Jin Ling

Since President Joe Biden of the United States took office， restructuring and redirecting the transatlantic relationship has received increasing attention. Unlike his predecessor Donald Trump， who pursued a unilateralist course and maintained a policy of challenging and dividing allies under the rubric of “America First，” Biden loudly proclaims that “America is back，” and promises to embrace multilateralism and rebuild strategic mutual trust with American allies. In particular， the Biden administration hopes to preserve the Western-led liberal international order jointly with Europe by repairing the transatlantic ties. This gives positive signals to the improvement of US-European relations. However， we need to move beyond the policy adjustment made by a new government and focus on the structural elements that determine US-European relations， including the changes in the international power configuration and order， the respective economic and social transitions within the US and Europe， as well as the division and reorganization of each others power， perceptions and interests. The foreign policies and initiatives of the Biden administration will undoubtedly ease many of the tensions between the two sides during the Trump era， and will improve their interaction and coordination on multilateral issues， but it is difficult to totally reverse the trend of their estrangement. In other words， the US-European relations can only be transformed from alliance to partnership through a new round of interactions.

Structural Power Changes Reshaping the US-European Relations

The nature of US-European relations has varied in different historical periods. The two sides were rivals during the early days after the United States independence. They peacefully coexisted with each other in the interval of the two world wars， and became allies during the Cold War.1 The changing relationship resulted from the shifting balance of power， and the convergence or divergence of interests and concepts between the two sides. Based on common interests and identity， the current transatlantic relations represent an alliance constructed by both sides and are geared toward security cooperation in the face of common security threats during the Cold War. The transatlantic relationship and its underlying liberal order have three mainstays： the NATO-centered security pillar， the pillar of international mechanisms and rules based on multilateralism， and an identity pillar based on common interests and values.

As the international landscape evolves and the international order undergoes profound changes， the liberal international order led by Europe and the US has been impacted from within. With the decline of US hegemonic influence and the strengthening of European strategic autonomy， the three mainstays that have sustained the traditional US-European alliance， while still being thought to be resilient， are weakening and undergoing structural adjustment， and this has become a decisive factor driving the transition to a more balanced partnership. After President Biden took office， President of the European Council Charles Michel said， “We have our differences. And they will not magically disappear. America seems to have changed， and how its perceived in Europe and the rest of the world has also changed.”2 Michels remarks precisely expressed a structural change in the US-European relationship. If the disagreements and conflicts between Europe and the US during the late 1990s and the Iraq War were a sign of historic rift in the post-Cold War transatlantic order，3 then the reshaping of relations between the two sides today is a historical continuation of that process and an important inflection point in the transition of transatlantic relations.

Crisis of the liberal world order weakening the institutional basis of transatlantic relations

The post-war liberal international order led by the US and Europe represents primarily a system of international mechanisms and rules defined by the US with the support of its allies. It is the institutional basis for the common interests and identity of the two sides. The liberal international order under US hegemony is marked by trade openness， US commitment to“embedded liberalism” （i.e.， ensuring that economic openness is reconciled with domestic economic stability and policies in pursuit of full employment）， corresponding international multilateral mechanisms， and special relations between so-called Western democracies.4 However， with the reshaping of the international power structure， and the inherent divisions in Western economies and societies， Europe and the US have in different ways chosen to selectively defend the multilateral order， pushing the liberal international order into a deep crisis. Some even concluded that “the liberal order has collapsed.”5

The shifting balance of power and the changing international landscape has shaken the foundation of the US-led liberal international order. US hegemony and the absolute superiority of Western power once laid the foundation for the post-war international order. “Based on their GDP that accounts for 40 percent of the global total， the EU and the US have set 80 percent of the international rules and standards for the global market， forming a de facto G-2 management structure in the international multilateral system.”6 However， as the world moves toward multi-polarity， most dramatically after the global financial crisis in 2008， there has been a major shift of international power as well as an increasingly prominent relative decline of Western countries.

The most important systemic change in the new framework of transatlantic relations is that “the US-Europe alliance is not enough to reshape the world.”7 With the growing share of emerging powers in the global economy， their contribution to the worlds economic growth has become more significant. The United States share of the global economy fell from 40 percent in 1960 to 24 percent in 2019，8 and the share of the Group of Seven （G7） countries in the global economy was less than 40 percent in 2018. In contrast， the share of emerging powers， particularly China， has made a qualitative leap. For example， Chinas GDP share grew from less than two percent in the 1990s to 14.7 percent in 2018.9 As the balance of power shifts， global challenges have also become more multifaceted and the global governance deficit is getting worse. In a 2019 speech to ambassadors， President of France Emmanuel Macron noted， “We were used to an international order that had been based on Western hegemony since the 18th century， but a transformation， a geopolitical and strategic reconfiguration， has been taking place today. We are probably in the process of experiencing the end of Western hegemony over the world. New powers， whose impact we have probably underestimated for far too long， have emerged.”10

When discussing the driving forces of such transformation， the international community has often overlooked the internal weakening of the Western-dominated international order.11 The basis for the domestic legitimacy of the liberal international order is its intrinsic coherence with national security， economic prosperity， and social employment. In 1982， John Ruggie used the concept of “embedded liberalism” to describe a compromise between the state and society on an open international economic policy， in which the state keeps the balance between market and society through effective policies to avoid divergence between the liberal order and the goals of domestic economic security and full employment.12 He once even predicted a crisis in neoliberalism due to the growing imbalance between society and market， stating that globalization is likely to be undone by domestic policy reactions driven by social pressures.13 In recent years， the liberal international order has been losing its basis of domestic legitimacy， marked by growth imbalances， increased political polarization， and the rise of populism， nationalism， extremism， xenophobia and antiglobalization， which have emerged in the process of economic and social transformation in Europe and the United States. According to Macron， the crisis of governance in Western societies shows that “the equilibrium in which individual freedoms， the democratic system and the continued progress of the middle classes formed a kind of tripod， on which we were moving forward thanks to the market economy” has been disrupted and that a new equilibrium is required.14

