亞當(dāng)·明特 李婧萍

Getting married isn’t cheap in China. In Da’anliu， a small farming village outside Beijing， the local “bride price”—the fee that a groom’s family pays to a bride’s in advance of their nuptials—recently breached the $30，000 mark. That’s extreme for a village where incomes average $2，900 per year. So， this summer， local officials decreed that bride prices and associated wedding expenses shouldn’t exceed $2，900.

Out-of-control bride prices play to official and popular Chinese anxieties over the country’s plummeting1 marriage and birth rates. Nowhere are those fears stronger than in China’s countryside， home to millions of involuntary bachelors， often known as “bare branches.” High bride prices， and the women who command them， are an easy target to blame for this supposed marriage crisis.

The truth is more complex. Bride prices have existed in China as long as marriage has. Traditionally， more affluent families granted large sums as a mark of prestige; the money was often returned to the groom’s family， or to the married couple in the form of material items for the new household. For lower-income families， especially in rural areas， the bride price served as compensation for a wife’s future service to her husband’s family and wasn’t returned in any meaningful form. Because real value was being exchanged， rural bride prices were typically higher.

Rural Chinese were complaining about bride-price inflation as far back as the 1980s. In 2013， China Vanke Co. Ltd.， a major Chinese real estate developer， and SINA Corp.， developer of the Sina Weibo social network， created a national map of bride prices that quickly went viral online.

These days， news stories， blogs and social media posts about bride prices， the lengths that families go to pay them， and the broken engagements， family tensions and financial crises that sometimes follow， are staples of China’s internet. Bride prices in the hundreds of thousands of dollars are not uncommon and—among the rich—they can reach even higher.

Yet， just as in the past， the most expensive bride prices on average continue to be charged in China’s less-affluent areas. Several factors are to blame. First， decades of coercive2 family-planning policies and centuries of traditional preferences for male children have skewed China’s gender balance. In China’s countryside， so-called “bachelor villages” are reportedly home to 150 boys for every 100 girls. Theoretically， at least， these shortages drive up the value of single women.

At the same time， economic reforms that began in the 1970s allowed millions of women to migrate for work to China’s booming coastal factories. Some even chose to migrate for marriage， usually to wealthier regions with better economic prospects and hard-to-obtain residence permits entitling their families to better schools and other urban services.

This social mobility came at an inopportune time for rural families. The dismantling of China’s social safety net began in the 1980s and left much of China’s rural population without livable3 pensions. In one sense， that was no big change. Traditional Chinese norms hold that a son should remain a member of his parents’ household and contribute to its upkeep. When he marries， his wife transfers her labor to the household.

That’s less of a problem in a society made up of big families. In a country where one-child population controls have shrunk family sizes， though， that traditional mindset has driven up bride prices as daughters are viewed， in essence， as pensions.

The price controls imposed in Da’anliu won’t have any influence on these entrenched social forces. Instead， they’ll likely drive bride-price transactions underground—and possibly to new heights.

For Da’anliu and other Chinese towns worried about how to address declining marriage rates， the better option is to address the underlying issues driving up costs. A good start would be a law that ensures a woman’s claim on marital property in the case of a divorce. Current Chinese law makes no such provision， and thus provides a strong disincentive4 to marry and a very powerful incentive to charge higher bride prices.

Next， China needs to reform its archaic household registration system so that rational economic incentives—not benefits obtained from marriage—promote social mobility. Finally， a concerted nationwide effort to close the wide gap between China’s rural and urban schools would help encourage more women to stay closer to home. If China wants to lower the cost of rural marriages， it needs to make more of them possible first.

在中國(guó)結(jié)婚并不便宜。在北京城外以農(nóng)耕為主的小村莊大安六村，當(dāng)?shù)氐摹安识Y”——新郎家在舉辦婚禮前給新娘家的一筆錢(qián)——最近突破了3萬(wàn)美元大關(guān)。對(duì)于年均收入2900美元的農(nóng)村家庭來(lái)說(shuō)，這筆費(fèi)用過(guò)于高昂。因此，今年夏天村政府規(guī)定彩禮和相關(guān)的婚禮費(fèi)用不應(yīng)超過(guò)2900美元。

失控的彩禮一定程度上反映了中國(guó)政府和民眾對(duì)結(jié)婚率和出生率大幅下降的憂(yōu)慮。這種憂(yōu)慮在中國(guó)農(nóng)村最強(qiáng)烈，那里有數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的男性無(wú)奈地淪為單身漢，俗稱(chēng)“光棍”。高額的彩禮以及伸手要彩禮的女性，很容易就被當(dāng)成這場(chǎng)所謂的婚配危機(jī)的罪魁禍?zhǔn)住?/p>

