 40 “China Is ‘Putting its Tentacles’ around the World： Pauline Hanson，” Sky News， December 1， 2020， https：//www.skynews.com.au/details/_6213239005001.

41 See Clive Palmer’s tweet on May 17， 2019， https：//twitter.com/clivefpalmer/status/1129277078354911232.

42 “Tasmanian Greens Leader Doubles Down on Chinese Election ‘Meddling’ as Slurs Hit Candidate，”ABC News， October 15， 2018， https：//www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-15/greens-cassy-oconnor-yongbeitang-row-deepens/10376686.

43 Cassy O’Connor， “Chinese Communist Party - Political Influence in Tasmania，” Tasmanian Greens MPs， September 17， 2020， https：//tasmps.greens.org.au/parliament/chinese-communist-party-political； Cassy O’Connor， “Tasmania Must Resist Influence and Reduce Reliance on China，” June 12， 2020， Tasmanian Greens MPs， https：//tasmps.greens.org.au/opinion/tasmania-must-resist-influence-reduce.