Moreover， in the face of shifting international power and weakening social foundations of the Western liberal order， Europe and the United States have been selective in their defense of multilateralism， thereby undermining the legitimacy of international mechanisms. The US is inherently skeptical of the “erosion” of its own sovereignty by international organizations and treaties， and holds a transactional stance toward multilateralism. Despite his proclivity for multilateralism， President Barack Obama once said， “The United States will use military force， unilaterally if necessary， when our core interests demand it， when our people are threatened， when our livelihoods are at stake， when the security of our allies is in danger.”15 It has been argued that the unilateralist tendencies of the US under the presidency of Donald Trump and his radical approach of withdrawing from a range of international mechanisms are simply a return to the traditions of American policy. When forced to choose between realist or idealist preferences， the US public has nearly always chosen realpolitik foreign policy preferences such as security and autonomy over that of liberal ones.16

On the other hand， the EU hopes to exert its international influence by upholding multilateralism， but due to multiple internal and external factors， it usually adopts a more flexible and pragmatic stance in order to safeguard its own interests. In fact， since the World Trade Organizations Doha round of negotiations failed and the EU was embarrassed in the Copenhagen climate negotiations， the EU has begun to pursue a more flexible and pragmatic strategy on multilateralism. For example， it builds issue-based coalitions in multilateral affairs， promotes multilateralism through bilateral relations， and sometimes even uses unilateral means to promote a multilateral agenda. It has been argued that “effective multilateralism had more or less disappeared from the radar screen.”17 In recent years， European countries have been using its normative power and market scale to selectively defend multilateralism. For example， the EU issued the General Data Protection Regulation， European countries like France started to charge digital tax， and the EU has been discussing carbon tariffs.

The decline of US global influence undermining the social basis of US-European relations

Traditional transatlantic relations are premised on US hegemony. In Europes view， the decline of US global influence has made it impossible for the US to lead the traditional transatlantic relations. In the past four years， due to political polarization， the rise of populist forces， its continuous withdrawal from international mechanisms and poor response to COVID-19， the United States international influence has been seriously damaged， and Europe is more skeptical about Washingtons capacity and reputation， which has resulted in a change in the nature of transatlantic relations.18 Following the 2020 US election， a poll across 11 European countries conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations showed that two-thirds of the respondents did not disagree with the statement that “Americans cannot be trusted after voting for Trump in 2016” and considered Germany to be the most important country to build a good relationship with. 60 percent of the respondents felt that the US political system was completely or somewhat broken， with support for that opinion in Germany， the United Kingdom and France at 81 percent， 71 percent and 66 percent， respectively. The poll showed a change in threat perceptions in European countries which called into doubt the ability of the US to protect their security， with only 10 percent of the respondents in Germany and France saying they “need a great deal of”US security guarantees.19 Faced with the impasse after the 2020 US election， European leaders said they would continue to face a troubled ally with longterm uncertainty. Trumps rise to power was a symptom， not the cause， of a divided America； and Trumps fall from power still left tens of millions of supporters who arent going anywhere.20

With its declining international influence， the United States foreign policy will be forced to be more responsive to its internal concerns. Discussions about global leadership have been a central part of the US foreign policy debate. In line with the embedded liberalism ideas throughout US history， domestic consensus on its international leadership could only be reached when social development was relatively shared equally by all classes and the middle class believed not only that the United States could afford to assume a significant global leadership role but also that they would benefit from it.21 At present， the United States is racked by division economically， politically and socially， leading to a further sense of insecurity among the middle class. Trumps isolationism under “America First” responds to the needs of conservative forces， and is thus gaining wide support. In the midst of COVID-19， more middle-class American families are disillusioned with globalization and do not want the US to bear the costs of foreign military and diplomatic involvement.22

The outcome of the election may put an end to Trumps antagonistic foreign policy， but it is impossible to fundamentally reverse Americas increasing estrangement from international affairs. Dramatic American reengagement appears unlikely as the publics priorities lie elsewhere.23 Currently， US citizens are more concerned about domestic affairs， especially the economy and healthcare， accounting for 79 percent and 68 percent respectively. Less than 35 percent of voters believe that the US should first work with allies and international institutions to address global challenges， and less than 31 percent say improving relations with allies should be a top foreign policy priority over the next five years.24 US voters want the next US president to focus first on domestic issues—overcoming the pandemic， digging the country out of a deep economic hole， calming racial tensions， and reversing inequality. Therefore，although the Biden administration has announced that “America is back，” it will still face the constraints of domestic conservative forces， and the proposed foreign policy will also serve the domestic middle class.

European strategic autonomy aspirations weakening the basis of mutual interests

In the early stage of integration， the EU has promoted a political and defense community， indicating that strategic autonomy has been a longsuppressed but significant awareness in the European integration process. In the context of a changing global landscape， the EUs awareness of strategic autonomy has been awakened from time to time， but substantial progress has not been achieved due to internal differences and the absence of imminent threats. As the global landscape is undergoing profound changes， the EUs internal political and social crises and the deterioration of US-EU relations during the Trump era have pushed the EU to regard achieving strategic autonomy and maintaining European sovereignty as a new target for strategic transformation. The deep-seated motive of Europes pursuit for strategic autonomy is structural， and its trend is irreversible. Against the background of both internal and external pressures， internally， the EU wants to respond to public demand and signal its ability to protect Europe through reform and solidarity； externally， the EU is seeking autonomy and independence in order to avoid becoming a battlefield for major-power competition and losing its international influence. By emphasizing the coexistence and mutual reinforcement of European sovereignty and the sovereignty of member states， the EU will succeed in deconstructing the “return to sovereignty” demands of Eurosceptic and anti-European populist forces， while constructing and strengthening the EUs ability to act and exert its influence as an independent political actor. This trend will not be changed by the Biden administrations renewed emphasis on transatlantic relations.