然而實(shí)情更加復(fù)雜。在中國(guó)，彩禮是伴隨著婚姻制度一同誕生的。傳統(tǒng)上，較富裕的家庭會(huì)出很多錢(qián)以彰顯派頭;這些錢(qián)通常以給新居添置實(shí)物的形式返還給新郎的家人或新婚夫婦。對(duì)于低收入家庭，特別是在農(nóng)村，聘禮被當(dāng)作新娘日后侍奉丈夫家庭的補(bǔ)償，不會(huì)有任何實(shí)質(zhì)性的退還。由于存在真正的價(jià)值交換，農(nóng)村的彩禮通常更多。

早在1980年代，中國(guó)農(nóng)村地區(qū)就有人抱怨彩禮禮金增長(zhǎng)太甚。到2013年，中國(guó)大型房地產(chǎn)開(kāi)發(fā)商萬(wàn)科股份有限公司和新浪微博社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)的開(kāi)發(fā)商新浪公司共同繪制了一張全國(guó)彩禮地圖，該地圖很快傳遍網(wǎng)絡(luò)。

如今，關(guān)于彩禮禮金、給付彩禮的周折以及有時(shí)隨之而來(lái)的悔婚、家庭關(guān)系緊張和財(cái)政危機(jī)等話(huà)題的新聞報(bào)道、博客和帖子在網(wǎng)上層出不窮。數(shù)十萬(wàn)美元的彩禮并不罕見(jiàn)，富人結(jié)婚時(shí)禮金還會(huì)更高。

然而，和以前一樣，往往不太富裕的地區(qū)彩禮禮金最高，歸咎于以下幾個(gè)因素：首先，數(shù)十年的強(qiáng)制性計(jì)劃生育政策和千百年來(lái)的重男輕女傳統(tǒng)日漸扭曲了中國(guó)的性別平衡。據(jù)報(bào)道，在中國(guó)農(nóng)村，所謂的“光棍村”里，男孩總數(shù)是女孩的1.5倍。至少在理論上這種短缺會(huì)抬高未婚女性的身價(jià)。

與此同時(shí)，從1970年代開(kāi)始的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革使數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的婦女得以到中國(guó)繁榮的沿海工廠務(wù)工。有些女性甚至選擇去異地結(jié)婚，通常是沖著在經(jīng)濟(jì)前景更好的富裕地區(qū)獲得來(lái)之不易的居留許可，使其子女享受更好的教育和其他城市服務(wù)。

這種社會(huì)流動(dòng)性對(duì)農(nóng)村家庭來(lái)說(shuō)不合時(shí)宜。中國(guó)原有的社會(huì)保障體系消解于1980年代，導(dǎo)致中國(guó)大部分農(nóng)村人口沒(méi)有足夠的養(yǎng)老金。從某種意義上說(shuō)，這不是什么大變化。中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)觀念認(rèn)為，兒子結(jié)婚后仍是父母家庭的一員，應(yīng)該贍養(yǎng)老人。兒子娶妻后，妻子也成為男方家庭的勞力。

在由大家庭組成的社會(huì)中，這不成問(wèn)題。然而在這個(gè)曾實(shí)行計(jì)劃生育的國(guó)家，家庭規(guī)模已經(jīng)縮小，這種養(yǎng)兒防老的傳統(tǒng)觀念抬高了彩禮禮金，因?yàn)榕畠罕举|(zhì)上等同于養(yǎng)老金。

大安六村限制彩禮的一紙村規(guī)不會(huì)對(duì)這些根深蒂固的社會(huì)因素產(chǎn)生任何影響。相反，彩禮可能被迫轉(zhuǎn)為地下交易——還可能抬高價(jià)碼。

對(duì)于大安六村和其他中國(guó)城鎮(zhèn)結(jié)婚率下降的問(wèn)題，最好從致使彩禮金額上漲的根本原因入手解決問(wèn)題。最好從立法入手，立法明確保障離婚時(shí)女性對(duì)婚內(nèi)財(cái)產(chǎn)的分配權(quán)益。中國(guó)現(xiàn)行的法律在這方面不夠完善，因而大大遏制了人們結(jié)婚的意愿，又使索取更高額彩禮的風(fēng)氣愈演愈烈。

另一個(gè)辦法是，中國(guó)需要改革其戶(hù)籍制度，以便用理性經(jīng)濟(jì)激勵(lì)的方式——而不是以通過(guò)結(jié)婚謀利的方式驅(qū)使人口流動(dòng)。最后，全國(guó)范圍內(nèi)采取措施縮小中國(guó)農(nóng)村和城市學(xué)校教育的巨大差距，這將有助于鼓勵(lì)更多農(nóng)村女性留在家鄉(xiāng)。如果中國(guó)想降低農(nóng)村結(jié)婚成本，就應(yīng)該先讓鄉(xiāng)村婚姻成為可能。? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?□