In September 2017， Macron proposed the goal of a “sovereign Europe”in his speech at the Sorbonne University. Since then， this concept has become Europes prescription for almost all crises， from economic sovereignty to industrial sovereignty， technological sovereignty， data sovereignty， and even sovereignty within the fields of food and health. Europes demand for sovereignty penetrates the economic， political， and social layers as well as its foreign policies. The EUs sense of sovereignty has been significantly strengthened by new tensions between Europe and the US caused by COVID-19， the intensified competition between China and the US， the EUs rethinking of the security of the global industrial chain， and the wider application of digital technology. Currently， the EU has acted in a series of policies in order to demonstrate its strategic autonomy. For example， it has proposed a tougher defense of its trade， a carbon tax initiative， stricter investment reviews and active industrial policies， and a series of initiatives to regulate large data companies in the digital sector.

The United States is the most important “other，” or external driver， in the EUs accelerated strategic autonomy. Changes in transatlantic relations have reshaped the concept of European strategic autonomy， pushing the discussion beyond security and defense autonomy to broader foreign policy autonomy， and adding the goal of seeking independence from US foreign and security policy. In the face of an increasingly inward-looking and divided United States， Europe recognizes that dependence on the US is no longer politically sustainable.25 The US governments “America First” principle is a driving force for Europe to seek ways to protect its interests and values. The Trump administrations ambiguous stance on NATO， expanded sanctions on Iran， tariff actions against Europe in the trade sector， and the “decoupling strategy” pursued in the US-China competition have accelerated Europes sovereign awakening. During Trumps administration， Europe has made more progress in strategic autonomy than at any time during the post-Cold War period， and some people have chided that Trump “has been the accidental father of European sovereignty.”26

Driven by the concept of strategic autonomy， the EU has consciously maintained its strategic independence from the US for the sake of its own interests， rather than simply following in US footsteps. In response to the US-China competition， French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said，“Europe must invent a third way， based on firm defense of our interests and fundamental principles and openness to multilateral dialogue.”27 German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also said that “We Europeans have to act as a conscious counterweight when the US crosses red lines，”28 and that “Where US government aggressively throws into question our values and interests， we have to react more robustly.”29 Macron signaled more clearly at the 2020 Munich Security Conference the need for Europe to seek independence from the United States. He argued that， due to different geographical conditions， social policies and philosophies between Europe and the US， Europe needs its own policies， not just transatlantic policies.30 Europes strategic autonomy， especially the path of digital sovereignty， has begun to take shape. The trend of regulating giant digital companies， including US companies， has caught on， not only in its strengthening antitrust scrutiny， but also in requiring large digital companies to share their access to data.

Continued Divergence of Interests and Perceptions between the US and Europe

The US-led liberal order is the institutional basis of traditional transatlantic relations， and its core is US-European coordination. Currently， the crisis of order and the estrangement between Europe and the United States interact as both cause and effect. Under this crisis of the liberal order， both Europe and the US have reverted to geopolitical thinking and have upheld the principle of power politics. For the United States， whether it is Trumps transactional“America First” foreign policy or the Biden administrations declaration that“America is back，” major-power competition， the priority of US interests， and a utilitarian approach to multilateral mechanisms will continue to be keywords in US foreign strategy， which is centered on maintaining American hegemony. For Europe， to avoid being marginalized and becoming the battlefield for major-power competition， it has become Europes key demands to seek independence in the competition， pursue a “European way，” defend its own interests and values， and become a geopolitical actor. Under the logic of geopolitics， Europe and the United States are experiencing estrangement from each other in terms of strategy， continuous divergence of interests， and weakening of a common identity.

US-European strategic estrangement under power politics principle

Although the Biden administration has announced its return to leadership on the world stage， and re-engagement with allies in the spirit of multilateralism， it is difficult to carry out its liberal foreign policy agenda given the shift in Americas power position and the domestic political and social divisions， which will be difficult to improve in the short term. In order to maintain US hegemony， the new administrations foreign strategy will not be fundamentally different from the one in the Trump era， but rather will see adjustment only in its approaches and tactics. In terms of major-power relations， it will still hold a zero-sum mindset and regard Russia and China as challenges and threats. In terms of strategic priorities， the eastward strategic pivot under the Obama administration will continue， and the Asia-Pacific region will still be a focus. In terms of multilateralism and relations with allies， although it will not seek isolationism， it will continue to adopt a utilitarian position to exert Americas exclusive influence.

After four years of the Trump administration， European sovereignty has become the new position of the EUs foreign strategy. Unlike the United States， the EU does not aim to maintain hegemonic influence in the international system， but would like to position itself as a major pole in the new world order in which it plays a leading role alongside the US， China and Russia.31 In terms of major-power relations， Europe goes beyond a single perspective of competition and confrontation， and emphasizes cooperation. Due to their geopolitical proximity， the European powers， typically France and Germany， have always emphasized the importance of Russia in building the European security architecture， and have also been trying to balance the pressure from the United States on its energy cooperation with Russia. In terms of China policy， Europe seeks coordination with the US， but opposes Cold War-style “decoupling.” In his Atlantic Council speech， Macron made clear that putting the EU and the US “in a situation to join all together against China” is “a scenario of the highest possible counterproductivity.”32 In terms of strategic priorities， Europe has always prioritized its neighborhood and Africa in the face of disorder in the neighborhood and the impact of incoming refugees and migrants. On multilateral issues， the EU， with its normative influence， wants multilateral mechanisms to serve its goal of “hardening” its soft power and safeguarding its own interests and values.

It is because of their strategic estrangement that the EU took a series of actions to demonstrate its autonomy when the new US administration was about to take office. Despite pressure from the US， it concluded the ChinaEU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and picked up on the euros international status. France and Germany welcomed Bidens proposal at the Munich Security Conference to reinvigorate alliances and fight against the so-called “authoritarian states，” but laid more emphasis on European strategic autonomy and European interests.

Divergence of European and American security interests

Security cooperation is the backbone of transatlantic relations. With the growing separation of their strategic priorities， the security interests of Europe and the United States have also diverged. The disagreements and contradictions in responsibility sharing between Europe and the United States in their security cooperation in the post-Cold War era are the results of their diverging security perceptions and interests. This is witnessed in the crisis in transatlantic relations triggered by the Iraq War， the policy differences and responsibility-sharing disputes in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan， the new division of labor in the Libyan War and the Ukraine crisis， and their conflict on the Iranian nuclear issue.

The change in US geopolitical focus has also led to the declining importance of Europe in its geostrategy. Both political parties in the US want to invest more capabilities and resources in the Indo-Pacific region， and extricate the US from the chaos in the Middle East. They dont want Europes eastern flank and the Balkans to weigh them down. The prevailing view of US realism is that “Leaving European security to the Europeans could increase the potential for trouble there. If a conflict did arise， however， it would not threaten vital US interests. Thus， there is no reason for the United States to spend billions of dollars each year （and pledge its own citizenslives） to prevent one.”33 Furthermore， the United States wants Europe to provide support for its security presence in the Asia-Pacific region. While the US is shifting strategic focus eastward， the security environment around Europe has seriously deteriorated， with traditional security issues intertwined with terrorism， refugee migration crisis and other non-traditional security issues. In the face of multiple crises and chaos， the EU has explicitly made safeguarding its own security and a resilient neighborhood its top priority， and has incorporated it into relevant security strategy documents. Moreover， the EU has been increasing its operational capabilities in the neighborhood and in Africa through permanent structural cooperation mechanisms in defense and security and through the European Intervention Initiative.

The divergence of security interests has reduced the role of NATO in supporting US-European relations.34 Faced with the heterogeneity within NATO and the lack of coordination between Europe and the United States during Trumps term of office， Macron once declared NATO “brain dead.” While the Biden administration stressed the importance of NATO as a security community and promised to fulfill its security responsibilities to Europe after coming to power， Macron reaffirmed Europes strategic autonomy. At the Munich Security Conference， despite Bidens emphasis on major-power competition， Europe focused on epidemic control and security issues on the African continent， which reflected the divergence of European and American security interests.

Rising competition in the economic and trade fields

Jointly maintaining an open world economic system is an important basis of traditional transatlantic relations. Against a backdrop of geopolitical changes and domestic political and social divisions， the economic and trade policies of Europe and the United States have developed， to varying degrees， in a two-pronged manner： an offensive promotion of third-party market opening and a protective “closing” of their own markets. An open trade system is no longer the common interest of Europe and the United States. Instead， they are implementing their own protectionist policies under the goal of “fair trade.” The above trend has led to rising competition and conflict between the two sides both in traditional economic and trade cooperation and in the process of their joint promotion of new industries.

The protectionist trend in Europe and the US will restrain cooperation between the two sides in traditional economic and trade fields. Trade protectionist policies have a broad political consensus and a strong social basis in both Europe and the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified the protectionist trend， with Europe and the US implementing more security-based and politicized economic and trade policies in the name of maintaining security of industrial and supply chains. On the one hand， still influenced by the “America First” philosophy of maintaining US employment and growth， the Biden administration has difficulty in promoting a more liberal trade agenda； on the other hand， the list of strategic industries in Europe is expanding， and the wall of protectionism is being reinforced. Currently， the Biden administration is clearly developing manufacturing into the engine of US prosperity， with an executive order issued on January 25， 2021 emphasizing the “Buy American” provisions， which， based on the purchasing power of the US government， will strengthen domestic manufacturing and develop markets for new technologies. The executive order also stipulated that the government should， whenever possible， purchase goods， products， materials， and services in favor of US business competition in strategic industries， to make American workers thrive.35 In response， Executive Vice President of the European Commission Valdis Dombrovskis expressed clear concern about the need to track the potential impact of the policies on European businesses and determine whether they violate US commitments under the WTO framework.36

The competition between Europe and the US in the field of emerging industries will also be intensified. The EU has deployed green and digital transformation and introduced a new industrial strategy， hoping to gain an advantage in international competition through supportive policy frameworks and rules-making power. Inevitably， the competition and contradiction between the EU and the United States will be intensified in the abovementioned fields， whether due to the national subsidy policy in the “green”transformation， or to the pursuit of control over data information and the use of rule advantages to make up for technological shortcomings in data transformation. In the field of the data industry， the EU excels at rules and the US is strong on technology， which， coupled with their differences in data governance philosophy， has led to their continuous disagreements in the data industry in recent years. The European Commission has launched several lawsuits against US data enterprises on issues such as digital tax， privacy and monopoly. Currently， the EU has introduced legislative proposals for the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act， which primarily regulate the giant US data companies in Europe. The EUs increased support policies for strategic industries， involving competition， subsidies， government procurement and a series of other issues related to fair competition， have triggered different reactions in the United States， and US businesses in Europe are generally concerned about the impact on their local trade and investment. The enhancement of European normative standards in the field of data technology has also been questioned by the United States as a protectionist measure to safeguard the interests of European enterprises.

The weakening of common identity

Despite similar positions on human rights， democracy and rule of law， the different historical experiences have made Europe and the United States differ greatly in their perception of strength and the relationship among individuals， the state and society. The current differences between Europe and the US in economic and social governance models， as well as their contradictions on issues such as the data economy and privacy protection， are the result of their perceptional differences. Macron has publicly stated that the differences in perceptions indicate that Europe and the US have different values， with Europe attaching more importance to social democracy and equality.37 During the Cold War， the differences in values and perceptions between the two sides were subordinated to their common identity of threat， and European identity was subordinated to the US-led Western bloc. However， in the context of the evolving international landscape， the strategic estrangement， interest divergence and cultural differences between the two sides have inevitably caused a continuous weakening of their common identity.

At the end of the Cold War， Europe and the United States expanded their influence in the international community in different ways. The EU has mainly expanded its rules and governance model according to its own power characteristics. The United States， under the influence of hegemonic goals， is not afraid to use force or threaten to use force. In this way， Europe and the US have developed distinctly different identities in the international community. From their disputes in the Iraq War to their tensions during Trumps presidential tenure， the common identity of the two sides in the transatlantic order has been experiencing setbacks， and their common “Western” identity has been further weakened. Whats more， they even become totally opposites from time to time. During the Iraq War， Robert Kagan compared the difference between Europe and the US as “Venus and Mars，” while then US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld saw “Old Europe” as a challenge to US leadership， and commentator Thomas Friedman even stated that France was the enemy of the United States.38 Also， Trump has repeatedly said that Europe is the “foe” of the United States.39

Since the end of the Cold War， Europe has adopted a series of soft balancing approaches to US foreign actions， typically reflected in its insistence on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol， opposition to the Iraq War， and defiance of US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal， all of which have helped shape a different identity for Europe in the international community. In the neorealists view， this is a “soft balancing” of the United States international behavior by Europe as the “other” of the US. The European-American common identity has further weakened during the Trump administration. If the transatlantic relationship was once seen as a national rationale by policy elite， today it is seen as remarkably less important by both Europe and the US.40 The weakening of the transatlantic identity is reflected in the fact that most respondents to a survey of the European public advocate a tougher stance toward the US on trade issues and remain neutral in the US-China competition. Biden made it clear at the Munich Security Conference that the community of liberal democracies is at an “inflection point，” and Macrons arguing that “the United States is now a Pacific power”also reflects the weakening of the European-American identity.41

In the face of the current great-power game， the EU is committed to becoming one of the “poles” in a multi-polar system. Driven by the concept of strategic autonomy， “sovereign Europe” is a declaration of European identity， seeking to achieve a European path in the geopolitical game by means of its own characteristics of international power and its unique policy tools. In its latest strategy paper on strengthening multilateralism， the EU makes clear that it will leverage more effectively its regulatory power and unique single market and social market economy， its position as the worlds first trading superpower and the relevance of the euro， to step up its leadership and make better use of its role as a convener， honest broker and bridge-builder.42

Toward a More Balanced Partnership？

The deep crisis and declining influence of US hegemony， as well as Europes waning trust in the United States and the irreversible trend toward European strategic autonomy， have all served as structural forces that are reshaping USEuropean relations. In a new agenda for transatlantic relations， the EU states that “we should not embark on a nostalgic search for the global order of past decades or the transatlantic partnership of past generations. The US and the EU have changed， as have power dynamics and geopolitical and technological realities.”43 With the combined effect of these structural forces， it will be difficult to return to the old US-European relations， and the transatlantic order will continue the process of reshaping itself， as it has since the end of the Cold War， with bilateral relations shifting from a traditional alliance to a more balanced partnership. Under the partnership， the US-European relations will be weakened as a whole， and the power of the two sides in the structure will be more balanced， with issue-based loose alliances as the main mode of cooperation.

Continuous weakening of US-European relations

The US-European relations in the midst of once-in-a-century global changes is in a critical period of transformation. Despite the Biden administrations emphasis on the strategic value of allies and its commitment to strengthening coordination and cooperation with them， structural forces are far more profound than the impact of an administrations policy adjustments. Charles A. Kupchan， a senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations， thus talked about the transformation of US-European relations in 2008， “The end of the Cold War， the growing maturity of Europe， and their differences in strategic priorities in the Iraq War were structural elements that weakened the transatlantic order. Transatlantic relations have become increasingly loose and it has become more difficult for the two sides to agree in the multilateral arena.”44 The dynamics of US-European relations in the last decade have validated this conclusion， in a way more profoundly than that perceived by Kupchan.Kupchan had hoped to bring bilateral relations back to “normal” by promoting the common goals of democracy and market economy. However， the unity and coordination between Europe and the US is weakening in the face of intertwined interests and value issues， as reflected in the crisis of Western democratic governance and the protectionist posture of both sides.

In recent years， in response to the contradictions in US-European relations， some European scholars have proposed four possible prospects based on the EUs further development： （1） Europe adapts its behavior according to US priorities under US hegemony and achieves a division of labor with the US in the international arena； （2） core members in the EU come in effective cooperation with the US. In both cases， the US-European relations would be strengthened. However， the reality is different， with the US unable to maintain its hegemonic influence and Europe unwilling to follow unconditionally. Despite the difficulty of reaching a consensus within the EU， the core members are still actively promoting strategic autonomy. Other possibilities are （3） the EU， as a force that competes with the US， defends its own interests and values in the international arena； or （4） different members in the fragmented EU present different dynamics in regard to cooperation， competition and conflict with the US.45 In fact， US-European relations are developing in the direction of the latter two cases. The trends of unity and differentiation coexisted in the EUs development process. But neither the pursuit of strategic autonomy， the maintenance of sovereignty， nor the internal differentiation over policy toward the US will strengthen the US-European relations. In the context of the crisis， the EU is more united and independent from the US， and the coordination of European and American foreign and security policies is weakening.46

Europes declining significance in US geostrategy has gone hand in hand with Europes reduced strategic dependence on the United States. Over the past decade， the EUs debate on its international status has shifted from establishing a global liberal order， strengthening transatlantic relations， and preserving effective multilateralism to focusing on European sovereignty， ensuring strategic autonomy， and preserving the European way of life. In its first security strategy report in 2003， the EU defined the United States as Europes strategic dependency for achieving global governance. Currently， although Europe still emphasizes the importance of cooperation with the US， its latest multilateralism strategy， instead of highlighting the particularity of US-European relations， emphasizes coalitions of the willing， issuebased alliances and diversified partnerships， and even indicates the paths and principles of governance that tap into non-traditional forms of alliance cooperation.47 As the strongest link between the two sides， NATO pointed out in its reflection group report that the large number of “internal strains” has weakened the cohesion of the alliance， and recommended the establishment of temporary alliance mechanisms to improve the organizations operational strength.48 In the framework of NATO， the parties have replaced collective security cooperation with coalitions of the willing， highlighting the weakening of US-European alliance in the security field.

More balanced US-European relations

Despite the significant differences between Europe and the US in hard power such as economic and military strength， the EU， as a unique international actor， possesses power advantages different from those of the US， namely， widely recognized normative power and soft power. The different modes of power in Europe and the US have resulted in different dynamics in the international communitys recognition of both. According to a Gallup survey， from 2007 to 2019， global public support for US international leadership fell from 38 percent to 33 percent and disapproval rose from 33 percent to 42 percent， with the fastest decline witnessed in European recognition of US leadership.49 Trumps “America First” transactional foreign policy has seriously damaged US international credibility， which is difficult to recover in the short term. In contrast to the decline of US influence， the EUs unity and autonomy against the backdrop of the crisis， and its defense of multilateralism against US pressure on issues including the WTO reform， climate change and the Iran nuclear deal， have earned it international credibility. The contrast in international influence between the two sides is developing in favor of Europe. The survey also showed that confidence in Germanys global leadership remained stable or higher over the same period， leading the world for three consecutive years.50 European and US respondents had a favorable opinion of the EU even in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.51

Both Europe and the United States want to shape a new， more balanced partnership that reflects their unique roles in a multi-polar world.52 While the US needs Europe to take on more responsibility， especially in the area of security， in line with its own eastward shift of strategic focus， Europe intends to shape a more balanced transatlantic relationship as it clarifies its strategic positioning as a pole in a multi-polar world. In an interview with Le Monde， former US politician Henry Kissinger said that US-European relations must adapt to the environment that is taking shape in the face of the new international situation. If US-European relations are to move in a new direction， the importance of Europe must be redefined in a new， substantial， and an almost solemnly ritualistic way. Against the backdrop of uncertainty of transatlantic relations and the increase of bilateral conflicts， Europe， no matter how much it wishes to preserve Western principles and solidarity， needs a transatlantic relationship that actively seeks balance and symmetry. Europes new agenda for transatlantic relations makes clear its claim to a balanced transatlantic relationship， believing that this is beneficial not only to Europe itself， but also to the transatlantic partnership and the multilateral system. In response to cooperation under the NATO framework， Macron advocates the strengthening of NATOs political attributes， with a basic demand of obtaining a more equal status with the United States， rather than submitting blindly to US dominance in decision-making.53 President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen also said that NATO is not only about burden sharing， but also about upholding fairness in transatlantic relations and also making decisions together，54 which again calls for equality between Europe and the United States.

The nature of the EUs power dictates that the multilateral arena is an important platform for it to balance US actions. Although Biden proposed a return to multilateralism， due to restraints from domestic political and social divisions， he needs the support of allies more than ever. This makes the strategic position of Europe even more important. The Biden administrations policy shift toward Europe has increased the possibility for European initiative. In the past four years， whether it is WTO reform， climate change， or global health governance cooperation， the EU has gained certain first-mover advantages， which can better showcase its international leadership. In the case of climate change， for example， the EU has more consensus at political and social levels. After overcoming internal disputes and reaching consensus on increasing emissions reduction targets， establishing a recovery fund， and including a green dimension in future long-term budgets， the EUs leadership has shown more certainty and is more sustainable. Unlike the European consensus， the United States is highly polarized both at elite and societal levels， and the lack of domestic consensus makes its global leadership much less credible.

Pragmatic partnership under issue-based alliances

The Biden administration has increased the call for cooperation between Europe and the United States in the areas of democracy and human rights，and both sides still have a social foundation in terms of value identification. However， under the impact of realpolitik demands and domestic economic and social contradictions， the trend toward pragmatism in both Europe and the US foreign policies remains unchanged. In areas where the interests of both sides seriously diverge， policy coordination between the two sides cannot be guaranteed by so-called common values， but will be based on specific issues， showing a degree of pragmatic adjustment.

In the face of US decoupling strategy and its policy of building exclusive alliances， Europe has clearly made a pragmatic policy choice by hedging risks and making commitment to building a more diversified and inclusive partnership. Europe lays emphasis on the multilateral governance principles of coalitions of the willing， issue-based alliances and diversified partnerships， and the United States is only a member of its partnership network. Europes strategic choice of pluralistic partnership is reflected in Macrons demand for“result-oriented multilateralism” in EU-US cooperation， which emphasizes open multilateralism.

Europe is wary of the so-called “Alliance of Democracies，” fearing that cooperation between the two sides will be used as a mere instrument by the US and ultimately serve US objectives in its major-power competition，55 and that US strategy will lead the world back to two hostile camps， with the “Alliance of Democracies” becoming “an alliance for the US” instead of “an alliance with the US，” and the interests of the alliance will be subordinated to those of the United States.56 This explains the significant differences in their strategies toward China.

Conclusion

The transformation of US-European relations is an important part of the changes unseen in a century. Whether or not the transatlantic order can transform to a more balanced and equal partnership will have a globally structural impact. Although the transatlantic order has shown a weakening trend and the relationship is moving toward balance and pragmatism against the background of strategic estrangement， interest divergence and weakened identity between Europe and the United States， the transformation of transatlantic relations is destined to be a long-term process. Europes security dependence on the US， the deep integration in economy， trade and investment of the two sides， and their consensus on democracy and human rights issues act as key structural forces that determine the intensity and depth of the transformation. This also explains why Europe has made the preservation of sovereignty a new position in its external strategy， but an internal battle between strategic autonomy and Atlanticism still remains.

In terms of its impact on the world landscape， the EUs search for a more balanced transatlantic relationship through strategic autonomy has exerted a unique influence in the international arena， and has positive significance for the maintenance of a just and equitable multilateral system and the construction of a global partnership network. In the context of interdependence and multi-faceted challenges of globalization， Europes pursuit of openness， inclusiveness， cooperation and result-oriented multilateralism can， to a certain extent， exert a “soft balancing” on US isolationism or its attempt to form exclusive alliances， thus helping ease confrontation and promote world cooperation.

China is a significant force on the international stage and a key third party in the transformation of transatlantic relations. Therefore， Chinas diplomatic response is of global strategic significance and influence. Chinas declaration of fostering a new type of international relations and building a community with a shared future for mankind， as well as the pluralistic， inclusive and open cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative， will contribute to the transformation of transatlantic relations on an equal footing and the inclusiveness and justice of the international system and order.

1 Charles A. Kupchan， “The Atlantic Order in Transition： The Nature of Change in US-European Relations，” in J. Anderson et al. （eds.）， The End of the West？ Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order， Cornell University Press， 2008， p.112.

2？Alexandra？Brzozowski，？“EU？Calls？on？Biden？to？Form？‘New？Transatlantic？Pact，”？January？20，？2021，？www. euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-calls-on-biden-to-form-new-transatlantic-pact.

3 Charles A. Kupchan， “The Atlantic Order in Transition： The Nature of Change in US–European Relations，” p.113.

4 John Ikenberry， “The End of Liberal International Order，” International Affairs， Vol.94， Issue 1， January 2018， pp.14-16.

5 Tom Mctague， “Remember the 90s， Dont Long for a Return，” April 19， 2020， https：//www.theatlantic. com/international/archive/2020/08/brexit-trump-china-90s-golden-era/615406.

6 Zhou Hong， European Union as a Power， Social Sciences Academic Press， December 2008， p.5.

7 Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev， “The Crisis of American Power： How Europeans See Bidens America，” January 19， 2021， https：//ecfr.eu/publication/the-crisis-of-american-power-how-europeans-seebidens-america.

8 Govind Bhutada， “Visualizing the U.S. Share of the Global Economy Over Time，” January 14， 2021， https：//www.visualcapitalist.com/u-s-share-of-global-economy-over-time.

9 “Percent of World GDP in Asia，” https：//www.theglobaleconomy.com.

10 “Ambassadors Conference–Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron， President of the Republic，” August 27， 2019， https：//lv.ambafrance.org/Ambassadors-conference-Speech-by-M-Emmanuel-Macron-President-ofthe-Republic.

11 John Ikenberry， “The End of Liberal International Order，” pp.14-16.

12 Rawi Abdelal and John G. Ruggie， “The Principles of Embedded Liberalism： Social Legitimacy and Global Capitalism，” New Perspectives on Regulation， Cambridge， MA： Tobin Project， 2009， pp.151-162.

13 Ibid.

14 “Ambassadors Conference–Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron， President of the Republic，” August 27， 2019.

15 Pat Paterson， “Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy，” February 2018， https：//www.williamjperrycenter.org/ sites/default/files/publication_associated_files/Origins%20of%20US%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf， p.27.

16 Ibid.

17 Sven Biscop， “The EU and Multilateralism in an Age of Great Powers，” July 2， 2018， http：//www. egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2018/07/The-EU-and-Mulitlateralism-in-an-age-of-great-powers-Sven_ Biscop.pdf.

18 Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev， “The Crisis of American Power： How Europeans See Bidens America.”

19 Ibid.

20 David Herszenhorn， “Dismay and Denunciations in Europe as Washington Descends into Chaos，”January 7， 2021， https：//www.politico.eu/article/dismay-and-denunciations-in-europe-as-washingtondescends-into-chaos-donald-trump.

21 Salman Ahmed and Rozlyn Engel， “Making US Foreign Policy Work Better for the Middle Class，”September 23， 2020， https：//carnegieendowment.org/files/USFP_FinalReport_final1.pdf.

22 Rozlyn Engel， “A U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class，” September 9， 2020， https：// carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/09/u.s.-foreign-policy-for-middle-class-pub-82504.

23 Bruce Stokes， “US Electorate Shows Distrust of the Realities of Foreign Policy，” September 4， 2020， https：//www.chathamhouse.org/2020/09/us-electorate-shows-distrust-realities-foreign-policy.

24 Ibid.

25 Jeremy Shapiro， “How European Sovereignty Can Survive Joe Biden，” December 3， 2020， https：// www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/opinion/how-european-sovereignty-can-survive-joe-biden.

26 Julien Barnes-Dacey et al.， “A New Transatlantic Bargain： An Action Plan for Transformation， Not Restoration，” November 26， 2020， https：//ecfr.eu/publication/a-new-transatlantic-bargain-an-action-planfor-transformation-not-restoration.

27 “Pompeo Talks to EU Foreign Ministers as Rifts Fester，” Euractive， June 15， 2020， https：//www. euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/pompeo-talks-to-eu-foreign-ministers-as-rifts-fester.

28 Moritz Luetgerath， “Why the Vision of European Strategic Autonomy Remains a Mirage，” March 30， 2019， https：//www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/why-the-vision-of-european-strategic-autonomy-remainsa-mirage.

29 Sven Biscop， “The EU and Multilateralism in an Age of Great Powers.”

30 “Munich Security Conference： Frances Macron Envisions New Era of European Strength，” DW News， February 15， 2020， https：//www.dw.com/en/munich-security-conference-frances-macron-envisions-newera-of-european-strength/a-52389586.

31 European Parliament， “Draft Report on the Foreign Policy Consequences of the COVID-19 Outbreak，”September 2， 2020， https：//www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFET-PR-653845_EN.pdf.

32 Katherine Walla， “Emmanuel Macrons Plan to Rebuild US-Europe Relations，” February 5， 2021， https：//www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/emmanuel-macrons-plan-to-rebuild-us-europerelations.

33 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt， “The Case for Offshore Balancing： A Superior US Grand Strategy，” Foreign Affairs， July/August 2016， quote from Jolyon Howorth， “Strategic Autonomy and EUNATO Cooperation： Threat or Opportunity for Transatlantic Defence Relations？” Journal of European Integration， 40：5， pp.523-537.

34 Ville Sinkkonen et al.， “President Joe Biden and the Restoration of US Global Leadership： Turning the Tide？” December 2， 2020， https：//www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/bp297_biden-administrationand-global-leadership.pdf.

35 The White House， “Executive Order on Ensuring the Future Is Made in All of America by All of Americas Workers，” January 25， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidentialactions/2021/01/25/executive-order-on-ensuring-the-future-is-made-in-all-of-america-by-all-of-americasworkers/.

36？“EU？Trade？Chief？Warns？Biden？over？‘Buy？American？Push，”？Politico， February 18， 2021， https：//www. politico.eu/article/joe-biden-valdis-dombrovskis-eu-trade-chief-warns-over-buy-american-push.

37 Joseph de Weck， “Macrons European Identity Politics，” November 26， 2020， https：//ip-quarterly.com/ en/macrons-european-identity-politics.

38 Charles A. Kupchan， “The Atlantic Order in Transition： The Nature of Change in US–European Relations，” p.115.

39 “Trump： EU Is One of United States Biggest Foes，” Politico， July 15， 2018， https：//www.politico.eu/ article/donald-trump-putin-russia-europe-one-of-united-states-biggest-foes.

40 Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev， “The Crisis of American Power： How Europeans see Bidens America.”

41 Munich Security Brief， “Beyond Westlessness，” February 19， 2021， https：//securityconference.org/ assets/02_Dokumente/01_Publikationen/Munich_Security_Brief_Beyond_Westlessness_MSC_Special_ Edition_2021_210224.pdf.

42 “EU Strategy on Strengthening the EUs Contribution to Rules Based Multilateralism，” EEAS， February17， 2021， https：//eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/en_strategy_on_strengthening_the_eus_contribution_to_ rules-based_multilateralism.pdf.

43 European Commission， “Joint Communication： A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change，” December 2， 2020， https：//ec.europa.eu/info/files/joint-communication-new-eu-us-agenda-global-change_en.

44 Charles A. Kupchan， “The Atlantic Order in Transition： The Nature of Change in US–European Relations.”

45 Marianne Riddervold and Akasemi Newsome， “Transatlantic Relations in Times of Uncertainty： Crises and EU-US Relations，” Journal of European Integration， p.509.

46 Ibid.， p.515.

47 “EU Strategy on Strengthening the EUs Contribution to Rules Based Multilateralism，” EEAS， February 17， 2021， https：//eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/en_strategy_on_strengthening_the_eus_contribution_to_ rules-based_multilateralism.pdf.

48 “NATO 2030： United for a New Era，” Brussels， November 25， 2020， https：//www.nato.int/nato_static_ fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.

49 Alexandra Brzozowski， “EU Scores High Approval Ratings， Despite Pandemic，” November 18， 2020， https：//www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/eu-scores-high-approval-ratings-despite-pandemic.

50 Anthony Cordesman， “Making America Great？ Global Perceptions of China， Russia， and the United States： The International Scorecard，” January 7， 2021， https：//www.csis.org/analysis/making-america-greatglobal-perceptions-china-russia-and-united-states-international.

51 Laura Silver et al.， “Majorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc，” November 17， 2020， https：//www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/11/17/majorities-in-the-european-union-havefavorable-views-of-the-bloc.

52 Jolyon Howorth， “Europe and Biden： Towards a New Transatlantic Pact，” January 2021， https：//www. martenscentre.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CES_POLICY-BRIEF_Biden-V3.pdf.

53 David E. Sanger， Steven Erlanger and Roger Cohen， “Biden Tells Allies ‘America Is Back， but Macron and Merkel Push Back，” The New York Times， February 19， 2021， https：//www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/us/ politics/biden-munich-conference.html.

54 Judy Dempsey， “American Value and European Values，” https：//carnegieeurope.eu/ strategiceurope/78375.

55 Laura von Daniels et al.， “A New Beginning with President Biden，” December 2020， https：//www.swpberlin.org/10.18449/2020C61.

56 Sven Biscop， “An Alliance of Democracies： with the US or for the US？” July 28， 2020， https：//www. egmontinstitute.be/an-alliance-of-democracies-with-the-us-or-for-the-us-2.